Introduction                      

 

                 The purpose of this book is to help us think biblically about who God is. More specifically, we hope to address some of the conundrums that arise when we attempt to think about God's character in light of the fact that he has created, and has covenanted to redeem a people. Our focus, therefore, will be on the character of God, first of all, then we will focus on that character, given creation. In order properly to understand this relationship, it is necessary, in the first place, to understand who God is, quite apart from his creation. As we will see, to begin with God-in-relationship (with creation) is to begin in the wrong place. We must first understand who the Triune God is before we can begin to grasp who he is as he relates himself to creation. Thus, God...With Us will explore God's revelation in order, first, to affirm his character as independent, as God, then we will begin to see how this independent God condescends to relate himself to his creation, as God...With Us.

                 So, this is not, in the first place, a book on the "doctrine of God" (what is sometimes referred to as "theology proper").[1] Much that will be discussed in this book will have to be assumed, therefore, and not debated in these pages. Those debates are ongoing and important, and the lack of discussion with respect to them should not be understood as a lack of concern.

                 On the other hand, given certain biblical and historical truths with respect to the character, attributes, and properties of God, it is incumbent on the church to think about such things carefully, in order more adequately to worship him.[2] The primary purpose of this book, therefore, is that the church might more biblically "think God's thoughts after him," i.e., that we might understand better just who God is, what he has told us about himself, and how best to think about him. In that sense, the doctrine of God, or theology proper, will be the subject of every page.

                 As we will see, there is an inextricable link between the doctrine of God - his attributes and properties - and the biblical understanding of who Christ is. This should not be surprising. If it is the case that we know who God is by virtue of his revelation to us, the quintessential knowledge of God will naturally come by way of the quintessential revelation of God, which is given to the world in Jesus Christ. It would not be an overstatement to say that the way to a proper understanding of God and his attributes is, first of all, given in a proper understanding of the Son of God, come in the flesh, in Jesus Christ.[3]

                 If we begin to think in this way - that the Person of Christ gives us a proper way to think about who God is and how he relates himself to his creation - then we are more adequately equipped, not only to think about God according to his own revelation, but to meet some of the challenges that have arisen, historically and of late, with respect to God's character and attributes.

                 To mention just one example of those challenges, Clark Pinnock, commenting on the classical view of an immutable and impassible God, notes the following: "For most of us today, however, this immobility of God is by no means attractiveÉ I admit that modern culture has influenced me in this matter. The new emphasis upon human freedom requires that I think of God as self-limited in relation to the world."[4] This notion of God, sometimes called "open theism" (in that God is thought to be "open to," and not in control of, the future), has gained a hearing and is even argued to be within the confines of evangelical thought. John Sanders, commenting on this view, emphasizes the newness of open theism, "[M]odern theology has witnessed a remarkable reexamination of the nature and attributes of God."[5] This reexamination, for open theists, includes the denial of virtually all of the classic, essential attributes of God.

                 In his helpful and poignant critique of open theism, John Frame gives a nice summary of some of the primary assertions argued by open theists, assertions which require them to reject classical Christian theism:

1. Love is God's most important quality.

2. Love is not only care and commitment, but also being sensitive and responsive.

3. Creatures exert an influence on God.

4. God's will is not the ultimate explanation of everything. History is the combined result of what God and his creatures decide to do.

5. God does not know everything timelessly, but learns from events as they take place.

6. So God is dependent on the world in some ways.

7. Human beings are free in the libertarian sense.[6]

                 As we will see later on, some of these tenets have a place in our overall understanding of who God is. But unless the "place" that they have is clearly and biblically set forth, these tenets can serve to override and undermine the foundational and necessary aspects of God's essential character, as given to us in Scripture. Once that happens, any relationship with a biblical understanding of God, and with historic Christian theism, is lost. One holding an "open" view of God, as summarized above, is not within the pale of Christian orthodoxy and should not assume to be; intellectual honesty demands otherwise.

                 This "remarkable reexamination," as we will see, is not altogether new (there's nothing new under the sun). It recapitulates much that has already been discussed and debated in the history of Christian thought. It is, however, destructive of any biblical notion of God. It undermines a proper understanding of his character (thus, of worship) and seeks to lessen, even eclipse, his glory, while it raises high the glory and excellencies of sinful, finite humanity.

                 This should not be surprising, though it is tragic. It is the temptation par excellence for man to see himself as more exalted, or at least to desire such a thing, all the while seeking to place God on a par with his human creatures. The temptation, "You will be like God," was the undoing of humanity, and its infection continues to spread through human hearts in the course of history.

                 We hope to avoid that temptation in this book. Assumed throughout will be the bedrock truth of God's absolute independence. There is no point at which God's essential character intersects with ours. He is God, and we are not. He is God and there is no other. His ways are not our ways and his thoughts are not our thoughts (Is. 55:9). His judgments are unsearchable and his ways inscrutable. No one has known the mind of the Lord, and no one has become his counselor. He is no man's debtor (Rom. 11:33-35).

                 He does, however, condescend to us. In that free act of his mercy, he takes on characteristics that determine just how he will interact with us, and with creation generally. It will be useful for us to think carefully about those characteristics and attributes, in order to see God in all of his resplendent glory, and in light of his covenant faithfulness to all of creation.

 

A. About the Attributes

                 There will be in this book, therefore, a particular focus on God's character, attributes and properties. But, even so, the focus will not be in a delineation and determination of all or most of the attributes of God as historically understood. As noted above, there are excellent resources available for such things. The focus, rather, will be on just how best to think of God's attributes, given that he is God, in the first place, and that, as God, he has determined to relate himself to creation, and to be "with us."

                 The first thing that is necessary to grasp about the attributes, properties or perfections (using these words as synonyms) of God, therefore, is that a basic distinction must be maintained between God as he is and exists in himself, on the one hand, and God as he condescends, on the other hand. The theological (i.e., biblical) reason for this distinction is that it is obvious that, before there was anything created,[7] there was, and has always been, God. That is, God himself is not essentially subject to time; he does not, according to his essential character, live, move and have his being in a temporal context. He has no beginning and will have no end. Not only so, but before there was anything created, there was only God. It is not as though there existed things - ideas, concepts, properties, etc. - alongside of God prior to creation.[8] Prior to creation, there was nothing but God. To put it more starkly, before God created, there was not even nothing; there was God and only God.[9] The language of the Westminster Confession of Faith, chapter 7, "On God's Covenant With Man," section 1, is quite helpful in this regard:

The distance between God and the creature is so great, that although reasonable creatures do owe obedience unto Him as their Creator, yet they could never have any fruition of Him as their blessedness and reward, but by some voluntary condescension on God's part, which he has been pleased to express by way of covenant.

                 The Confession, in this first section, is affirming a good bit in one paragraph. First of all, we should note, the "distance" which is affirmed here is not a spatial distance. There is no hint in Scripture, or historically, that God is absent, or spatially distant, from any part of his creation. The distance spoken of here is a distance of being; it is a distance that is determined by who God is as God, and who we, as his creatures are, as creatures. That is, there is a vast, even infinite, difference, thus a "distance," between God and everything else that exists.

                 That distance, the Confession notes, was so great, that we, as God's human ("reasonable") creatures, could not even render the obedience due him, nor could we enjoy him as our Creator, unless, as Creator, he determined to be known and to be in a relationship with us. He did so determine, and that determination is helpfully set out in this section as "voluntary condescension." We will elaborate more on this as we go along, but we should note here and affirm that any relationship that we have to God, and that he has to us, we have only because he freely ("voluntary") chose to come down ("condescension") to us, and thus to establish a relationship with us. It is only by virtue of God's activity, therefore, and his initiation, that we are able to be in a relationship with him.[10]

                 This understanding of God is, sadly, foreign to many who propose to discuss God's character. Philosophy of religion, for example, in the main, because of its anti-revelational bias with respect to matters philosophical, seems to be significantly wide of the mark when it comes to its understanding of who God is and of how he relates to his creation.[11] Virtually any article or book on the topic will conclude with some god who is (at best) far inferior to the Triune God of Christian theism. The best one can hope for in current discussions concerning the character of God in philosophy of religion is a conclusion that will steer us toward a kind of Super-Man rather than the Triune God.  How should we begin to address this predicament?[12]

                 It should be said at the outset that, contrary to much confused language in some of the literature about whether or not one can know God's essence, orthodox theology has consistently held that God's essence could indeed be known as it is revealed to us, but it (he) could not be known per se, that is, as it is known by God himself. Hence, Muller:

As Turretin indicates, the way in which God is what he is in the simplicity of the divine essence cannot be known by the human mind, granting that the human mind knows things only by composition and composite attribution - nonetheless, we are given to know the divine attributes or essential properties by revelation and rational reflection on revelation in such a way that God's nature is truly known by means of the revealed attributes.[13]

                 Two historical points bolster our discussions here. First, the history of Christian thought is replete with discussions of the essential attributes, or the essence, of the Triune God. Second, as Muller notes, though some might want to see Calvin's own approach as decidedly anti-essentialist, Calvin "belongs as much to the theological tradition, with its interest in the divine essence and in its understanding of Scripture as containing references to the divine being, as any of the later Reformed writers..."[14]  What Calvin rightly opposed was not essentialist language, but abstract speculation with respect to the character of God.

