The Clear and Distinct Knowledge of God
The appellation `Postconservative evangelicalism,` (PCE)
will be used here as a cognomen, a kind of `family name,` without reference to
those who might belong to that family. Perhaps when all is said and done, the
shoe described herein will fit no one single individual. More likely, however,
is that the shoe will fit different individuals in different ways. I leave it
to the reader to make that judgment. The primary purpose of this essay is to
warn any who might be teetering on the edge of PCE to move back, and quickly,
before they plunge into darkness.
If one were to pour a box of Grape Nuts cereal into a
bowl, at least one fact would be obvious. In spite of the name, the cereal is
neither `grapes` nor `nuts.` Perhaps its name is meant to call to mind the benefits
of eating grapes and nuts, but neither are contained in the cereal itself.
Postconservative evangelicalism, in its varied forms and
`moods,` is like Grape Nuts. While it may call to mind the benefits of being
conservative and evangelical, neither term seems adequately descriptive, and
that for at least two reasons.
In order to be evangelical, one must hold to the
inerrancy of Scripture. The inerrancy of Scripture is held because Scripture is
the word of God. It is not simply a `witness` to the word of God, neither is it
the Holy Spirit`s medium-of-choice for his own testimony. Rather, the authority
of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed, and obeyed, depends
wholly upon God (who is truth itself) the author thereof: and therefore it is
to be received, because it is the Word of God (Westminster Confession of
Faith I.4). It is simply not the case, then, as some PCEs would want it,
that the ultimate authority in the church is not Scripture, but only God. The
ultimate authority in the church is God speaking in his Word. To make a
distinction between God and his Word with respect to authority in the church
wreaks havoc on Christianity. One need only look at churches that have drunk at
the well of Karl Barth`s theology to prove that point.
If this point, the point of Scripture being the
self-attesting word of God, is in any way contravened or contradicted, either
directly or impliedly, by PCE, it should be honest with itself and the rest of
Christendom and stop calling itself something it is not.
Neither, it seems, is there warrant for PCEs to retain
the label `postconservative.` Here, I
take it, the label is meant to highlight the notion that those who belong to
this family have moved beyond the modernist construction of a Bible that is
full of propositional truth, (at least) some of which can be, and should be,
applied to anyone, anywhere, and at any time. But PCEs seem as wedded to the
notion of brute factuality and autonomy as any full-blooded modernist would be.
For example, postconservatives have adapted the postmodern emphasis of the
situated-ness of all language, tribes, people and nations. In the words of one
PCE, `we do not inhabit the world-in-itself; instead we live in a linguistic
world of our own making.'[1]
Such statements betray a naivete that, in most contexts, would not be taken
seriously. But, since this kind of statement is so in touch with the spirit of
the age, it gains some credibility, in spite of its self-referential
incoherence. Notice, however, that in order to inhabit ‘a world of our own making,’
it must be the case that such a world has no meaning until we ‘interpret’ it
(thus whatever is ‘out there’ is a brute fact) and that we are the one
who make our own worlds (autonomy). Though this seems sufficient to make any
Cartesian or Kantian modernist proud, PCEs nevertheless insist on their
postmodern roots.
This jump from the world in itself to a world of our own
making gets at the heart of the PCE agenda, an agenda driven, in the main, by a
(supposed) rejection of all things `modern` and an adaptation of most (if not
all) things postmodern. It is this notion, the notion of a ‘world of our own
making,’ that will provide the backdrop for what is offered below. If, as is
asserted by PCEs, we do not inhabit ‘the world-in-itself,’ then we do not inhabit
the world as it is created and sustained by God. And if we live ‘in a
linguistic world of our own making,’ then we are not the image of God, and we
have not the knowledge of God within us. The notion of inhabiting a linguistic
world of our own making is, in other words, distinctly sub-Christian.
I. Man is Universally Image
At the heart of a rejection of modernism, is the
announced (though not argued) demise of foundationalism.[2] But critical
questions and concerns have not been addressed by PCEs in this regard. In
response to that announcement, I would like to offer some preliminary thoughts.
Though much could be said in response, I will focus on two central and related
truths of Christianity, truths which are universal and which have universal
application. The third point is an attempt to steer the course between the
Scylla of foundationalism and the Charybdis of nonfoundationalism. Since it
depends for its cogency on the truth of the first two points, it should be seen
as a Christian response to the discussions about the structure of knowledge
itself.
First, Christianity maintains that God is the Creator of
the universe. At the point of creation, God condescends to his creation, and to
his creatures, in order to relate to them on their level. This is called God`s
covenant. Whatever it`s particulars, and those are monumentally important,
God`s covenant entails that he is in a relationship with all of his creatures,
but most especially all of his human creatures. Thus, Reformed theology
maintains that God is our ultimate environment. But what does it mean that God
is our ultimate environment? Two emphases, totally lacking in PCE discussions,
can be given here, the first dealing with who we are and the second, depending
on the first, with what we know.
When God condescends to his creation, he does so in order
to `relate` to that creation, to be involved in it (all the while remaining who
he essentially is - see Gen. 1:2, for example). More specifically, he creates
man (both male and female) in his own image. Without detailing just exactly
what that image is, there can be no question that it constitutes our basic
identity as human beings. It means that we are, originally, fundamentally, and
eternally, image. This truth goes hand-in-hand with the fact that God is
our ultimate environment. As our environment, we all, as human beings, live our
lives coram deo; we live our lives in the presence of him in whose image
we are.
We can think of image here in terms of a mirror
image. What has to be the case for a mirror image to be present? The first
requirement is that the `original` be present, in front of the mirror. It is
also true that the image, as image, while reflecting the original, depends at
every second on the presence of the original for its very existence. If the
original is no longer present, the image is gone. Image is, essentially, dependent
for its existence and every one of its characteristics, on the original.
The Lord God who made us as image gave us
responsibilities with respect to his creation, responsibilities that presuppose
our inextricable (universal) bond with creation. Given that he is Lord,
we were to be `under-lords` over God`s creation; he gave us dominion over what
he had made. This dominion includes (though it does not exhaust) the fact that
there is a `lordship` relationship between man, as male and female, and the
rest of creation. In order to understand just what this lordship relationship
is, we look, in the first place, to God who is the Lord. Two aspects of
lordship should be highlighted here.
