Our
president’s apocalyptic brand of spreading freedom and democracy throughout
the galaxy, though said to rely on confidential tips from God, has so far
been less than spectacularly successful. Moslem rage has been whipped up by
our armed intervention; Iraq is becoming a training camp for terrorists;
global public opinion condemns American unilateralism, human-rights
violations, and environmental irresponsibility; the economy staggers from a
combination of high military spending and taxes favoring the rich. But for
such redeeming features as arms exports—which indisputably promote peace
and understanding—we would be in truly sad shape.
It is as if the world
was almost deliberately goaded into turning against the US. An important
piece of that strategy has been our relations with Russia. When Gorbachov
introduced his policy of glasnost and reconciliation, America simply took
advantage of it, announcing that, Reagan having defeated the evil empire,
socialism was now dead forever. The lack of any generous response from the
West led to a reappraisal in Russia and ultimately helped the rise of Putin,
who openly regrets the fall of the Soviet Union. With Washington imposing
its hegemony and spending nearly as much on its military as the rest of the
world put together, Russia is desperately trying to hang on to its former
sphere of influence.
The present US
administration is in fact resurrecting the cold war. Bush’s participation at
the EU summit in Vienna was originally planned to be followed by a trip to
the Ukraine, an important bone of contention between Washington and Moscow.
When developments there prohibited a visit to Kiev, Budapest was put on the
itinerary instead. Thus Bush’s travel to Europe gained a symbolic
significance as a strengthening of ties between Washington and the successor
states to erstwhile Austria-Hungary, the one-time Habsburg dominion and
bulwark of the West against the Eastern menace. As well, it was to be a
reminder of the postwar period when a string of ancient European states had
come under Soviet domination. Added to its topicality was the upcoming
fiftieth anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian uprising, the commemoration of a
small freedom-loving nation’s heroic attempt to shake off the yoke of
foreign oppression.
Pressure by Washington
may have played a significant role in Moscow’s choice not to oppose with
force the aspirations to independence of its Central and East European
satellites in 1989-90, and at one level this helps maintain a special
relationship between America and “New Europe” to this day. But when Bush
spoke of the 1956 uprising, in Hungary he reawakened painful memories. For
at that date all the oft-repeated pledges of the Eisenhower administration
about liberation from Soviet tyranny, which came in handy as a campaign
platform, proved to be empty rhetoric.
Worse yet, according to
the testimony of many listeners, Radio Free Europe—which had a large
audience in Hungary and benefited from immense prestige, being given credit
as the voice of a true democracy as opposed to the bogus people’s
democracies of the Soviet Bloc—instigated the freedom fighters to carry on
with armed resistance, even promising that aid was forthcoming. It is said
that among other things the Munich headquarters of RFE broadcast
instructions on making Molotov cocktails. But the gravest charge was that by
its inflammatory language RFE contributed to Khrushchev’s conclusion that
the situation would spin out of control unless the revolt was quelled by
Soviet troops. It should be pointed out that at the time RFE, though funded
by Congress, made a show of relying heavily on private donations. It was not
revealed until many years later that RFE received its funding from Congress
through the CIA, which oversaw its news broadcasts.
For our generation of
native East Central Europeans, who had to suffer successively under German
Nazi and Stalinist Soviet occupations, the United States represented a
shining beacon, an inspiring model of Karl Popper’s open society. Though we
may have had reservations about the “mass culture,” immaturity, and a
penchant for oversimplification characteristic of the US, some of these
flaws themselves seemed to stem from a certain transparency and candidness
in the American character. In this writer’s personal experience, the
intrusiveness and deviousness permeating day-to-day life in this country was
a disillusioning surprise. When it turned out for instance that the school
where he was teaching had a secret monitoring device through the public
address system, his initial reaction was disbelief.
Yet on the whole
all-pervading institutionalized governmental spying is a comparatively
recent phenomenon over here. In the first instance, the Goebbels propaganda
machine and the hidden atrocities committed by the Third Reich provided a
justification, if not a pretext, for it, and in 1947 the notoriously
secretive modus operandi of Stalinist Russia served to validate the founding
of the CIA as an inevitable accompaniment of the cold war. But the very
theory of the open society in the contemporary sense was formulated to
emphasize the crucial difference between the totalitarian state and liberal
democracy, and the contention that in order to defend ourselves from
reptilian ways we must become like snakes is thoroughly fallacious.
By the 1950s the media
were manipulated by the CIA on a scale whose scope very few realized even in
this country. In Hungary, RFE broadcasts were profoundly trusted. Their
presentation had the semblance of being evenhanded because it often allowed
for a variety of opinions and dissenting voices, while Soviet-controlled
news was crudely biased and often palpably false. In some cases, the
American tactic proved all the more insidiously misleading.
In 2006, Bush & Co
landed in Budapest in force, equipped with a security apparatus that
elicited widespread sardonic comments. Bush’s fleet of bulletproof armored
limousines flown in beforehand; streets closed off to traffic and blocked by
streetcars; members of the Hungarian cabinet screened for explosives, etc.
The like of it had not been witnessed since Stalinist times if then. The
public could see for themselves what the open society of the US had come to:
an obsessive preoccupation with security, a passion for prying, a total
disregard for privacy to defend the population from a threat exaggerated out
of proportion.
Praising the 1956 revolt
was one thing; to draw a parallel between the aspiration of Hungarians for
freedom at that time and the situation in Iraq today as Bush did in his
major speech on scenic Gellért hill was a different matter. Numerous
commentators, including the noted philosopher Gáspár Miklós Tamás, thought
the comparison invidious, pointing out that the Hungarians in 56 fought
foreign occupation, whereas in Iraq the United States is the occupying
power. The reception of the trip by the media of the entire geographic
region was distinctly unenthusiastic, not to say skeptical. The event
brought out no cheering crowds, and the fact that it generated sizeable
protests in Vienna and Budapest was not substantially offset by the reserved
politeness of the hosts. It certainly cannot be chalked up as a smashing hit
for the Bush White House.
L.S.