                 How then do we construe God`s essential attributes? One way, though admittedly not the only (or even perhaps the best) way, would be to take those attributes that are associated with God as God, i.e., those attributes that God has, quite apart from creation — attributes, we could say, that are related strictly to God, and affirm them to be of the essence of who he is. In other words, given that God is essentially a se (i.e., independent), we could begin to posit attributes or properties that are entailed by his essential independence, which would themselves, therefore, also be attributes that define who God, as God, is.

                 For example, is it the case that God is essentially infinite? If we affirm that God is essentially a perfect being (that is, one who lacks nothing), if we affirm his character as a se, then it cannot be the case that he is in any way essentially limited by anything outside of himself, since to be limited would, by definition, be a lack; it would be a constraint placed on God by something else, be it space, or time, or human choices,[15] or... We can affirm, then, that God is essentially infinite. Entailed in his independence and his perfection is infinity itself.

                 On the other hand, is the property 'Creator' of the essence of God? One way to answer that question is to ask if it was necessary for God to create. Did God create the universe because he had to?  Or, to put it another way, is it possible that God not create anything? The orthodox answer to this question is, of course, that there was nothing in God, no necessity, that motivated him to create. He created by a free choice of his will. To answer otherwise would mean that God had to create the world, in which case the creation of the world would itself be a necessary property of God's.  But then God would have a necessary property that (1) was not entailed by his independence (since the necessity of God`s creative activity would entail a dependence on something outside of and besides God) and (2) implied some kind of lack in God (since the necessity of something outside of God, i.e., creation, would mean that God was in need of it in order to be who he essentially is). So 'being Creator' is not an essential property that God has.

                 It would seem, then, that God has essential properties, and others that are not essential to him. How should we delineate between these two? What is it that helps us to see God's essential properties as essential, and what is it that helps us to see God's other properties as non-essential? This will be a matter taken up in chapters below.

                 But so far we have simply delineated the mode of God's properties - God's essential attributes will certainly include any properties that are entailed by his aseity, his independence. But how are we to think of this aseity? Is it a biblical notion, or do we simply posit it because it suits our discussion?

                 We will argue that it is the divine name of God that gives us a way into his essential attributes,  and any attribute that would be entailed by God`s absolute essential independence would necessarily be included in God's essential attributes. This, we should note, is nothing new:

The divine names present a biblical point of entry into the rather abstruse and necessarily metaphysical discussion of the essence and attributes - indeed, as far as the Protestant orthodox were concerned, the names of God, the biblical identifiers of who and what God is, provided the natural point of contact between the biblical language of God and a more strictly philosophical discussion.[16]

                 It is not possible for us comprehensively to understand just what kind of being God is in himself.  If we try to conjure up in our minds just what eternity - with its lack of time - might be, and just how someone can actually be, and be without beginning or end, we soon reach our cognitive limits. We can affirm it, but we cannot conceive it. The best our minds can do is to try to project present existence backwards until it can no longer be "seen" by our mind's eye. But surely God's eternity is of an entirely different character. Given that it is God's eternity, it just simply is his existence; unlike time, it is not a context in which he exists, surrounding and engulfing him as time does creation. Rather, it just is him. Words cannot adequately express what exactly this is. More on this later.

                 Not only so, but God, since God is essentially infinite, he is without boundaries - temporal or spatial. He is not "contained" by a context of space which surrounds him. Rather, his existence just is. It is not an existence here or there; it is simply existence.[17]

                 Not only is he "simply existence," traditional Christian theism has always held that God is "simple existence." "Simple" here means, not the opposite of complex (what can be more complex than God?), but rather it affirms that God is not composed of any parts external to himself. Thus, any distinctions that we make with respect to God must themselves be identical to him. One way to illustrate this is by way of our understanding of God as Triune. By "Triune," we mean that God is one in three. He is one identical essence and he is also three Persons. But this does not in any way mean that God is composed of three parts - Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Rather, it means that the three Persons of the Trinity are each one and all together identical to God. They are, as the history of the church has taught us to say, one in essence, three in persons. So, we make distinctions - between Father, Son and Holy Spirit - and the distinctions do actually tell us that the Father is not the Son is not the Spirit is not the Father. But those distinctions are in no way "parts" of God. They are one and the same God.

                 So also, though not in an identical way, are the attributes of God. They are distinctions that we make with respect to God's character. But these distinctions with respect to who God is essentially are themselves not parts of God - parts which come together to "compose" who he is. Rather, they just are God. Thus, when we say God is eternal we do not mean that God partakes of that which is eternal and external to his existence. What we mean is that the eternity of God is itself God. To think otherwise is to make God dependent on something else - in this case eternity - in order to be who he is essentially.

                 And this brings us to an affirmation that should be seen to be foundational to everything else that we say about God, i.e. the aseity of God. This aseity, or independence, of God must be seen to be foundational because, in order to think and speak rightly about God, we cannot suppose at any point that God is essentially dependent. According to Herman Bavinck,

Now when God ascribes this aseity to himself in Scripture, he makes himself known as absolute being, as the one who is in an absolute sense. By this perfection he is at once essentially and absolutely distinct from all creatures. Creatures, after all, do not derive their existence from themselves but from others and so have nothing from themselves; both in their origin and hence in their further development and life, they are absolutely dependent. But as is evident from the word "aseity," God is exclusively from himself, not in the sense of being self-caused but being from eternity to eternity who he is, being not becoming. God is absolute being, the fullness of being, and therefore also eternally and absolutely independent in his existence, in his perfections in all his works, the first and the last, the sole cause and final goal of all things. In this aseity of God, conceived not only as having being from himself but also as the fullness of being, all the other perfections are included. They are given with the aseity itself and are the rich and multifaceted development of it.[18]

The aseity of God, therefore, must be the place on which we stand in order to assert anything else about him, given that anything else we say about him depends for its proper understanding and meaning on that aseity. Or, to put it a bit more succinctly, unless God is a se (of himself), he is not God, and no characterization of God that excludes aseity can be true of him. Any theology that denies or otherwise negates this aseity cannot be sustained as a true, biblical doctrine of God.[19] A god who is not a se, and thus who is essentially dependent, is a god who is unable to be god. In order for God to be who he is, he must be, and remain, essentially independent.[20]

 

B. Hermeneutics and Theology (Proper)

                 Before moving to some of our more specific concerns, it is necessary for us, in the interest of full disclosure, to sketch at least some of the main interpretive principles that will be assumed throughout our study. These principles are particularly important and relevant when it is "theology proper," or a biblical doctrine of God that is in view.[21]

                 Perhaps one way to emphasize our (Reformed or Calvinistic) hermeneutic with respect to a biblical understanding of God's character is by way of contrast. Note, just to use one example, the way in which one current author seeks to deal with the character of God, given his own particular hermeneutic.[22] First, the passage:

When they came to the place of which God had told him, Abraham built the altar there and laid the wood in order and bound Isaac his son and laid him on the altar, on top of the wood. Then Abraham reached out his hand and took the knife to slaughter his son. But the angel of the LORD called to him from heaven and said, "Abraham, Abraham!" And he said, "Here am I." He said, "Do not lay your hand on the boy or do anything to him, for now I know that you fear God, seeing you have not withheld your son, your only son, from me." (Gen 22:9-12, my emphasis).

                 In the book, Inspiration and Incarnation, the author offers a hermeneutic that provides for the hegemony of the human in Scripture.[23] The main point of the book is that, given the humanness of the Bible, there are many and sundry passages that simply do not make coherent sense, and cannot be brought together to affirm a coherent doctrine.[24] This hermeneutic is extended, in one section, to aspects of the biblical doctrine of God.

                 Under the section,"Does God Change His Mind?," in the chapter, "The Old Testament and Theological Diversity," the author, we should note, does indeed want to affirm a distinction between Creator and creature. The affirmation is given that God "is supreme over his creation" and that he "does not need creation in any way to be complete." The author goes on to affirm that "God is in control" and that "no one can stop what he determines to do."[25] These affirmations are correct, as far as they go. What is most troublesome in this section is the material that follows. Given that material, the best one is left with is that the Bible is confused in its descriptions and ascriptions of God. A couple of examples from the book should suffice to show this.

                 In this section, a discussion of Genesis 22 ensues (Abraham's near-sacrifice of Isaac). In commenting on Gen. 22:12 ("Now I know that you fear God..."), the author says:

It is clear that the purpose of the test was not to prove anything to Abraham but to God. For God to say "Now I know" makes sense in this story only if the test was a real test; if something was at stake. ...In this story, God did not know until after the test was passed.[26]

                 Without elaborating on various ways one might understand this passage, the obvious question, given the above, is just how the God of this story is related to the God who is supreme and self-complete. The answer the author gives is simply that we cannot "allow either of these dimensions" of God's character "to override the other."[27] This answer is, at best, confused, and should be seen as a direct result of the hermeneutic offered in the book (including a confused Incarnational analogy). Not only so, but the indictment is given in this section of the book that to try to reconcile different descriptions of God given in Scripture is somehow to go beyond the Bible, to be interested in a God behind the scenes.[28] This, too, is a result of the hermeneutic method espoused, in which any attempt at bringing together passages that appear to be inconsistent is illegitimate, in that it does not do full justice to the "humanity" of Scripture.