(1) As Lord, God has committed himself, for eternity, to
his creation. He has promised not to annihilate what he has made, but rather to
keep it for himself forever. As was alluded to above, we call this commitment a
covenant; it is a commitment of God the Lord to tie himself so inextricably to
what he has made that creation, in being bound by God to God, will go on into
and for eternity. (2) As Lord, the relationship that obtains is not one of
equality. Because God has committed himself to us does not entail that he has
become an equal partner in this relationship. He is and remains God and we are
and will remain his creatures. He neither depends on us nor owes us anything
(Rom 11:33f.). We owe him allegiance and worship, and we owe it to him for
eternity. He rules over us - lovingly, sovereignly, wisely - and we submit to
that rule (either now or in the future - cf. Phi. 2:9-11).
When God created man in his own image, he intended for us
to be lords over everything else that he made. This lordship over creation
carries the same two implications, noted above, of God`s lordship over us. (1)
God has committed us to creation in such a way that we are inextricably linked
to it.
For example, it is instructive to notice that, in
creating the animal world God used the same `dust` that he used in creating
Adam. In creating Adam, notice, "the LORD God formed the man of dust from
the ground" (compare Gen 2:7 with Eccl 3:20). This is intended to show us,
at least, that we, like the beasts, are children of dust (Gen 3:19). Adam (and,
indirectly, Eve also since Eve came from Adam) came from the same `stuff` as
the beasts (Gen 2:19).[3]
Thus we are linked with creation, in one sense, because we are taken from it;
we are, quite literally, a part of it.
But there is a significant difference in the creation of
Adam, a difference, we could say, that marks us off from everything else
created: "...then the LORD God formed the man of dust from the ground and breathed
into his nostrils the breath of life, and the man became a living
creature" (Gen 2:7). Of course, the beasts of the earth were living as
well when God created them. But our living, that act of God that constituted
man as a `living soul,` was a result of God`s own inbreathing. It was that
inbreathing, the imparting of the very breath of God in us, that made us
images of God.[4]
The point to be made here is that, in creating us as
image, God bound us together, not only with himself, but with creation as well.
There is a bond of humanity with (the rest of) creation such that, since
creation, one will not, and cannot, exist without the other.
It is for this reason that Paul, in speaking of `the
problem of evil` in Romans 8 can say confidently that, as a result of our sin,
the whole creation groans and itself was subjected to futility (Rom 8:19-20).
It does not groan because of its own inherent deficiencies, but because, in our
sinning, we subjected it to futility (cf. Gen 3:16-19). Creation, in covenant
with man, fell, because we fell.
(2) As in God`s Lordship over us, our lordship over
creation is not one of equals. We were meant to rule over - lovingly and wisely
- all that God made. Because of the entrance of sin, matters have become complicated
(to say the least) and our `ruling` sometimes causes harm rather than good. The
point to be made here, however, is that there is an inextricable link between
ourselves and the world, a link that is both established by God and is intended
to reflect his character. Because of that, we are people who are created to
know, and to interact with, our world, all to the glory of the Triune God, our
Creator. It is this crucial but (almost) universally neglected truth - that our
connection with the world is initiated, constituted, orchestrated and sustained
by the Triune God - that is the theological key to a Christian understanding of
our `situated-ness` and our access (and knowledge of that access) to reality.
One other theological point, mentioned above, must be
underscored. Because God is who he is, all of his dealings with us and
with creation presuppose his voluntary condescension.[5] In John
Calvin`s words:
For who even of slight intelligence does not understand
that, as nurses commonly do with infants, God is wont in a measure to
"lisp" in speaking to us? Thus such forms of speaking do not so much
express clearly what God is like as accommodate the knowledge of him to our
slight capacity. To do this he must descend far beneath his loftiness.[6]
In relating himself to us, the Triune God creates the means by which he
condescends to us. He takes on human language, meaning, experience, even flesh
in order to faithfully maintain his covenant with us; and he does all of this
while yet remaining fully and completely God.[7]
As human beings, therefore, we are `situated` within the
context of God`s presence, and are, by virtue of that situatedness, images of
his. We live and move and have our being in him. This is true whether we are
covenant-keepers (in Christ), or covenant-breakers (in Adam). In
either case, we are covenant creatures, with God as our ultimate environment,
responsible to image him in all our living, thinking and doing.
This is who we are by virtue of God`s creation.
Unfortunately, the story of creation is not the whole story. Something went
wrong, terribly wrong. God`s fellowship with Adam and Eve that was a natural
part of the created order was radically and decisively disrupted. The image of
God as male and female, fully and completely revealed in the Garden prior to
sin, became a source of shame after the fall (Gen 3:7). Though God graciously
clothed Adam and Eve, the need itself for clothing, though necessary because of
sin, was, nevertheless, fundamentally unnatural, not a part of the
created design or order. What was true physically, was just as true
spiritually; the image of God that Adam and Eve fully exhibited prior to sin,
was now a source of shame, shame due to their real guilt, and was covered up
because of sin.[8]
This, then, is the serious problem, even the terminal
condition, that confronts us. After the fall, the image of God becomes a source
of shame; our visceral reaction to who we are, as image (including the presence
of God ever before us) is to hide and suppress whatever we can of that image
(Gen 3:8-10).[9]
Though the image itself remains (see, for example, I Cor. 11:7), it has been
fractured and broken because of sin. Thus, we would, if we could, hide from God
and construe the world in such a way that we would not have to face him. We
would pretend, if we could, that access to God by way of his revelation (both
in the world and in his Word) is impossible. We might even think that it is our
very environment or context that is a barrier to a sure and certain knowledge
of God.
II. Universal Knowledge of God
But it is just that point that Paul seeks to subvert in
Romans 1:18ff. In this passage, according to Calvin, there is a universal
application of the image of God, relative to sin, given by the Apostle Paul.
"Paul shows that the whole world is deserving of eternal death. It hence
follows, that life is to be recovered in some other way, since we are all lost
in ourselves."[10]
Paul’s point, in other words, is initially to show that we are all under
the grip of sin, and that the way out of that condition requires something
outside of us (extra nos). It is crucial to note here, as we have said,
that Paul’s purview in this passage is universal; he is not attempting,
in this passage, to describe the way things are or have been in particular
circumstances, or with particular people, only. He is not saying that only some
people have a sensus divinitatis (sense of deity, hereafter SD)
and are therefore rendered without excuse, while others lack such knowledge and
are thereby excused from judgment. Paul’s point here in Romans 1 and 2 is to
argue that we all are in the same depraved boat. Since we all are under
the same curse of sin, the gospel and its truth is for all of us as well
– to the Jew first, and also to the Greek (v. 16).
