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| Figure 1. Reference: Report of the Committee on Ballistic Acoustics, Page 107 |
BB&N studied the frequency compression caused by the Dictaphone and measured an error of 5 percent. Their measurements agree closely with spectral analysis of the segment containing the pulse patterns attributed to the third shot. The Bowels tape of the Dictabelt is the source of this segment.
The spectrographically measured 57.3 Hz for the power line frequency yields a compression ratio of 0. 955.
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| Figure 2. Spectral Analysis of the Channel-I pulse patterns attributed to the third shot |
The Ramsey Panel used a phonograph to play the Audograph disk of Channel-II. This method eliminated repeats and skips but introduced a varying frequency scale. A spectral analysis of the concluding words of Decker's "hold everything secure" broadcast and an unmistakeable power line hum show no error in composite playback/recording speeds of the Audograph and phonograph disk. Apparently they targeted the Decker broadcast and adjusted playback rate of the phonograph to produce a 60-Hz hum.
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| Figure 3. Spectral Analysis of the hum following the concluding words of the "hold everything secure" message |
Since tape recorders operate with near clock like precision, the Dictaphone bears sole responsibility for altering frequencies. So taping a playback of the historic Dictabelt compressed frequencies by a factor of 0.955. Playing the tape had negligible effect. However, if they recorded a new dictabelt from the compressed tape then the net compression during playback would be 0.955 multiplied by 0.955. This product is 0.91205 and falls exactly within the range of reported compressions to maximize matching.
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