                 To use another example, the author provides some commentary on Genesis 6:5-8:[29]

The LORD saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every intention of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually. And the LORD was sorry that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him to his heart. So the LORD said, ÒI will blot out man whom I have created from the face of the land, man and animals and creeping things and birds of the heavens, for I am sorry that I have made them.Ó But Noah found favor in the eyes of the LORD. (Gen 6:5-8).

In this passage, the author notes,

The scene is straightforward: (1) God creates everything good; (2) wickedness and evil enter; (3) God reacts by intending to wipe out everything he made. Of course, it is possible to say that God already anticipated step 3 in step 1, that is, he knew what was going to happen, and so step 2 does not take him by surprise. That may be so, but that is only a guess that goes far beyond what we read. The story is told in such a way that steps 2 and 3 have an unexpected quality to them. Any attempt to force the God of Genesis 6 into a mold cast by certain theological commitments or to reconcile this description to other biblical passages simply amounts to reading past this story. I take it as a fundamental truth, however, that God did not put this story here so we could read past it.[30]

                 There are many questions that should be addressed in this regard. All of them cannot be pursued here. Is it really the case that the church is supposed to read these passages as self-contained revelations of God, without access to any other characteristic or attribute of God at all? Is the proper method of interpretation simply to read the story on its own, to bracket it off as an independent piece of revelation, in order to understand better who God is? Such a suggestion can only misunderstand who God is and what his revelation is meant to communicate.

                 Specifically, on what basis can the claim be supported that God's omniscience is "only a guess?" If the answer is that it is a reference to the story line within Genesis itself, then the assumption is that the knowledge of God that those reading the story possess is gained exclusively and only from that story.                   This answer is confused, at best, for at least two reasons. (1) It presumes that those reading the story have only that story in which to glean their knowledge of God. It would seem, however, that they have, at minimum, the fact of God as Creator in view as well, given the Genesis story up to chapter 6. And the truth of God as Creator cannot be divorced from the notion of God as sovereign and independent of his creation. (2) It assumes that no knowledge of God is present universally and clearly by virtue of God's natural revelation, such that his "invisible attributes, that is, his eternal power and divine nature" (Rom. 1:20) have not been clearly seen since creation (though Paul affirms that they have been). That is, "the story" comes to those who, by virtue of being created in God's image, already know him. There is not, nor can there be, any reading of any biblical passage from any other standpoint than the true and accurate knowledge of God given in and through creation. Here we need to see and affirm that no one comes to any passage of Scripture neutrally, or de novo, with respect to who God is.

                 Secondly, and specifically, just who is the "God of Genesis 6"? The clear answer seems to be that he is the God of the story, and that to import anything into the God of the story that is not given in the story is to misunderstand, not just the story, but who God is (or who the God of the story is). In other words, it is a "fundamental truth...that God did not put this story here so we could read past it."

                 This hermeneutic method begs a number of questions. Is it the case that an affirmation of God as the sovereign, independent Creator of all, and who himself is grieved by the sin of creation, is "reading past" the story? Is it really "reading past" the story to understand who God is, from Genesis 1 to 6, attempting to see the character of God in all of his majestic glory, rather than simply a God who grieves? Can this hermeneutic method possibly help evangelicals, or anyone else, in their attempt to know God better?[31] Hasn't  this hermeneutic, in its concern to highlight the humanity of Scripture, rendered a consistent knowledge of God impossible?

                 We should not miss, however, the clear intent of this section of Inspiration and Incarnation. The intent, stated more than once, just is that the story, to be understood properly, must be "taken alone." What is taught by this author in this portion of the book is that it is just those who do not take the story "alone" who themselves "read past" the story and thus misconstrue its meaning. If the story is not taken alone, the clear accusation is given, then the concern is for a God behind the scenes, rather than for the God of the story.

                 More generally, and related to the specific concerns noted above, just why is it the case that "Any attempt to force the God of Genesis 6 into a mold cast by certain theological commitments or to reconcile this description to other biblical passages simply amounts to reading past this story"?  Presumably because any notion of systematizing with respect to who God is, as revealed in Scripture, is secondary, at best, and an outright foreign imposition on Scripture, at worst.

                 While not wanting in any way to undermine the importance of textual exegesis, it should be noted here that the conclusions reached concerning this passage in Genesis 6 are given as a result of the hermeneutic, together with a (reassessed) doctrine of Scripture, proposed in this book. The clear obstacle to this hermeneutic method proposed comes from those who would force the God of a certain text into a coherent or systematic teaching, a teaching that attempts to reconcile biblical texts which speak of God with other texts that speak of him.

                 This methodology seems to be in direct conflict with an understanding of Scripture that affirms one divine author (and therefore one truth), and with a hermeneutic that, for the sake of knowing God and his gospel better, seeks to bring the entire relevant teaching of Scripture to bear on a particular passage.[32] This is the reason, it seems, that the author can state, quite erroneously, that whether or not prayer has "some effect on God" is "for God to know, not us."[33] Even though the book states that there is a "ring of truth" to the notion of prayer's effect on God, this statement, no matter the context or point being made, betrays a basic confusion with respect to knowledge of God and of his Word, rather than a proper hermeneutic. Pursuing this hermeneutic will, if consistently applied, end up denying the fundamental doctrines of the Christian faith.

                 Not only so, but it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that those who are involved in working out (as Westminster Confession of Faith, 1.5 states) "the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is, to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation," are, in fact, if this hermeneutic is applied, involved in the obscuring of the various texts of Scripture.

                 The author, to his credit, does attempt to bring his method into some conformity with a traditional understanding of God:

I am not trying to drive a wedge between the Bible and God. Actually, and somewhat ironically, this is what I see others doing. I feel bound to talk about God in the way(s) the Bible does, even if I am not comfortable with it. The Bible really does have authority if we let it speak, and not when we -- intentionally or unintentionally -- suspend what the Bible says about God in some places while we work out our speculations about what God is "really" like, perhaps by accenting other portions of the Bible that are more amenable to our thinking. God gave us the Bible so we could read it, not so we can ferret our way behind it to see how things really are.[34]

                 It seems clear from this statement, that those who, in their exegetical work, ascertain the unity of Scriptural teaching on God, or who bring the Bible's teaching to bear on a text (1) are denying the authority of Scripture by not letting God speak (2) suspend what the Bible says about God in some places (3) work out speculations about what God is "really" like and (4) accent portions of the Bible that are more amenable to our thinking. This, however, seems to be, by and large, a false problem' it is a caricature both of evangelical theology and (especially) of Reformed theology. It cannot be shown, in either case and in the main, that "speculations" about God have superseded what passages of Scripture say about him.

                 It seems impossible to avoid the conclusion, given the above, that there is a great chasm fixed, impossible to bridge, between the hermeneutic espoused in Incarnation and Inspiration and a biblical doctrine of God. It should be noted as well that this hermeneutic method is destructive of the Bible's organic unity. As John Murray put it:

The Bible is an organism; its unity is organic.  It is not a compilation of isolated and unrelated divine oracles. Our knowledge of the Bible, if it is to be really adequate, must be knowledge of the Bible as it is, and must reflect this organic character, not knowledge of the piecemeal or block variety but knowledge of the vital organic unity that belongs to the Bible. We must understand that the whole Bible stands together and that the fibers of organic connection run through the whole Bible connecting one part with every other part and every one truth with every other truth.[35]

Not only so, but this kind of hermeneutic is detrimental to the basic tenets of a Reformed, Calvinistic hermeneutic. So, says Silva,

To put it in the most shocking way possible: my theological system should tell me how to exegete.[36]

And further,

Indeed, the most serious argument against the view that exegesis should be done independently of systematic theology is that such a view is hopelessly na•ve. ...[E]xegetes who convince themselves that, through pure philological and historical techniques, they can understand the Bible directly - that is, without the mediation of prior exegetical, theological, and philosophical commitments - are less likely to perceive the real character of exegetical difficulties.[37]

The stark conclusion to this discussion is difficult to avoid. According to this book, a hermeneutic method that attempts consistency and unity will inevitably be one that skews the meaning of the various, diverse texts of Scripture. If this is the case, multiple problems persist. For example, practically speaking, students who are trained under this method cannot, as pastors, confidently stand in their pulpits and expound the truth of a given text in any coherent and consistent way, week after week. The truth one week will be countered the next week.