Beginning in Romans 1, and into Romans 2, Paul’s
particular purpose is to describe just what the image of God looks like even
while we remain in our sins (in Adam). He wants to show us just how that image
works in light of our rebellion, what processes it engages in while we remain
in our sinful state. It is important for us, briefly, to look at Paul’s
analysis. We will focus our attention on Rom 1:18-25:
For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all
ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress
the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has
shown it to them. For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and
divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the
world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. For
although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him,
but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were
darkened. Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of
the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and reptiles.
Therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity, to the
dishonoring of their bodies among themselves, because they exchanged the truth
about God for a lie and worshiped and served the creature rather than the
Creator, who is blessed forever! Amen.
Much could be said about Paul`s discussion here. For our purposes, however, we
will confine our discussion of this passage to elements germane to the SD.
We would suggest a threefold account of the sensus
divinitatis, given Paul’s discussion of it here. The SD, as a
central aspect of our being made in God`s image, (1) just is God`s
revelation to us; as revelation it is (2) implanted in us by God himself; (3)
given (1) and (2), as Paul makes clear, the SD is knowledge of God, a
knowledge that is universal and infallible. Let`s look at these three in
reverse order.
Notice, first of all, that we all, born as we are
into our sinful state and continuing in that state by virtue of our wickedness,
nevertheless, know God. The way in which Paul introduces this notion is
not, in v. 18, to tell us first of all about our knowledge of God. His initial
concern is the revelation of God`s wrath and the reason for it. And the
reason for such an expression of wrath by God lies in the fact, according to
Paul, that we all, in our sins, suppress the truth. But Paul immediately
realizes, as he writes, that he should explain what he means by
"suppression" and by "truth." He takes up the latter first.
He affirms, beginning in v. 19, that there is a universal
knowledge of God in every man. He affirms that in the context of elaborating,
first, our suppression of the truth (v. 18), and then by explaining what that
truth is that we suppress. In sum, the truth that we suppress is not
truth, first of all, about nature, or about aspects of this world. The truth
that we suppress in unrighteousness is simply this - the "clearly
perceived" and "understood" knowledge of God. This is no obscure
knowledge, neither is it knowledge that is beyond our capacity to understand.
This knowledge that we have is both perceived–clearly perceived–and it is
something that we, somehow, comprehend.
And it is knowledge with significant and substantial
content. Universally, clearly and infallibly, we know much about God, by virtue
of this clearly perceived and understood revelation of God to us. We know his
invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity (or,
"God-ness"). We know these things to such an extent that Paul can
pronounce, in v. 21, that, since the creation of the world to the present,
human beings are and have always been creatures who "....knew God..."
This is strong (and clear) language. It explicitly states
that all of us, "since the creation of the world," are characterized
as those who knew (and know) God - we know his deity and his power, in short,
all of those things that are a part of his "invisible nature." And
what are those things that are a part of God’s invisible nature? Charles Hodge,
in his commentary on Romans, says that Paul means to delineate here "all
the divine perfections"[11]
in his affirmation of those things which we know about God. Presumably, then,
human beings are created such that they know God to be a Spirit, infinite,
eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice,
goodness, and truth.[12]
Important truths such as these (and we could say these truths are really the most
important ones) God has seen fit not to leave to our own reasoning process to
discover; they are not left to the schools or seminaries; they are not in any
way dependent on the capacities of human creatures themselves for the process
of knowing. They are given to us, revealed to and in us, implanted in us, by
the creative power and providence of Almighty God the Creator.
This seems altogether consistent with God’s character.
There would be something amiss if God chose to create creatures such as us, but
also chose to hide himself from us, leaving us either without a witness to
himself, or, perhaps worse, leaving us to ourselves to try to figure out what
he was like.[13]Just
what kind of knowledge this is and how it might function is another question,
but the import of Paul’s pronouncement here should not be lost. He is affirming
that human beings, all human beings "since the creation of the
world," know, and have always known, the character and attributes of the
true God. This would indicate in fairly strong terms that, whatever else we
might want to say about the SD, it is, in fact, “notitia."
The second aspect of the SD is the internal
implanting by God of this knowledge. Notice, again, how Calvin describes it:
To prevent anyone from taking refuge in the pretense of
ignorance, God himself has implanted in all men a certain understanding
of his divine majesty. Ever renewing its memory, he repeatedly sheds fresh
drops. Since, therefore, men one and all perceive that there is a God and the
he is their Maker, they are condemned by their own testimony because they have
failed to honor him and to consecrate their lives to his will.[14]
And further,
Men of sound judgment will always be sure that a sense of
divinity which can never be effaced is engraven upon men’s minds.
Indeed, the perversity of the impious, who though they struggle furiously are
unable to extricate themselves from the fear of God, is abundant testimony that
this conviction, namely that there is some God, is naturally inborn in all, and
is fixed deep within, as it were in the very marrow. . . .For the world . .
.tries as far as it is able to cast away all knowledge of God, and by every
means to corrupt the worship of him. I only say that though the stupid hardness
in their minds, which the impious eagerly conjure up to reject God, wastes
away, yet the sense of divinity, which they greatly wished to have
extinguished, thrives and presently burgeons. From this we conclude that it is
not a doctrine that must first be learned in school, but one of which each of
us is master from his mother’s womb and which nature itself permits none to
forget, although many strive with every nerve to this end.[15]
We know God, not because we have reasoned our way to him, or have worked
through the necessary scientific procedures, or have inferred his existence
from other things that we know, but we know him by way of his revelation; we
know what God is like "because God has shown it" to us.
The knowledge we have of God is knowledge that has
been given to us by God. It is "implanted" in us, "engraven"
in our minds, "naturally inborn" in all of us, "fixed deep
within" us, a knowledge "which nature permits none to forget."
As Creator, God has guaranteed that he will never be without witness to the
creatures who have been made in his image. He has insured that all of his human
creatures will, and will always, know him. The SD, then, is not "a
doctrine" or teaching that is learned, but rather it is that which is
present within us "from our mother’s womb." Such is the case because
this knowledge is not dependent on us to be acquired; it is given by God. So,
we have the SD, because we are God`s image, and because, as
image, God implants the knowledge of himself within each of us. And this
knowledge is, ipso facto, universal and infallible; to say otherwise
would render those in Adam as excused before God (Rom. 1:20).
