Moroney sets a difficult task for himself. He proposes to evaluate, analyze, summarize and review a small group of highly influential thinkers with regard to their respective emphases, or lack thereof, on the noetic effects of sin, and he attempts this within the space of 154 pages. He wants to survey the thinking of John Calvin, Abraham Kuyper, Emil Brunner, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, and then show how his ‘new model’ of the noetic influence of sin can be incorporated into social psychology. In his own words,
In brief, the book attempts to answer two main questions. (1) What can be learned from past Christian thinkers as their thoughts are criticized and modified in the process of developing a new model of how sin affects our thinking? (2) What are the interdisciplinary implications of the noetic effects of sin for some prominent ideas on the fields of theology, philosophy, and psychology (vii)?
He begins with a summary of Calvin’s view of human reason. He argues that Calvin divided the terrain between earthly and heavenly matters, applying the noetic effects of sin to the latter, not the former, category. He affirms that, depending on circumstances, etc., our own sin, Satan, and God himself can and do impair the use of our reason(4). Primarily with regard to Calvin, however, Moroney argues that Calvin “lauded the ingenuity of human reason” with respect to earthly things, while remaining skeptical of human reason with respect to spiritual things. “Calvin was exuberant over the accomplishments of...fallen human reason as found among unbelievers... (6). This exuberance extended, in Calvin, only to earthly subjects.
Moroney is critical of this strain in Calvin’s thought. The categories of “earthly” and “heavenly” are not precise enough to help us understand just how our reason is used in particular situations. Also, beginning a critique that continues throughout the book, Moroney detects too much individualism in Calvin with respect to his view of sin. He is anxious to include and highlight a corporate dimension.
In chapter two, “Kuyper, Brunner, and a New Model of How Sin Affects Our Thinking,” Moroney devotes one page to Kuyper and a page and a half to Brunner before broaching his ‘new model.’ Kuyper’s antithesis was too severe, while Brunner takes first honors for best describing the variability of sin’s effects on different areas of human knowledge (34).
Moroney’s new model is this: Objectively, sin disturbs human thinking in some areas more than in others (36). Calvin, Kuyper and Brunner all affirmed this.
Working from the bottom up, the proposed model suggests, in general, that when examining impersonal creation..., scholars are minimally affected by the distorting effects of sin. ...However, when scholars examine human beings..., as a general rule, more distorting effects of sin are anticipated. ...Finally, when scholars examine matters related to God..., the greatest distorting effect of sin is generally anticipated (37).
Subjectively, the model proposes to fill a lacuna in hamartiology with respect to the effects of regeneration on human reason, with three particular emphases. First, we must acknowledge that there is a moral dimension to human knowledge. Apart from regeneration, reason is in bondage. But, given regeneration, there ought to be an acknowledgement of progress in the noetic effects of sanctification.
Furthermore, and secondly, we should acknowledge the communal aspect of the effects of sin on our thinking. “Within Christian theology, a doctrine of extensive human depravity demands serious analysis of corporate and systemic sin (39).”
Thirdly, the noetic effects of sin will differ “according to the complex interplay of multiple factors (40).”
From his presentation of the new model, Moroney takes us to chapter three, “Pannenberg’s Rationalist Theology.” Acknowledging that Pannenberg, at least to some extent, “defies categorization (49),” Moroney nevertheless argues that Pannenberg is both an apologist and a rationalist. As apologist, Pannenberg attempts to show that Christian doctrine agrees with the principles of reason. In examining Christian doctrine, Moroney, quoting Pannenberg, reminds us that, for Pannenberg, “it is the force of the argument alone” that is the deciding factor. Theology should examine what it believes sola ratione, by reason alone (51).