                 Not only so, there is no hope for those whose theological commitments influence their exegesis. To put the matter squarely within a Reformed context, anyone allowing the "system of doctrine" taught in the Westminster Standards to influence their reading of particular texts of Scripture will inevitably misread, and therefore, misunderstand any given passage. And that, because they have failed adequately to grasp what seems to be the hegemonic, universal and all-pervasive application of the messiness of Scripture's humanity as it is offered in Inspiration and Incarnation.[38]

                 On the other hand, the hermeneutical parameters marked out by Silva, along with the organic view of Scripture delineated by Murray (a view which Scripture itself demands), provide the ground on which the unity-in-diversity of Scripture can be faithfully articulated, and thus the ground on which the God of Scripture may be rightly and obediently understood. In other words, if we combine the assessments above (of Silva and Murray), we end up with a Reformed hermeneutic that follows the truth of the Westminster Confession of Faith, 1.9: "The infallible rule of interpretation of Scripture is the Scripture itself: and therefore, when there is a question about the true and full sense of any Scripture (which is not manifold, but one), it must be searched and known by other places that speak more clearly."

                

(1)  The Proper and Protestant Principle

                 What basic hermeneutic principle, therefore, should we assume as we begin to think carefully about the attributes of God? It may help to note the principle in play, with respect to the doctrine of God, in the seventeenth century:

Here, admittedly, the orthodox line of thought is guided not by a totally open or unbiased exegesis of texts, but by an ontological conception of the immutability of God: this guiding conception in turn leads to an interpretation of Scripture that gives priority to those texts stressing the unchangeability of God over those texts which indicate change, priority to those texts which stress GodÕs otherness over those which indicate emotion, passion, or other kinship with humanity. But this is not a case of rationalism or metaphysical speculation overruling revelation: instead it is an example of one of the many instances in which theology must make a choice concerning its view of God, deciding which aspects of the scriptural view are governing concepts, anthropomorphisms or transcendence, the ÒrepentanceÓ of God or the divine constancy. And, in this case in particular, the Reformed orthodox stand not only in line of the more philosophical arguments typical of scholastic theology but, together with the older scholasticism, in the line of the churchÕs exegetical tradition - and indeed, in accord with the doctrinal statements and with the exegesis of the Reformers.[39]

Here Muller notes a basic hermeneutical principle. Contrary to what we have just noted, there must be, given Scripture's unity, a priority given to our interpretive endeavors with respect to the various texts of Scripture.[40] Muller denominates that priority as "ontological." What he means by that is that any and all texts of Scripture (and here we will confine our concerns to texts that deal with the character of God) that seek to tell us something of God's character must be prioritized on the basis of the fundamental aseity of God.

                 The reasons for this prioritization will be explored as we move along, but we should notice the initial motivation behind this method. To put it negatively, the motivation behind this method is not in order to impose an extra-biblical conception of God on the text so that it will say what we, in our preconceived assumptions, want it to say. That is, Muller is not saying, nor is it the case, that the Reformed exegetes in the seventeenth century came to Scripture with their own preconceived idea about what God should be like (ideas gleaned from culture or philosophy or...) and then proceeded to prioritize the various texts of Scripture based on those ideas.

                 The point he is making is deeper, and more radically biblical, than that. This "ontological conception" with which the Reformed approached Scripture was a conception that was itself based on the teaching of Holy Scripture. Perhaps it will help to think of it this way. There is, embedded in the human constitution by virtue of our being created in the image of God, an inherent understanding that God is and must be independent.[41] This can be seen most simply when we consider that creation itself is not eternal, and that, prior to creation, God existed. His existence, therefore, does not in any way depend on the existence of creation. By "ontological conception," therefore, Muller is pointing to the fact of God's existence as God, apart from and prior to creation.

                 It is that existence, that "ontological conception," that must define, direct and guide all other texts of Scripture that point us to the character of God. The natural and obvious question to ask when confronted with such texts (texts, for example, as noted above, wherein God says, "Now I know...," or, "the LORD was sorry...) is just how we should relate those texts to the fact that the LORD himself is not dependent on creation in order to be who he is. These questions have been asked, in various ways, throughout the history of the church, and have been answered in different ways. We will look at some of those ways in later chapters. The point to be made here, however, is that it is right and proper to broach those questions at every turn. We should want to know precisely and clearly, as much as it lies within us, just how it is that one who is altogether independent of his creation can, at the same time, "not know" or "be sorry."

                 But it is not only the image of God, entailing as it does a true knowledge of God, that causes us to ask such questions. As we noted above, it is also the fact that in our reading of Scripture we rightly, carefully and routinely seek to bring what we read and know of Scripture to every other text, or set of texts, that we read. That is, to put it in Silva's words, "my theological system tells me how to exegete" various other texts with which I am confronted. Given that my theological system may be errant, even as my system guides my exegesis, it is also the case that my exegesis may adjust my theological system.[42] But it is decidedly not the case that we come to the text of Scripture "on our own," independently of a prior knowledge of its teachings, and then seek to build up as we move along. Rather, we come with that knowledge of Scripture, applying it to specific passages, and changing it as those passages inform our system. Neither is it the case that we simply take a text as a self-contained "story," as Inspiration and Incarnation seeks to do, because we will inevitably conclude with a confused and truncated view of God's character.[43] Instead, as Muller notes, the "ontological conception," that is, an understanding of God as God, must be our guiding principle as we attempt to understand, as much as possible, the Bible's teaching on God's character.

                 To put the matter differently, the way in which we read and interpret Scripture is that we let the clearer passages interpret the less clear. Given our concern over the attributes and character of God, the clearer passages are those passages in which God reveals to us his independent character. Passages, for example, in which God is revealed as the "I Am," in which he is declared to be from everlasting to everlasting, intuitively resonate with us, given that we, as his image, know his "eternal power and divine nature." Those passages are clearer because they articulate the "divine nature" of God; they tell us something of who he essentially is.

                 Passages that speak of God being sorry, or ignorant of historical events or of our own commitment to him, automatically demand questions. They cry out for resolution, because we know enough about God's "God-ness" (θειότης-Rom. 1:20) to know that he cannot be both independent and dependent in the same way. Yet there are passages that clearly note some level of dependence. Minimally, for example, if God swears by an oath to be faithful to his promises (Heb. 6:13), such an action depends on creation, and God's working out of his plan in creation. More pointedly, if God is truly sorry that he created man, then that which takes place in creation, namely, in this case, the extent of sin in the world, moves God to regret  something he has done. We rightly question just how such regret coheres with God's independence.

                 And now we come to the focus of our study. How do we, biblically, organize our thinking about God and his character, given the reality (1) of his independence and (2) of those texts in Scripture which indicate his dependence on creation? Before we move more directly to begin to respond to that question, perhaps a brief introduction to responses given will provide a helpful backdrop to what is to come.

                

C. The Specific Concern

For though God is said to change His determinations (so that in a tropical sense [tropica[44]] the Holy Scripture says even that God repented), this is said with reference to manÕs expectation, or the order of natural causes, and not with reference to that which the Almighty had foreknown that He would do.[45]

                 As we have said, the more specific concern that will occupy our time throughout this study has to do with the relationship of God's attributes, as related only to him, in the first place, and, secondly, as related to his creation.

                 The notion of some kind of lack in God, of God changing, or of God relenting or being sorry, is rightly confusing on the face of it. As we noted above, it is confusing because basic to a biblical understanding of God is that he is independent. He existed prior to creation; his existence did not and does not lack anything. He did not create out of necessity. He did not need us for fellowship, in that, as Triune, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit had complete and perfect fellowship with each other, as one God.

                 But the Bible clearly uses such language about God. As we have already seen, there are texts in Scripture that speak of God being sorry, of his discovering, or, knowing something that he might not have known previously. Scripture tells us that God becomes angry, that he has compassion, that he loves and hates. Because of these texts, and given our basic human tendency to exalt man at the expense of God, much of what goes under the name of "theology" or "theism" has been quick to place all or most of the emphasis on God's interaction with the world, to the exclusion, or near exclusion, of God's independence.

                 To use just a few of the more prominent examples, we can begin with those whose affirmation of the absolute independence of God is unquestionable.