But how could that be the case? How could it be the case
that something within us, we flawed and imperfect human beings, could be
such that its content was always and everywhere infallible? This brings us to
the third element of the SD – revelation.
Traditionally, this section of the book of Romans has
been understood to be discussing the topic of natural, or general, revelation.
The knowledge of God which human beings possess is not a knowledge that
depends for its acquisition and content on something that is within us.[16]
It is a knowledge that is given, and it is given by God himself. It is
the revelation of the character of God, given to man, in and through the things
that are made. Thus, the SD is regarded by Paul as knowledge itself
which comes directly and repeatedly from God himself through the things that
God made and sustains. This, of course, is consistent with the Old Testament
understanding of natural revelation as well. The Psalmist, therefore, can say,
The heavens are telling the glory of God; and the
firmament proclaims his handiwork. Day to day pours forth speech, and night to
night declares knowledge (Ps 19:1-2, RSV).
Of course, it is not, strictly speaking, the heavens
that are declaring God’s glory but it is God declaring his glory
"through the things that are made" (the heavens). The SD
itself, then, is revelation from God, implanted in us by God, and is knowledge
of God, the true God, which is clearly perceived and understood by us.
There is another factor that we need to see from Paul’s
discussion in this passage. We should remember that Paul began his discussion
of the SD, not directly, but indirectly, as an elaboration of the notion
of "truth," which truth we all, in our sins, suppress. Specifically,
it is the truth suppressed that is the subject of Paul’s description of
the SD. It is not, we should note, the suppression that is
a part of the SD, but the truth suppressed that is. The
suppression itself is, rather, an elaboration of what it means to be ungodly
and wicked (cf. Rom 1:18).
We must acknowledge, therefore, that the context, the
situation, the environment, for all men everywhere, no matter what the
language or customs is the presence and knowledge of the true God, a knowledge
that comes by way of God`s self-attesting natural revelation. The
implications of this for Christian epistemology, and for Christian apologetics
and philosophy generally, are multifold and abundant, exciting and stimulating.
As was said above, it seems to be altogether true and
right, that man, by virtue of their being created in the image of God, always
and everywhere carry the knowledge of God with them. This knowledge does not
come by the proper and diligent exercise of our cognitive, emotive or volitional
capacities; it rather comes by God’s own revelatory activity within us.[17]
Thus we could say that what Paul is affirming here is the basic, foundational
reality of Universal Theism. This is not a `bare` theism in which we might
believe that something, somewhere, somehow bigger than us exists. Rather, it is
true and universal knowledge of the true God that is ours as his
image.[18]
One important qualifier needs to be added here, and should be developed, but
cannot be elaborated. Since this knowledge of God that all people have is both knowledge
and implanted by God through the dynamic of his revelatory activity, it
is a knowledge that is in many ways quite different from most (if not all)
other kinds of knowledge that we acquire. It is a knowledge, we could
say, that is presupposed by any (perhaps all) other knowledge. For this reason,
it may be best to think of it as more psychological than epistemological.[19]
It is a knowledge that God infuses into his human creatures, and
continues to infuse into them, even as they continue to live out their days
denying or ignoring him (in Adam).
We should also note that this knowledge of God is a knowledge
that he implants "through the things that are made." Thus, it comes,
always and anon, whether or not the human creature claims to know God, or to
have reason for not knowing. This means that entailed in our condition as human
beings is access to the world as created. Behind every culture, and every
`situation;` behind any context or conditioning; behind any linguistic
construct, is the world known, and known as created by the true God who is
known. As God reveals himself through the universe, the universe is known to us
even as God is known to us.
To put the matter theologically, we must know the
world in order to know God, and we must know God because we are his
image. There is, therefore, a universal and necessary access to the world in
such a way that we know God through
knowing it.
Another implication of this formulation of the SD
is that theistic belief of this kind always and everywhere is infallible. That
is, there can be no situation in which God implants the knowledge of himself
and in which the person to whom this knowledge is given fails to know God. This
does not mean that our knowledge of the world is infallible, however, since all
that is required for an infallible knowledge of God is his implanting that
knowledge through the things he has made. Not required is that we
infallibly know the things that are made, but only that we do know them by
virtue of being inextricably tied to them covenantally.
III. Neither Foundationalism Nor Nonfoundationalism
God is our ultimate and most immediate environment. Any
other environment in which we are situated is never, and can never be,
determinative for our being and knowing. We are and know as image.
Given the above two truths, that we are God`s image and thus that we know him,
what should we think about the knowledge situation generally? This is perhaps
the crux of PCE discussions as they relate to epistemology, as they implies a
certain epistemology that threatens a biblical notion of God`s revelation.
For example, entailed in most discussions of PCE is a
rejection of foundationalism. Without so much as an argument,[20]
PCEs tend to dismiss foundationalism out of hand, and to `replace` it with a
noncompensation. So, why the rejection? What seems to be the problem?
First, to be clear, foundationalism is an epistemological
theory about our belief structure, not about the source of our
beliefs (as is the case with discussions of empiricism or rationalism). As a
structure, foundationalism has been described, metaphorically, as a pyramid. At
the base of the pyramid are our `basic` beliefs. Whatever the precise content
of these beliefs, they are all thought to be rational and acceptable without
themselves being supported by any other beliefs we might have. The two sides of
the pyramid are inferential beliefs - beliefs that are in need of
support, and are supported by those beliefs that are basic. So, we have basic
beliefs and inferred beliefs. The sticky wicket in foundationalism, according
to PCE, is that there is embedded in it a notion of properly basic beliefs that
themselves are universal, and universally valid. This universal aspect of our
beliefs, so the PCE story goes, fell victim to the Enlightenment and must be
rejected. It does not take into account the situated-ness of language, or of
cultures, or of contexts. Because of this category of properly basic beliefs, a
foundationalist structure of knowledge is easily merged with the Common Sense
Realism of Thomas Reid and his followers. Reid held that certain, common,
beliefs simply did not need to be justified by way of argument in order to be
rationally held. These beliefs, Reid argued, are rational, universal and not inferred.