As far as I can tell, the only reason that Pannenberg is included in this book is for his lack of emphasis on the noetic effects of sin. Moroney brings this out in his critique. Perhaps Pannenberg needed to be included since he is such an influential thinker; Moroney does highlight the fact that, in spite of Pannenberg’s neglect of the topic of the noetic effects of sin there is, in his work, a tremendous emphasis on the doctrine of sin. Aside from the latter emphasis, however, there does not seem to be a strong reason for including Pannenberg in this survey.
Chapter four continues with another discussion of the lack of emphasis on the noetic effects of sin as it evaluates the contribution of Plantinga and Wolterstorff in this area. Moroney states here what others have recognized, i.e., that the “Reformed Epistemology” project has given too little attention to the noetic effects of sin. Though this chapter, in that regard, is in continuity with the previous chapter on Pannenberg, it is, likely due to its date of origin, somewhat outdated, for at least two reasons. First, there is no account given of Plantinga’s shift from a more internalist epistemology to an externalist one, and thus no recognition given of the near absence of the term “Reformed epistemology” in the more recent literature (though Moroney does note Plantinga’s regret in coining the term) (85). Second, since Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief, to which Moroney had no access, this gap has been, at least to some extent, narrowed. That said, however, the chapter is relatively helpful in giving a summary of the project in its earlier days.
The last chapter, chapter five, focuses on the relationship of theology, particularly the model of the noetic effects of sin proposed in chapter two, to social psychology. It proposes to “focus on the subset of cognitive distortions which are self-serving, and hence are an exemplary manifestation of the noetic effects of sin (90).” After an interesting section detailing statistically with our proclivity to attribute failures to external causes and successes to internal ones, Moroney gives us two models - two ways - in which theology can help social psychology. The first model is the Parallels Model (Perspectivalists) (98-100). This model affirms that psychology and Christianity are two separate spheres of knowledge, but that, where there is overlap in subject matter, the two can complement each other.
The second model, the “Integrates Model (Christianizers),” “involves the explicit incorporation of religiously based beliefs as the control beliefs that shape the perception of facts, theories and methods in social science (101 - quoting Jones and Butman’s, Modern Psychotherapies). Moroney offers, in the remainder of this chapter, some of the psychological claims that are given in particular situations, after which he provides theological correctives, in the context of the Integrators Model. Specifically, Moroney notes the claims of some that self-deception and cognitive disorder are to be cultivated, since those who engage in such practices seem more able to cope with their situations. Moroney argues that Christian theology is needed in situations like this to correct this view. Christian theology opposes self-serving cognitive distortion, it offers some means of counteracting sinful behavior, it offers us eternal happiness, perhaps alleviating some of the pressure to find happiness now, it offers grace and forgiveness, and it motivates us to strive for holiness in our thinking (103-104).
There are two appendices in the book, “Calvin’s Psychology” (115-123) and “Representative Teachings on the Noetic Effects of Sin in Christian Tradition and Christian Scripture” (125-133). Moroney notes, correctly in my view, Calvin’s influence of Plato in his understanding of the relationship of body and soul. This influence was not total, as Calvin did not see the separation of body and soul as the more desirable condition as Plato had. In the final appendix, Moroney wants to provide a more ecumenical impetus for including the noetic effects of sin in present-day discussions, agreeing with Merold Westphal that such a doctrine is not the exclusive property of Reformed thought. Thus, he disagrees both with Hoffecker and with Rushdoony in their contention that Aquinas denied sin’s noetic influence. Interestingly, though wanting to remain ecumenical, he mentions in the context of his plea for an ecumenical approach to this doctrine, Augustine, Aquinas, Luther and Jonathan Edwards.
In spite of its brevity, its ambitiousness, and its attempt to move across (at least) two different disciplines, this book is helpful in its brief analyses of the particular figures chosen. The reader is left, however, in the end with a cursory understanding of the problem and an all-too-brief discussion of the issues involved. In that sense, the book glosses a very important topic. On the other hand, one who wants to look into these issues, particularly in the Reformed tradition, would gain some benefit by beginning with this brief study.