                 In his commentary on Genesis 6:6 ("And the LORD was sorry that he had made man on the earth..."), Calvin says:

The repentance which is here ascribed to God does not properly belong to him, but has reference to our understanding of him. For since we cannot comprehend him as he is, it is necessary that, for our sakes he should, in a certain sense, transform himself. That repentance cannot take place in God, easily appears from this single considerations that nothing happens which is by him unexpected or unforeseen. The same reasoning, and remark, applies to what follows, that God was affected with grief.  Certainly God is not sorrowful or sad; but remains forever like himself in his celestial and happy repose: yet, because it could not otherwise be known how great is GodÕs hatred and detestation of sin, therefore the Spirit accommodates himself to our capacity. ...This figure, which represents God as transferring to himself what is peculiar to human nature, is called ἁνθρο¹ο¹άθεια.[46]

This is standard fare in Reformed thinking. Henry Ainsworth, on the same passage, notes,

The scripture giveth to God, joy, grief, anger, &c. not as any passions or contrary affections, for he is most simple and unchangeable, James 1:17, but by a kind of proportion, because he doth of his immutable nature and will, such things as men do with their passions and changes of affections.[47]

Again, Calvin in his Institutes writes,

Although he is beyond all disturbance of mind, yet he testifies that he is angry toward sinners. Therefore whenever we hear that God is angered, we ought not to imagine any emotion in him, but rather to consider that this expression has been taken from our own human experience; because God, whenever he is exercising judgment, exhibits the appearance of one kindled and angered.[48]

                 We will return to these analyses later on. It might be useful here, however, to note how one Calvin interpreter (commenting specifically on Calvin's comments on 2 Cor. 5:19) understands Calvin with respect God's disposition in the transition from wrath to grace in history:

So the truth about atonement, about reconciliation to God, has to be represented to us as if it implied a change in God, and so an inconsistency, an apparent contradiction, in his actions towards us. But in fact there is no change in God; he loves us from eternity. There is however, a change in us a change that occurs as by faith Christ's work is appropriated. The change is not from wrath to grace, but from our belief that we are under wrath to our belief that we are under grace.[49]

                 Is it accurate to say that God's disposition of wrath, on the one hand, and grace, at the point of our union with Christ, is really simply a matter of what we believe with respect to God? Admittedly, just how God's eternal, electing purposes determine his disposition toward those who are elect, in history, but not yet in Christ, is a difficult matter. But it seems there must be a better way to articulate a biblical response than to shift the crux of the debate to our beliefs.

                 It is for this reason, among others, that (at least some) open theists understand the classic, Reformed understanding of God itself disingenuous, as an attempt to play down or otherwise undermine biblical passages such as these. So, for example, Greg Boyd says,

My fundamental thesis is that the classical theological tradition became misguided when, under the influence of Hellenistic philosophy, it defined GodÕs perfection in static, timeless terms.  All change was considered an imperfection and thus not applicable to God.  Given this definition of divine perfection, there was no way to conceive of God as entertaining real possibilities (emphasis mine).[50]

So also Clark Pinnock:

According to Scripture, God moves with his people through time.  He is even described as wondering what they are going to do next! God says ÔI thought, after she has done all this, she will return to me, but she did not returnÕ (Jer. 3:7). God had thought he could bless his people but they proved unfaithful (Jer. 3:19-20). God had planted a pleasant vineyard and put a lot of effort into it but it yielded only wild grapes, and in Isaiah 5:1-4 he asks why.  He had hope for things to happen which did not happen and he was disappointed.  God existed before creation and before creaturely time but since then has related to the world within the structures of time.  God is not thought of in terms of timelessness. He makes plans and carries them out; he anticipates the future and remembers the past.  Since creation, divine life has been temporally ordered. God is participant, not onlooker; he enters the time of the world and is not just above the flow of history looking down, as it were, from some supra-temporal vantage point.  God is inside not outside time, sharing in history - past, present, and future.[51]

                 Process Theology, as well,  has wrestled with the relationship of God to the world, and has concluded that such a relationship is necessary for God to be who he is. As with open theism (as noted above), they tend to view the love of God as central to his character.[52] One of the differences between process theologians and open theists is that the latter locate this love of God, first of all in his Triunity, expressed in Father, Son and Holy Spirit, whereas for process theologians the love of God requires creation in order to be properly expressed.[53]

                 Even with such differences, the end result of both open theism and process theology is that God's independence is severely compromised. Even if affirmed in some way, the reality is that, in both systems, God remains dependent on the world in order to be who he is and to act.[54]

                 But it gets worse. Those with less acumen with respect to theology proper, but who nevertheless involve themselves in such discussions, i.e. philosophers of religion, are reticent, at best, to see just how it can be that God's independence could be affirmed, given the creation of the world.[55] Many current day philosophical discussions, however, seem to ignore the (vast majority of the) historical discussion, and thus to present God as in some ways fundamentally dependent on creation. Stephen Davis, to use one example, cannot make sense of God's eternity, given the existence of time. If God is eternal, says Davis, then the following sentences are either meaningless or necessarily false:

God existed before Moses.

God`s power will soon triumph over evil.

Last week God wrought a miracle.

God will always be wiser than human beings.[56]

These statements are thought to be meaningless or necessarily false because, obviously, they postulate something time-conditioned of one presumed to be essentially independent of time.

                 But Davis' concerns run deeper than this. He is convinced that the traditional understanding of eternity, in which God is not subject to time, serves, in the end, to deny the existence of the Christian God. The following argument illustrates his point:

(1) God creates x.

(2) x first exists at T.

(3) Therefore, God creates x at T.[57]

Now (3) is ambiguous, notes Davis, between (3a) and (3b):

(3a) God, at T, creates x.

(3b) God creates x, and x first exists at T.

The defender of divine eternity will opt for (3b) as the proper understanding of (3).[58]

                 Given this argument, says Davis, a timeless God cannot create anything at all. He cannot create because, he argues, we do not have a usable concept of atemporal causation (that is, causation that would not itself be dependent on time) that would allow for (1) and (2) to be meaningful. "Therefore, we are within our rights in concluding that [(1)] and [(2)] entail that God is temporal, i.e. that a timeless being cannot be the creator of the universe."[59]

                 Furthermore, says Davis, the Christian God`s existence must also be denied by the defender of divine eternity because of the ways in which Scripture speaks of God.

He makes plans. He responds to what human beings do, e.g. their evil deeds or their acts of repentance. He seems to have temporal location and extension. The Bible does not hesitate to speak of God`s years and days... And God seems to act in temporal sequences-first he rescues the children of Israel from Egypt and later he gives them the Law...[60]

Davis is to be commended for his motive here. His motive is to seek to do justice to the Christian view of God as he is presented to us in Scripture. He wants to argue for God as Creator and as one who interacts with his creation, but he just cannot make his way clear to do so if what must be affirmed is God's fundamental and essential independence and aseity with respect to time.

                 William Hasker, a philosopher of religion and proponent of open theism, has the same kinds of concerns:

The other main difficulty about divine timelessness is that it is very hard to make clear logical sense of the doctrine.  If God is truly timeless, so that temporal determinations of ÒbeforeÓ and ÒafterÓ do not apply to him, then how can God act in time...?  How can he know what is occurring on the changing earthly scene?  How can he respond when his children turn to him in prayer and obedience?  And above all, if God is timeless and incapable of change, how can God be born, grow up, live with and among people, suffer and die, as we believe he did as incarnated in Jesus?[61]

                 But it gets even worse. There is an apologetic dimension to all of these discussions on the compatibility, or lack thereof, of God's attributes. These matters are not simply intramural debates among Christians, they are also used to attempt to argue against the existence of God. In the anthology, The Impossibility of God, Theodore Drange marks out two primary categories of atheological arguments (arguments for the nonexistence of God). The first category consists of "incompatible-properties arguments." These are arguments that seek to show that there are properties which God is assumed to have which cannot reside in the same person. If Drange is right, then God - that is a God who is thought to be both infinite and Creator, for example - cannot exist. The second category consists of "God-vs.-world arguments" in which it is argued that there is a serious incompatibility between the supposition of GodÕs existence and the nature of the world such that we are compelled to conclude for the nonexistence of God.[62]

                 While DrangeÕs categories might point to different nuances in certain atheological arguments, category one — incompatible-properties arguments — is really just a subset of category two arguments — God-vs.-world arguments. For example, the first "incompatible-properties argument" that Drange gives is "The Perfection-vs.-Creation Argument," which proceeds as follows:

1. If God exists, then he is perfect.

2. If God exists, then he is the creator of the universe.

3. A perfect being can have no needs or wants.

4. If any being created the universe, then he must have had some need or want.

5. Therefore, it is impossible for a perfect being to be the creator of the universe (from 3 and 4).

6. Hence, it is impossible for God to exist (from 1, 2, and 5).[63]

                 Whatever the merits of this argument (and there seem to be none), it is strange for Drange to set this out as an "incompatible-properties argument," when clearly the problem here is the fact of God's creating activity. It is because God's creating comes into the equation that Drange sees conflict in God. Even stranger for Drange(r) is that he doesnÕt seem to be aware of some of the most basic elements of Christian theology with respect to the attributes of God. So, for example, he notes, "...if the creation were accidental, then that in itself would imply that God is imperfect (since perfect beings do not have accidents), and that would be another basis for the Perfection-vs.-Creation Argument."[64]

                 We will discuss these arguments below. For now, the point to be kept in mind is that, as we have said, the problem is creation. More specifically, once God determines to bring into existence something that is contingent, finite and of a different order than himself, the relationship of that existence to his own becomes a problem (for us, not for God). It is in response to that problem that we will seek to understand the character, attributes, or properties of God.

(1)  Antinomy and Paradox

                 At this point we need to be clear about some of the terminology that will be useful to us as we proceed. Whenever we discuss God, who is altogether different from creation and created things, and those things that are essentially and fundamentally dependent, we will inevitably encounter antinomies  and paradoxes.

                 As we will use the term here,  any antinomy will refer to two or more entities which in some sense contain laws or operations that seem to be in conflict and that cannot be reconciled by us. We are using the notion of antinomy, therefore, in its more strictly etymological sense; it is a conflict of laws.