We should note here that there is some merit in a
rejection of foundationalism, if what is meant by that term includes
significant aspects of Common Sense Realism. As George Marsden has pointed out,
it is just this `common sense` approach to knowledge that set the stage for the
decline of Christianity`s relationship to academia in the nineteenth century.[21]
In arguing that nineteenth century apologists and Christian academics were
unable radically to challenge the Darwinism that sprang to life in their day,
Marsden shows that, as a matter of fact, the common sense realism that was
dominant during this time among evangelicals was ill-equipped for serious
intellectual challenge. The reason it was ill-equipped, according to Marsden,
was that "common sense could not settle a dispute over what was a matter
of common sense."[22]
This is just to say that common sense beliefs, while perhaps useful for a
generic analysis of human beliefs, are not able to carry the weight of a final
rationale for belief itself. The best one can hope for with such a scenario is
a kind of majority `vote.` Granted, if the vote is a vast majority, the weight
such beliefs can carry is significantly increased. But given that their status
depends on human behavior, it will never be possible to move toward anything
more than probability with respect to the status of belief itself.[23]
For the most part, however, PCEs seldom argue for another
epistemological structure.[24]
They reject foundationalism in support of.....nonfoundationalism. This
is rather like a child rejecting spinach in favor of nonspinach; he`ll
starve to death unless something is put in its place. If neither
foundationalism nor nonfoundationalism will suffice, what then?
What is needed is an epistemological structure that can
support the `why and wherefore` of the knowledge situation. Because of God`s
creative activity, because he has made us as his image, because all of this
presupposes God`s revelatory activity to us, only revelation can provide such
roots.[25]
But just what is a revelational epistemology? According to Cornelius Van Til:
Primary and fundamental for revelational epistemology is
the contention that man can have true knowledge of reality. No form of
agnosticism is consistent with any form of Christianity. Oh yes, there have not
been wanting those that have asserted the contrary, but they are not typical.
Agnosticism is suicidal. Arguments from the possibility of error have amply
demonstrated that we must choose between real knowledge or suicide. ...All that
the argument of the possibility of true knowledge can and does mean is a
negation of agnosticism. Then comes the following question, not to be
identified with the former, whether the possibility of true knowledge, which in
this case must also be an actuality, is attained and can be attained by
theistic argument or is in itself historically a product of revelation.
...Suffice it here to state that all forms of revelational epistemology take
their stand on the trustworthiness of the human consciousness in the most
general sense of the term.[26]
Two elements of a revelational epistemology mentioned
here by Van Til need some elaboration.
First, there is the affirmation that we can have
knowledge of reality. This, of course, is what is rejected in much PCE
literature. Without arguing the case here, this rejection of our access to
reality has nothing of Christianity, and much of Kant, to thank. Though rejected
in PCE, this idea is maintained in common sense realism. Any belief thought to
be basic, and properly so, is an affirmation that there is an intrinsic and
intuitive `connection` between the subject and the object, at least in some
cases. But that connection could only be asserted; it had to provide its own
rationale which, as Marsden maintains, rendered it relatively useless. The
reason that a revelational epistemology can provide an affirmation of knowledge
is that our knowledge of the world is inextricably tied to our knowledge of
God. And our knowledge of God is a necessary element of who we are as image of
God.[27]
Since, as image, God has covenantally bound himself to us, we must, and do,
necessarily know him. We know him because he makes himself known to us through
all that he has made. Just as certainly as we know God, therefore, we know
the world.[28]
Therefore, `the trustworthiness of the human consciousness` has its foundation
in God`s revealing activity.[29]
Secondly, we should note that any idea of believing
anything must find its ground in God`s revelation (natural and special).
As God reveals himself in and through creation, and in his Word, we believe
what we see, hear, taste, etc., because all comes from God and shows us
something of who he is. We will return to this notion below, but first we
should `contextualize` it in terms of the important, Reformed, notion of principia.
In the Protestant tradition, the notion of principium
(meaning `source` or `beginning-point`) was adapted from philosophical
discussions in order to underline the importance of foundational (though this
is not foundationalism) starting points with respect to our
knowledge. Thus, necessary for any theological knowledge was, first, a principium
essendi and then, secondly, a principium cognoscendi. The principium
essendi was that which provided for the reality itself. It was that without
which the thing to be known would not exist. Of course, in theology this is the
Triune God himself. Given this principium essendi, the principium
cognoscendi is that principle, or `starting place,` for knowledge, which
itself depends on the principium essendi. And the starting place for
knowledge, we have said, is God`s revelation.
In theology, the foundation (principium) is
twofold: of being and of knowing (Essendi et Cognoscendi), namely, that
by which it is and that by which it is known; the former establishes or
presents the knowable object (lit., the knowable thing and the object: scibile
et obiectum); the latter brings forth knowledge and gives form to the
subject: the former is God, and the latter is the word of God himself, as is
manifestly expressed and indicated in holy Scripture.[30]
What this means is that, with respect to theology at
least, knowledge must be grounded in something else. It cannot have or find its
ground within itself. With respect to the principia, knowledge must be
grounded in the nature of (ultimate) reality itself. As it turns out, this
emphasis is found in Aquinas` epistemology as well.[31] We`ll
outline some general principles of Thomas` approach, then seek to incorporate a
biblical understanding of the knowledge of God into the main contours of that
approach.
According to Thomas, "demonstration," by which
he means syllogistic reasoning, must "proceed from principles that are
immediate either straightway or through middles."[32] It is
necessary, therefore, for the reasoning process that the knowledge gained
thereby rest on knowledge that is not inferred. So far, we might think that
Thomas is simply affirming here the basic structure of foundationalism. It
sounds as though he is classifying our knowledge as either inferred or
immediate. And so he is.
But there is a difference in what Thomas is saying from
what many modern foundationalists want to affirm. It is certainly the case that
Thomas affirms knowledge of propositions that are indemonstrable. Such is his
meaning of immediate propositions. If immediate propositions were in need of
demonstration they would not, therefore, be immediate. They would be mediated
by way of demonstration.
Immediate propositions, however, are those in which
"the predicate is included within the notion of its subject."[33]
These propositions are known by virtue of themselves, and not by virtue of any
inference from predicate to subject. Thus, immediate propositions are stronger
than mediate, and are known with more certainty. Immediate propositions,
therefore, are not simply epistemic grounds for other, mediate, propositions,
but, even more importantly, they are propositions which themselves are grounded
metaphysically. So, says MacDonald, "Immediate propositions, then, are
capable of being known by virtue of themselves and are, therefore, proper
objects of non-derivative knowledge."[34] This much
could be said by virtually any foundationalist. What is more significant,
however, is the following sentence: "But their actually being known by virtue
of themselves requires that one be acquainted with the facts expressed by
those propositions which requires that one conceive the terms of those
propositions."[35]
In other words, one of the key elements necessary for a
proposition to be immediate is that there be a particular structure of reality.