                 For example, as Cornelius Van Til notes,

We were in the nature of the case completely interpreted before we came into existence; the universal plan of God needed not to be supplemented by historical particulars and could not be supplemented in this way. The historical could not produce anything wholly new. This much we see clearly. God being what he is, it must be his counsel which acts as the indispensable and self-complete unity back of the finite one and many. The only alternative to saying this is to say that the historical produces the wholly new, and this would be to give up the basic idea of the Christian-theistic scheme, namely, the idea of God and of his creation and control of the universe. On the other hand the historical must have genuine significance. Or else why should God have created it? Prayer must be answered or God would not be God. The universe must really glorify God; that is the purpose of its existence. So we seem to have on the one hand a bucket that is full of water and on the other hand we seem to add water to this bucket which we claim to be already full.[65]

The point we wish to make at this juncture is that antinomy, in the way that we will use it, has to do with a state of affairs, a circumstance in the world. Thus, it is more metaphysical than epistemological. That is, because the focus of an antinomy is on laws that are an essential aspect of certain entities, the primary concern has to do with the way things are. As Van Til notes, it has to do with the way God is — his character as a se, his unchangeable decree, etc. — on the one hand, and the way the universe, or people in the universe, are, on the other hand. This conflict of laws is something that obtains, whether or not we believe it or are able to formulate it.

                 Paradox, in the way that we will use it, has to do with the articulation of antinomies, or the positing of things that seem contradictory. A paradox refers to conflicting or contradictory propositions which themselves are presumed to be true. Again, taking paradox in its etymological sense, we are dealing with two (or more) teachings that conflict or that seem to be contradictory. Again, Van Til offers an example of a paradox:[66]

They are involved in the fact that human knowledge can never be completely comprehensive knowledge. Every knowledge transaction has in it somewhere a reference point to God. Now since God is not fully comprehensible to us we are bound to come into what seems to be contradiction in all our knowledge. Our knowledge is analogical and therefore must be paradoxical. We say that if there is to be any true knowledge at all there must be in God an absolute system of knowledge. We therefore insist that everything must be related to that absolute system of God. Yet we ourselves cannot fully understand that system. We may, in order to illustrate our meaning here, take one of the outstanding paradoxes of the Christian interpretation of things, namely, that of the relation of the counsel of God to our prayers. To put it pointedly: We say on the one hand that prayer changes things and on the other hand we say that everything happens in accordance with GodÕs plan and GodÕs plan is immutable.[67]

A paradox has to do with the expression, verbal or propositional, of an antinomy. Thus, we say (and know from Scripture) that prayer does change things; we also know that the change that prayer brings about was itself a part of God's immutable plan. This conflict has to do with the antinomy of prayer in relation to God's immutability, articulated paradoxically as (something like), "Prayer changes what would otherwise happen," and "God's plan is comprehensive and immutable."

                 It will be helpful to keep these terms, with their subtle distinction, in mind as we proceed. Because we will want to think about God's relationship to, and his dealings with, his creation, we can expect that antinomies and paradoxes will be a significant part of our discussion.

 

D. The Triune God

                 Before we begin our discussion of the attributes of God, we should make clear, though we will not be fleshing this out in detail, that we are, always and everywhere, discussing the attributes of the Triune God. The history of discussions and developments in theology proper can sometimes leave the impression that there is an emphasis on the oneness of God to the exclusion of his three-ness. If that is the case, we should note, then it is possible to understand the doctrine of God in a kind of "generic" way, i.e., in a way that could easily transfer to Judaism or Islam, for example. This is decidedly not the way we are wanting to proceed in this study. However, because we will be focusing more specifically on the attributes and properties of God, and not, say, on the individual properties of the Father, Son or Spirit, our emphasis in most of what we will say will be on attributes and properties that God, as Triune, has. Attributes and properties, in other words, that are applicable to each Person of the Trinity, in that they are essential to what it means for God to be God.

                 This is a point that must be kept in mind throughout, especially given some of the modern-day criticisms that have been lodged against an "abstract" consideration of God's essential nature, prior to, or even apart from, a discussion of God's triunity. Karl Barth, for example, complains that,

It is...hard to see how what is distinctive for this God can be made clear if, as has constantly happened in Roman Catholic and Protestant dogmatics both old and new, the question who God is, which it is the business of the doctrine of the Trinity to answer, is held in reserve, and the first question ot be treated is that of the That and the What of God, as though these could be defined otherwise than on the presupposition of the Who.[68]

The concern expressed by Barth here is a legitimate one, and one that must be avoided whenever Christians set out to think carefully about God and his character. If what is discussed in any way obscures or undermines the truth of God's triunity, then to that extent the doctrine of God discussed in not the doctrine of the Christian God. As a matter of fact, as Muller notes, Barth's concerns were misplaced, given the history, after the Reformation, of discussions and developments in theology proper.

The order of the older dogmatics, in moving from proofs to essence and attributes and then to Trinity, was not a movement from "that" (or more properly, "whether"), to "what," to "who"..., but from "whether"...to "what"... to "what sort "— with the "whether" (Barth's "that") corresponding to the proofs; the "what" corresponding to the essence and essential properties (attributes of the "first order") and, in the arrangement of some of the orthodox writers, to the Trinity as well, not as Barth would seem to imply, to the essence and attributes generally; and the "what sort" referring to the relational attributes (attributes of the "second order") and, in other of the orthodox, to the Trinity. The locus [doctrine of God] does not segment Trinity off from the discussion of essence and attributes: the issue addressed by this order is not a movement from an extended philosophical or speculative discussion of "what" God is to a biblicistic, trinitarian definition of "who" God is, but the movement from a statement of "what" (or "who") the existent One is, namely, God, to a lengthy discussion in terms of attributes and Trinity, of precisely "what sort" of God has been revealed, namely, a triune God who is simple, infinite, omnipotent, gracious, merciful, and so forth.[69]

In other words, we should keep in the forefront of our minds that everything we say about God, generally, in our discussion, applies to the triune God; it does not apply, in abstraction, but to God as one in three.

                 We need, then, to remember that there are distinctions to be made between God's essential character - those properties that apply to God as God, and attributes that have in view the relationship that God, as Triune, sustains to himself (and, secondarily, to the world). There are personal properties, therefore, that apply only to the respective persons of the Trinity (for example, filiation applies only to the Son, not the Spirit or Father), and not to the oneness of God. So also, there are essential properties that serve to highlight or emphasize God's essential relational character - properties such as the love of God (directed, in the first place, to the three persons). These characteristics of God are important and crucial, and our lack of direct attention to them in what follows should not be seen as a lack of importance.

                 As we said above, the problem (for us) is creation. This does not mean that creation per se is a problem. God saw all that he had made and it was very good. It means rather that the fact of creation, and its status as created, seems to be, almost invariably, what gets in the way of clear, Christian thinking on these matters. Too many discussions about God and his relationship to creation conclude with a god who is in some way, like his creation, essentially needy. In order (supposedly) to safeguard intellectual respectability, the Triune God of Scripture takes a back seat to a host of wants, needs and aspirations as many philosophers and theologians choose to debate his nature and character. Is there any way to maintain the integrity of the revelation of the Triune God in the midst of such a bleak and anemic context?

                 We will be arguing that God has essential attributes - attributes (or properties) which he has because of who he is, quite apart from creation, and "covenantal" attributes - attributes (or properties) that God has, given creation. How, though, would an this understanding of God be able to reckon with the fact that God is Triune, given that God is essentially Triune - that is, that there is no way that he could be anything but Triune? It is not possible that the Godhead could consist of two persons in one, or four in one, or anything but three in one - how does one go about thinking of the Three Persons in relation to the One essential God?

                 This is a problem inherent in any discussion of God's characteristics, so it is not unique to those who affirm that God has essential attributes (and we will see that those attributes are not distinct from him). The best that one can do, it seems, is to affirm that there are essential properties of God, all of which apply to each of the Persons, and that there are essential properties of each of the Persons that are unique to each one. That is, in line with historic Christianity (in this case, the Athanasian Creed), orthodox theology has historically affirmed that

...the Godhead of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit is all one, the glory equal, the majesty coeternal. Such as the Father is, such is the Son, and such is the Holy Spirit. The Father Uncreate, the Son Uncreate, and the Holy Ghost Uncreate. The Father Incomprehensible, the Son Incomprehensible, and the Holy Ghost Incomprehensible. The Father Eternal, the Son Eternal, and the Holy Ghost Eternal and yet they are not Three Eternals but One Eternal. As also there are not Three Uncreated, nor Three Incomprehensibles, but One Uncreated, and One Incomprehensible. So likewise the Father is Almighty, the Son Almighty, and the Holy Ghost Almighty. And yet they are not Three Almighties but One Almighty. So the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God. And yet they are not Three Gods, but One God.

While affirming this truth, we must also affirm, with the same creed, that

The Father is made of none, neither created, nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone; not made, nor created, but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father, and of the Son neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding.