What propositions are immediate depends on the nature of the world.
Which propositions are immediate, then, depends solely on
what real natures there are and what relations hold among them, that is, on the
basic structure of the world, and on the psychology or belief-structure of any
given epistemic subject.[36]
We can highlight the difference in Thomas` view here perhaps by recalling one
of the typical ways that foundationalism has been pictured in comparison to
coherentism.[37]
As was mentioned above, foundationalism has been pictured as a pyramid, the
base of which pictures basic, non-inferential beliefs, and the two sides of
which picture beliefs inferred from those basic beliefs. Coherentism, on the
other hand, has been pictured as a raft, i.e., a set of beliefs, each of which
is consistent with the rest.[38]
The problem with this picture, however, if we take our cue from Thomas`
formulation, is that the pyramid itself is a raft. While it may have some kind
of base, it nevertheless is "floating" around on its own without
anything to tie it down. For Thomas, it is not the case that the structure of
knowledge is a pyramid. Rather, it is a pyramid that needs its own ground; it
is a pyramid that is grounded in the way the world is made. Thus, says
MacDonald, "Propositions are immediate by virtue of expressing what might
be called metaphysically immediate relationships or facts, the relationships
that hold between natures and their essential constituents."[39]
Thomas, therefore, sees a necessary and direct link
between what we know and the nature of the world. This takes knowledge out of the
realm of epistemology per se, and requires, for a justification of
knowledge, a metaphysical structure such that facts, natures and their
constituents, and the relationships between them, themselves be and be
known, and known immediately. This is contrary to virtually any current
understanding of foundationalism. Foundationalism, as presently discussed, will
allow for no intrusion of metaphysics.
This metaphysical picture allows us to see the kind of
objectivist requirement Aquinas incorporates into the theory of demonstration.
When he claims that the first principles of demonstration must be immediate and
indemonstrable, he is claiming that they must express metaphysically immediate
propositions and not just propositions that are epistemically basic and
unprovable for some particular epistemic subject. That a given proposition P
happens to be indemonstrable for some person S because there are no
other propositions in S`s belief-structure on the basis of which S
would be justified in holding P is no guarantee that P is, on
Aquinas` view, an immediate, indemonstrable proposition. The structure of
demonstration, then, is isomorphic with the metaphysical structure of reality:
immediate, indemonstrable propositions express metaphysically immediate facts,
whereas mediate, demonstrable propositions express metaphysically mediate
facts.[40]
It is the nature of the world, therefore, that gives us a foundation for
foundationalism. The pyramid itself needs a place on which to rest. That place
is creation as revelation, which itself rests on the character of God.
We should note here, that Thomas` epistemology fits
within the context of the principia noted above. We can have knowledge
because of the way things are, the way the world is made. Thus, our principium
cognoscendi is dependent on the principium essendi. The principle or
source of knowledge depends on the essential principle, the latter of which
provides the context and the foundations for the possibility of knowledge itself.
We can also begin to see just how Thomas` approach to
epistemology fits most comfortably with Calvin`s discussion of the sensus
divinitatis (SD). [41]
If it is the case that the SD constitutes knowledge, and knowledge given
by God himself, then, while there can easily be similarities between the SD
and other basic ways of acquiring knowledge–ways like perception and memory–we
need to affirm that there are important and crucial differences between the SD
and other ways of acquiring knowledge or warranted belief. Thomas` way of
spelling out those differences is helpful.
Specifically, given that immediate propositions are those
in which the predicate is included in the notion of the subject, any knowledge
of God that people have by virtue of God`s general revelation is, necessarily,
knowledge in which the predicate is included in the notion of the subject. To
know that God is, for example, is to know that existence is included in the
very idea of God. So also to know that God is good is to know that goodness has
its ground in the character of God himself.
Fundamental to the SD, however, is the fact that
this knowledge of God, given that all people have it, and given that it is had
by virtue of our being made in the image of God, means that it is a knowledge
that is both universal and is immediate. The fact that it is
universal has already been explained above. The `immediacy` of the knowledge of
God that we all have does not mean that this knowledge is not mediated through
anything. For surely it is mediated, as Paul says, "through the things
that are made." Rather, it is immediate knowledge because it is not gained
by way of inference. There is nothing that we do - no demonstration, no
syllogism - that is the ground for the acquisition of this knowledge. As stated
above, it is, as our Christian forefathers would say, cognitio insita.
It is implanted (or inserted) knowledge of God, that is given to us,
through the things that are made, by God himself.
It is knowledge, therefore, that depends on the nature of
the world. It is knowledge that requires that the nature of the world be such
that God is always and everywhere revealing himself through it, and that this
revelation is not something that is resisted, or even resistable, by us,
but is rather something that we do indeed take.
It may very well be that this knowledge is not
propositional. Our analysis of the SD might indicate such. But, if it is
not, that is no problem for a theory of knowledge which seeks to be grounded in
the real nature of things. To insist that such knowledge be propositional is to
revert back to a narrowing of epistemology, and thus, perhaps to a
(foundationalistic) pyramid with no place to rest.[42]
If it is the case, therefore, that all of us know God,
and we know him by virtue of being created in his image (itself a metaphysical
notion), then there is a universal, metaphysical ground for anything, and
everything, else that we can and do know. Given that all of us begin our
cognitive awareness with sure and certain knowledge (of God), all else that we
know will have that knowledge as its anchor. All else that we know, if we know
it, will be consistent with that knowledge. It would be impossible for us to
know something, therefore, that in any way contradicted or contravened that
essential, fundamental, metaphysical knowledge of God. Since God is the
immediate, metaphysical known fact par excellence, anything else that
comes to us as knowledge will have that knowledge as its Archimedean point.
What might this mean for non-inferential knowledge or
belief? Given Thomas` delineation of knowledge, we know immediately, when we
do, because of the nature of the world and its constituent parts. That is, knowledge
is inextricably linked with the way things really are. As we have seen, we
first and foremost know God. And, as Paul says, we know him "through the
things that are made." Entailed, therefore, in our knowledge of God is a
knowledge of the thing, or things, made through which we know God. It is not
the case, we should note, that Paul is arguing that knowledge of God comes
through the things that are made, without at the same time knowing the thing
itself. Thus, it seems, the way in which we begin with respect to knowledge is
by being confronted with the reality of God`s creation, in all its splendor,
and, because of sin`s effects, in all its ugliness as well.
How might we explain this kind of knowledge? Remember in
MacDonald`s analysis above, he notes that, on Thomas` view, things known by
virtue of themselves, "requires that one be acquainted with the
facts expressed by those propositions which requires that one conceive the
terms of those propositions." I may say that I am acquainted with
an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I
am directly aware of the object itself.[43]
Now that which is indubitably, relentlessly, clearly and
comprehensibly "present" to and in all of us is the natural
revelation of God. We know him by virtue of his presence.[44] But we also
know the things made, the things of this world - including, at least, other
people, the world around us, the testimony of others, our own memories -
because, as present to us, these things are the conduits through which God
himself is revealed and known.
It is not the case, therefore, that `common sense`
beliefs, or non-inferential beliefs (or knowledge) must be universal in order
to be justified. Rather, what is universal is the knowledge of God. And
it is universally the case that this knowledge comes through all that God has
made, including we ourselves. It will be expected, therefore, that, included in
being the image of God is the fact that we are, as image, covenantally bound to
the rest of creation such that our knowledge of it and interaction with it is
an essential aspect of who we are as image. The `connection,` therefore,
between our own knowledge and the world as known is made by God himself, who
always and everywhere is revealing himself to his covenant creatures (creatures
made in his image) such that, in knowing what he has made, we know him. What is
`common sense` to us all, therefore, is not necessarily a specific set of
non-inferred beliefs, but rather the knowledge of God which all of us have, and
the concomitant knowledge of the created world which brings that knowledge of
God to us.
At least one of the implications of this for epistemology
is this: just as in theology there must be a principium essendi that
grounds our principium cognoscendi, i.e., just as the existence and
character of God grounds our knowledge of him, since that knowledge presupposes
his existence and character (as given to us in Scripture), so also in
epistemology generally. That is, with respect to knowledge in general, it must
be the case that the existence and character of God ground our knowledge of him
as given to all through all that is made. All knowledge, therefore, if
it is knowledge, presupposes, first, the knowledge of God (the universal
principium cognoscendi), and, second, his existence (the universal principium
essendi).
Foundationalism, therefore, cannot bear the weight of its
own claims. Rejecting, as it is wont to do, any appeal to `the way things are`
with respect to reality itself, it cannot find universal consent with respect
to beliefs that are thought to be basic. That universal consent is found in the
knowledge of God, knowledge which is immediate, and is grounded in the
metaphysical nature of God (as revealer) and of the world he has made (as
revelation).
Without this universal knowledge of God, there is no way
properly to assess the `connection` that we all have, and know we have, to the
world that God has made. This truth, as it is given by God, is the necessary
and universal foundation into which the universal truth of the gospel comes.
The particular truth of salvation in Christ comes into the context of that
universal knowledge of God. The same God who gives the former gives also the
latter. Thus, there is indeed significant, universal, even infallible knowledge
that not only transcends any and all beliefs we might hold, but transcends any
and all contexts, save that of creation itself.
It is important to note here (and this needs much more
attention than we can give it here) that this knowledge of God will not be conceded
by any who are unregenerate; instead it will be suppressed and held down. Thus,
at least two things seem to be the case: (1) only Christians can affirm this
clear and distinct knowledge of God and (2) that which we know is
universally known (God), we know only because of what God
has said in his Word, not because we have any kind of general epistemic
privileged access.
It would seem then that neither foundationalism (whether
strong, weak or otherwise) nor non-foundationalism comport with a Christian
view of the structure of knowledge. Or, if one would prefer the image of a
pyramid as a metaphor for the structure of knowledge, then at the base of the
pyramid is not properly basic belief, as all versions of foundationalism would
have it, but rather it is knowledge of God through the world that forms the
base of the pyramid and all other knowledge (and beliefs) stems from that
universal epistemic condition.
There is more to say, but space will not allow. The fact
of universal self-deception by virtue of our sinful reaction (in Adam) to this
knowledge of God plays a crucial role in how we should `read` the various
cultures and situations into which God`s special revelation in the gospel
comes. The fact that natural revelation itself cannot be properly acknowledged
without the gospel itself, through the Spirit, changing our hearts will have important
ramifications for epistemology as well.[45]
But we have said enough to this point to indicate that
current discussions of PCE and its relatives are significantly wide of the mark
if what is desired is a Christian analysis and application of theology
vis-a-vis philosophical and cultural fads. As we peer through the spectacles of
Scripture, we see a panoramic view that is clearer than the fog offered to us
in PCE. Only a high view of Scripture specifically, and of God`s revelation
generally, can clear that fog. Without
a lamp to our feet and a light to our path, we will always stumble around in
the darkness, morally and intellectually. If PCEs reject the self-attesting
Scripture, they cannot be evangelical. If they accept some form of contextual
determinism, then their postconservatism links them inextricably to their own
fog; PCE itself becomes simply a world of its own making. In that world, if the
true God exists at all, the darkness is so thick that he cannot be seen.
[1]Stanley Grenz and John Franke, Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 2001), 53.
[2]For the sake of simplicity, we can describe foundationalism as maintaining that some of what we believe is universal and certain and that all other beliefs stem from these universal and certain beliefs.
[3]Note that, in Gen 2:7 and 19, both Adam and the beasts are formed from the dust.
[4]This should not be read dichotomistically, as if the image of God in us resides only in the spiritual, or `soul-ish` aspect of man. The point to be made in the text is that God constituted us, both body and soul, as image by virtue of his breathing into what was otherwise non-image.
[5]This condescension should not be thought or construed in such a way that God enters into selective contexts in order to effect a certain goal, or manipulate that context. Rather, this is a part of who God is (covenantally, not essentially) at the point of creation.
[6]John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, vol. 20 of Library of Christian Classics, ed. John T. McNeill, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Library of Christian Classics (London: SCM Press, 1960), I.13.1.
[7]This was, in large part, God`s message to Moses in Exodus 3, and was climactically revealed to us in the Person of the God-man, Jesus Christ.