Thus, while everything that God is, the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are, there are properties of each of the Three that do not apply to the One essential God as One. The One Triune God, for example, is not from the Father, only the Son is from the Father.

                 Muller, in explicating the differences between the Persons and the essence (and, in part, quoting Rijssen) explains:

[The Persons] differ from the divine Essence not realiter - that is to say, not essentialiter, ut res & res - but modaliter, ut modus ˆ re: "the personal properties by which the persons are distinguished from the Essence, are modes of a sort, by which they are characterized, not formally and properly as in creatures who are affected in certain ways by their properties, but eminently and analogically, rising beyond all imperfections."[70]

So, there are essential properties of each of the Persons that do not apply to the One God, though the reverse is decidedly not the case.

                 One of the best ways, perhaps the only orthodox way, to distinguish these properties, as we suggested above, is with respect to the "essential properties" (proprietates essentiales) and personal properties (proprietates personales).[71] That is, the distinctions made between the Persons and essence of God are personal, rather than essential distinctions. Here, the use of the word 'essential' refers to the essence of God in distinction from the Persons who comprise the Godhead. Thus, there are essential properties of the Persons - what we might call personal properties - and there are essential properties of the One essence, applying as they do to each of the three Persons equally and without dividing those properties in any way.

                 While there is no way for finite human beings completely to circumscribe the relationship of the one God to the Three Persons, we may rest content, with the history of the orthodox Christian tradition, with the fact of God's Triunity and its evidence of God's utter incomprehensibility (Rom. 11:33f.).

Given God's essential, Triune character, the crux of our concern is the way in which we are to think of God and his relationship to his creation in the context of theological and philosophical discussions. Or, to put the matter in the form of a question, why is it, we might ask, that theological and philosophical arguments are routinely formulated that end up either (1) denying the (exegetically and historically) overwhelming evidence for the essential character of the Triune God or (2) denying the existence of God altogether? What kinds of principles are lurking in the background that seem to compel so many theologians and philosophers of religion who deal with theism to conclude with a less-than-Christian god?

E. Looking Ahead

                 As we have intimated throughout this introduction, the subject matter at hand is much too large to lay out in any detail. It is necessary for us, therefore, to focus our attention in the chapters ahead. That focus will move us from a consideration of God's character as he is in himself, and then to a consideration of how we might think of God, as God and as condescended, given his essential attributes.

                 In chapter one, we will discuss God's revelation of himself as "I Am." We will stress how that revelation controls our affirmation of God as independent (a se). This is, perhaps, the most central and crucial chapter to understand, since everything else that we will say will presuppose what is said here. In sum, we will affirm the truths of a classic, Reformed doctrine of God, in which his independence, and characteristics entailed therein, are non-negotiable. We will see how such characteristics are rooted in God's own revelation of himself.

                 In chapter two, we will begin to outline a way of thinking about God's characteristics that is not, itself, characteristic of discussions in theology proper. This chapter will be a relatively "new" approach to a discussion of divine attributes. Given God's essential independence, how do we think about God's relationship to the world? The central answer to that question, we will argue, is found in the climactic revelation of God in and to the world in the Person of Jesus Christ. In this chapter we will set out the biblical, creedal and theological truths that the church has historically affirmed with respect to the Person of Christ. Given those truths, it should be easier for us to think about how God relates to his creation since creation and into eternity.

                 In chapter three, having seen God's independence, and the fact that God's independence is in no way compromised as God comes to us in Christ, we will begin to discuss how we might think about God's character and attributes generally. We hope to see how the theological truths that are affirmed in an orthodox Christology help us to flesh out a (hopefully) biblically accurate and more useful way to articulate theology proper.

                 In the next chapter we want to employ the Christological paradigm for thinking about God's attributes and activities, to discuss such matters as the reality of prayer, the free offer of the gospel, the transition from wrath to grace in God, etc. These conundrums, it should be said at the outset, cannot be "resolved" in such a way that the mystery of God's working in the world is entirely comprehended. Rather, we hope to show that our understanding of what is "compatible" with respect to God and his activity in creation should be controlled by how we think of the compatibility of Christ's two natures.

                 Finally, we will want to ask whether or not the Christological paradigm for understanding theology proper is a way forward in the different permutations of the Calvinist/Arminian debate over theology proper?[72] Without in any way compromising or denying the classic, Reformed understanding of God's character, we will explore these kinds of questions by challenging the Arminian notion of God. We will do that, in part, through the historic understanding of the Person of Christ, and suggest that a biblical notion of compatibility (affirmed in Christology) can provide a context in which we can take God's relationship to creation, and us, seriously, while at the same time affirming the Reformed understanding of God's aseity.


[1]Anyone interested in the classical Christian doctrine of God, much of which will be presupposed rather than argued here, should consult Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: God and Creation, trans. John Vriend, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2004); Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology, trans. George Musgrave Giger, 3 vols. (Phillipsburg, New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1994), Vol. 1; Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 2nd ed., 4 vols., vol. Three (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 2002); Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Triunity of God, vol. 4 (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 2003); John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, The Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960). It seems nothing that is currently available, including this book, can take its place alongside these for a rigorous, clear, biblical and truthful exposition of classical Christian theism.

[2]"The dogmatics of post-Reformation Protestantism did not develop in a vacuum and was not formulated simply for the sake of classroom exercises in speculative thinking - it was churchly dogmatics..." Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 31-32, my emphasis.

[3]Readers will note that this statement is replete with covenant-historical connotations. There was, obviously, a time when Christ had not come in the flesh. We are not proposing that God, therefore, could not be known properly until that time. The Lord's people have always been responsible to know God according to his revelation in history, which itself is progressive. What we are proposing is that, given the climactic revelation of God in Christ, in history, it is, from that time on incumbent on the church to know God by way of knowing Christ. This is not simply the case for soteriology (salvation), but is the case with respect to theology proper as well.

[4]Clark H. Pinnock, ÒBetween Classical and Process Theism,Ó in Process Theology, ed. Ronald H Nash (Grand Rapids, Mich: Baker Book House, 1987), 315, 317.

[5]John Sanders, ÒHistorical Considerations,Ó in The Openness of God : A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, ed. Clark H. Pinnock, et al. (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 91.

[6]John M. Frame, No Other God (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 2001), 23. Frame takes much of this summary from Richard Rice, ÒBiblical Support for a New Perspective,Ó in The Openness of God : A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God, ed. Clark H. Pinnock, et al. (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1994).

[7]We should note here that to speak in temporal terms in referring to a non-temporal state of affairs (i.e., the existence of God) is still wholly accurate, given that God himself, in his Word, does the same thing (cf. Eph. 1:4, 20). As finite creatures, there is no other way to refer to such things, but neither is there a need for such.

[8]Thus, any notion, Platonic or otherwise, that there are eternal properties or verities that exist independently of God is erroneous. Whatever properties exist prior to creation are themselves identical to God and only exist in that he exists.

[9]When Christians speak, therefore, of creation ex nihilo, what is actually meant is creation from nothing except from God.

[10]In this first section of chapter 7, the Confession is not yet concerned with the matter of our sinful rebellion against God. It will begin to address that problem in section 3. We should keep in mind, therefore, that our relationship to God, quite apart from sin, depends on God's activity, not ours, given his absolute uniqueness and our inability, as creatures, to comprehend who he is. The problem of sin greatly complicates this inability, but it does not initiate it.

[11]See, for example, Michael L. Peterson, Philosophy of Religion : Selected Readings (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Pojman, Louis P., ed. Philosophy of Religion : An Anthology (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Pub. Co, 1987); Rowe, William L., William J. Wainwright, ed. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Third (Fort Worth, et al.: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1973).

[12]This is true, as we have seen and will see, of much current-day discussion of the character of God in some theological circles. See, for example, Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible : A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 2000); Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover : A Theology of God's Openness, Didsbury Lectures ; 2000 (Carlisle, Cumbria, UKGrand Rapids, Mich.: Paternoster Press ;Baker Academic, 2001).

[13]Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 195-196, my emphases. For a discussion and defense of "essence language" among the Protestant orthodox, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 227228. Note especially, "Thus, in answer to the question of "What" or "Who" God is, the orthodox set themselves first to describe the "nature" or "essence" of God...," 232.

[14]Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 250.

[15]Note number 7 in Frame's list of open theist beliefs above. If one presupposes libertarian freedom for man, then God is essentially limited in some way or ways.

[16]Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 248.

[17]We should keep in mind here that we are thinking of God as he is in himself. As we will see later, Scripture is clear that there is a presence of God, but that presence presupposes his creation.

[18]Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics: God and Creation, 152.

[19]This is not to say that there are no views of God which compromise or deny his aseity, only that such views are biblically unsustainable, as we hope to make clear.

[20]More on this later.

[21]We will return to this topic again briefly in Chapter 2 (section A.1) in which we will emphasize the necessity both of God's revelation (as inerrant) and of the importance of a proper understanding of "good and necessary" consequences that themselves flow from biblical revelation.

[22]We choose this particular example because of the obvious hermeneutic errors present. For a helpful discussion on the hermeneutic of open theism, see Frame, No Other God, 41-48.

[23]To examine the hermeneutic method in this book is beyond the scope of our concerns here. For a more detailed, and helpful analysis, see Gregory K. Beale, The Erosion of Inerrancy in Evangelicalism (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008).

[24]Coherence, for this author, lies in a "Christotelic" understanding of biblical passages. Without detailing the problems in such a view, it seems such an understanding is unable to make sense of the actual texts of Scripture.

[25]Peter Enns, Inspiration and Incarnation (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Academic, 2005).

[26]Enns, I&I, 103.

[27]Enns, I&I, 107.

[28] See Enns, I&I, 106-07.

[29] We need not engage all the passages mentioned in this section of the book. The points made apply, more or less, to each example given.

[30]Enns, I&I, 104, emphasis original.

[31] It should be noted here that to miss what this passage says about God is to miss the gospel itself. God condescends to his creation to deal definitively with wickedness. This judgment of wickedness is not tangential to this passage, but is at its heart. How a sovereign, omniscient and independent God can stoop to grieve over the sin of his creation has been thoroughly and biblically worked out in Reformed thought, and is obscured, not aided, by the "human" emphasis, and the hermeneutic proposed, in this book.

[32] In Silva's words, "...our evangelical view of the unity of Scripture demands that we see the whole Bible as the context of any one part. ...To the extent that we view the whole of Scripture as having come from one Author, therefore, to that extent a systematic understanding of the Bible contributes to the exegesis of individual passages" MoisŽs Silva, ÒThe Case for Calvinistic Hermeneutics,Ó in Revelation and Reason: New Essays in Reformed Apologetics, ed. K. Scott Oliphint, and Lane G. Tipton (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyteriand and Reformed Publishing, 2007), 87.

[33]Enns, I&I, 107.

[34]Enns, I&I, 106.

[35]

John Murray, ÒThe Study of the Bible,Ó The Claims of Truth Collected Writings of John Murray 1 (1976), 5.

[36]MoisŽs Silva, "The Case for Calvinistic Hermeneutics," 86.

[37]MoisŽs Silva, "The Case for Calvinistic Hermeneutics," 88.

[38]Readers should note that there seems to be a resurgence of evangelicals whose views are similar to the ones offered in this work, views which will inevitably end up denying the full, inerrant authority of God's word, and thus will confuse, if not deny, biblical truth as it is given in God's revelation. See, for example, Craig D. Allert, A High View of Scripture? The Authority of the Bible and the Formation of the New Testament Canon (Evangelical Ressourcement: Ancient Sources for the Church's Future) (Baker Academic, 2007); A. T. B. Mcgowan, The Divine Authenticity of Scripture: Retrieving an Evangelical Heritage (IVP Academic, 2008); Kenton L. Sparks, God's Word in Human Words: An Evangelical Appropriation of Critical Biblical Scholarship (Baker Academic, 2008).

[39]Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Triunity of God, 451-452, my emphases. This text appears in the context of a discussion of the divine will, but is applicable to the entire field of theology proper.

[40]This is the case, just to repeat, because God is the author of Scripture, and thus there is a unity to its (his) teachings, given that it has one author. This does not deny or in any way diminish the fact that God chose various men to write, and to write in various ways, but those considerations must take their place within the context of Scripture's inherent coherence and unity, since, every human author of Scripture is writing that which God breathes (cf. 2 Tim. 3:16).

[41]In Romans 1:18ff., the apostle Paul affirms that all people know God, and that what they know is his "his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature..." This knowledge includes the fact that God is in no way dependent on what he has made in order to be who he is (cf. Acts 17:24). Universal knowledge of God's independence is given to all human beings, and is basic to who God is.

[42]Thus, the hermeneutical circle.

[43]A view, we should remember, that winds up asserting that we just don't know if prayer has any effect on God. Such assertions can only hinder, not help, Christian growth.

[44]"Tropical" here means referring to a trope, figurative.

[45]Augustine, City of God, trans. Marcus Dods, vol. II, A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1988), XIV.11, 437.

[46]John Calvin, The Comprehensive John Calvin Collection, CD ed. (The Ages Digital Library System, 2002).

[47]From Ainsworth's Annotations upon Genesis as quoted in Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 559.

[48]Calvin, Institutes, I.17.13, my emphasis.

[49]Paul Helm, John Calvin's Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 395, my emphases.

[50]Boyd, God of the Possible : A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God, 17.

[51]Pinnock, Most Moved Mover : A Theology of God's Openness, 97.

[52]According to Richard Rice, an open theist, "Both process thought and open theism place love at the center of the divine reality. Both believe that God's love comes to expression in God's relationship to the world, and both maintain that love involves genuine sensitivity to its objects. Consequently, both believe that ultimate reality is inherently social or relational. Love requires an 'other,'" Richard Rice, ÒProcess Theism and the Open View of God,Ó in Searching for an Adequate God: A Dialogue Between Process and Free Will Theists, ed. John B. Cobb, and Clark H. Pinnock (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2000), 195.

[53]It should be noted that there was a certain priority to the love of God in Arminius' theology as well, though it did not take the form now articulated in open theism. Says Arminius, "I know, indeed, that the love of God, referred to, is not in all respects equal towards all men and towards each individual, but I also deny that there is so much difference, in that divine love, towards men that He has determined to act towards some, only according to the rigor of His own law, but towards others according to His own mercy and grace in Christ, as set forth in his gospel" James Arminius, The Works of James Arminius, 3 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library), 2.186. Given what Arminius says here, the love of God takes precedence over God's eternal decree, and in that way is given a certain primacy.

[54]We should state the obvious here, though we will not pursue it, given our more specific focus, and that is that these debates with respect to the character of God go back to the beginning of church history. Most prominently, they surround Augustine's debates with Pelagius, the ascendency of semi-Pelagianism, and the discussions surrounding Arminianism from the 16th century to the present. We will mention these in places later on, but we will not be able to engage the substance of those discussions directly. However, what we hope to conclude in this study would have implications across the spectrum of these various debates.

[55]This is a general statement and there are glowing exceptions. With respect to theology proper, the exceptions, in the main, are the Roman Catholic philosophers who, for reasons that cannot be pursued here, seem to be more sympathetic to the authority of God's revelation for a proper understanding of God, and who, therefore, use their skills in philosophy to better articulate those truths. Protestants philosophers, by and large, seem not to exhibit such sympathies.

[56]Stephen T. Davis, ÒTemporal Eternity,Ó in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology, ed. Louis P. Pojman (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2003), 211.

[57]Stephen T. Davis, "Temporal Eternity," 211, my numbering throughout.

[58]Stephen T. Davis, "Temporal Eternity," 213.

[59]Stephen T. Davis, "Temporal Eternity," 213.

[60]Stephen T. Davis, "Temporal Eternity," 213.

[61]Clark H. Pinnock, et al., The Openness of God : A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 128.

[62]Theodore M. Drange, ÒIncompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey,Ó in The Impossibility of God, ed. Michael Martin (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2003), 185.

[63]Theodore M. Drange, "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey," 186.

[64]Theodore M. Drange, "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey," 187.

[65]Cornelius Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 4th ed. (Phillipsburg, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 2008), 68. As in much of the literature that discusses antinomy, including Van Til's discussion, distinctions are not typically made between antinomy and paradox. For purposes of clarification, we would like to make just such a distinction.

[66]Van Til is actually discussing antinomies in this paragraph, but he uses the term interchangeably with paradox here. We are using the terms in a more distinctive way.

[67]Van Til, Defense, 67-68.

[68]Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. G. W. Bromiley, Second ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975), I/1, 300-01. quoted in Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 155.

[69]Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 156.

[70]Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Triunity of God, 190.

[71] For an elaboration of this distinction, see Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 213ff. Muller notes:

As Alexander of Hales had argued, there cannot be any distinctio realis between the attributes - nor can there be such a "real distinction" between the divine persons and the divine essence - but the persons as identified by the proprietates personales, must be distinct from one another, indeed, really (realiter) distinct (215).

See also Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, Ca. 1520 to Ca. 1725: The Triunity of God, 167-95.

[72]According to Roger Olson, it is the doctrine of God, theology proper, which is the basis for the division between Calvinists and Arminians, "In spite of all the huffing and puffing of extremists on both sides who seem to believe adherents of the other theology exercising bad faith, people of equally good faith come down on different sides. Why? Because when they read the Bible, they find God identified one way or another. At the bottom of these doctrinal differences lies a different perspective on the identity of God, based on God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ and Scripture, that colors the rest of Scripture." Further, he says, "Contrary to popular belief, then, the true divide at the heart of the Calvinist-Arminian split is not predestination versus free will but the guiding picture of God: he is primarily viewed as either (1) majestic, powerful, and controlling or (2) loving good, and merciful. Once the picture...is established, seemingly contrary aspects fade into the background, are set aside as 'obscure' or are artificially  made to fit the system," Roger E Olson, Arminian Theology : Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, Ill: IVP Academic, 2006), 70, 73, my emphases.