[8]The theological implications of this `clothing` after the fall cannot be explored here. We should note, however, that, according to Paul, the graciousness of God`s clothing Adam (which should be seen as both physical and spiritual) reaches its eschatological fulfillment at the eschaton (cf. 2 Cor 5:1-5).
[9]This is just another way of explaining what Paul details in Romans 1:18ff.
[10] John Calvin, Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul, the Apostle, to the Romans (Edinburgh: Calvin Translation Society, 1849).
[11] Charles Hodge, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1994), 37 Hodge likely got this from Calvin; see Calvin, Institutes, I.5.11.
[12] Westminster Shorter Catechism, Question 4.
[13] It is worth noting here that the Westminster Confession rightly attributes our inability to know and serve God, not, in the first place, to our sinfulness, but to our constitution as creatures. We are, as created, inherently limited in our ability to understand and to worship God. Thus, the revelation of himself to us, as Paul notes, was necessary, not simply because of or after the fall of man into sin, but at creation’s inception. See Westminster Confession of Faith, VII.1.
[14] Calvin, Institutes, I.3.1, my emphasis.
[15] Calvin, Institutes, I.3.3.
[16] To some extent it `depends` on us in that it would be impossible for us to have it if we did not exist, exist as human beings with cognitive capacities, etc. The distinction here is akin to that between an externalist and internalist notion of warrant. This knowledge does not depend on us in that it is acquired externally, as God himself implants it in us.
[17] Notice Paul’s point that that which is known about God is made manifest within us, and Calvin’s that "God himself has implanted" this knowledge and that "God himself, to prevent any man from pretending ignorance, has endued all men with some idea of his Godhead." The actor, clearly, according to both Paul and Calvin, with respect to the acquisition of the any knowledge of God, which is the SD, is God, not us; we are the (unwilling?) patients.
[18]We cannot here delineate the implications of Paul`s point that we, in Adam, suppress the truth that God gives us, and thus incur his wrath. We should note, however, that, because we suppress that truth, we are, in Adam, caught in a web of sinful self-deception from which only the power of the gospel can deliver us.
[19] That is, knowledge that is initially and centrally focused in the the soul, rather than centrally focused in the mind
[20]As Alvin Plantinga, speaking of postmodernism generally, humorously says, "But you don`t automatically produce a defeater for Christian belief just by standing on your roof and proclaiming (even loudly and slowly), "God is dead!" (Not even if you add: "And everybody I know says so too.") Nor can you call Christian belief (or anything else) into question just by declaring, "I hereby call that into question!" You can`t destroy a way of thinking just by announcing, "I hereby destroy that way of thinking!" This will not do the job, not even if it is embodied in writing of coruscating wit and style, and not even if you adopt a superior air and elegant gestures while intoning it. Something further is required," Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York, etc.: Oxford University Press, 2000), 245–46.
[21] See George Marsden, "The Collapse of American Evangelical Academia," in Faith and Rationality, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 219–64.
[22] Marsden, "Collapse," 244. At least one of the reasons for this seems obvious. If common sense beliefs function as presuppositions, then they take on the (religious) characteristic of authority, ultimacy, etc. But it is also "common" knowledge that common sense beliefs were only generally common and not absolutely so. Therefore, there was no criterion by which to determine which views are and which are not common sense. Or, to say it another way, there was no way to give a rationale for such common sense beliefs without, at the same time, appealing to that rationale, rather than those beliefs, as a presupposition.
[23]This is not to say that epistemic probability is essentially deficient. Some of our beliefs must necessarily remain probable. It is only to say that, if the very foundation on which our beliefs are built cannot rise above the status of epistemic probability, then all of our beliefs must themselves be probable beliefs. In that case, just to use one example, the best that we could say, for example, is that God (most?) probably exists.
[24]Note, to use one example, the comments from Moreland and DeWeese: "We find it rather disappointing that postconservative writers uniformly reject foundationalism, and generally do so with very little argument. The three theoretical commitments that can be discerned in their writings, which might undercut foundationalism are either themselves highly suspect, or only do so in the case of extreme versions, as straw men that represent no contemporary foundationalists," in "The Premature Report of Foundationalism`s Demise," Millard J. Erickson, Paul Kjoss Helseth, and Justin Taylor, Reclaiming the Center: Confronting Evangelical Accommodation in Postmodern Times (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 2004), 89–90.
[25]Here we must include general as well as special revelation. Just how these two relate cannot be detailed here. See Cornelius Van Til, "Nature and Scripture," in The Infallible Word A Symposium by the Members of the Faculty of Westminster Theological Seminary (Phillipsburg, N. J.: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1978), 263–301.
[26]" Cornelius Van Til, The Works of Cornelius Van Til, CD (New York: Labels Army Co., 1997), CD ROM.
[27]There are differences, we should note here, between the knowledge of God that we have and the knowledge of the world that comes with it. The knowledge of God that comes by way of general revelation is incorrigible and infallible, as is the knowledge of God that comes by special revelation (though we may pervert both). Since God reveals himself such that his revelation always and everywhere gets through to us, we unavoidably and necessarily always have it. Because of sin, however, our knowledge of the world is neither incorrigible nor infallible.
[28]In his explication of Van Til`s epistemology, Hendrik Stoker argues for what he calls a phanerotic (revelational) investigation of reality. This, it seems to me, is fundamental to a revelational epistemology. See Hendrik G. Stoker, "Reconnoitering the Theory of Knowledge of Professor Dr. Cornelius Van Til," in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, ed. E. R. Geehan (New Jersey: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1977), esp. 26–34.
[29]This means, of course, that while we may trust our consciousness, generally speaking, just why we may trust it remains a mystery to those outside of Christ. They will do all within their power to attribute such trust to anything but the true God and his activity.
[30] Muller is quoting Hoornbeeck here in Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics : Prolegomena to Theology (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Books, 1987), 298.
[31]Here we will borrow freely from Scott MacDonald`s fine article in Scott MacDonald, "Theory of Knowledge," in The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas, ed. Norman Kretzmann and Eleanor Stump (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 160–95.
[32] Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle, trans. F.R. Larcher O.P. (Albany, New York: Magi Books, Inc., 1970), 17.
[33] Aquinas, PA, 21.
[34] MacDonald, "Theory of Knowledge," 172.
[35] MacDonald, "Theory of Knowledge," 172.
[36] MacDonald, "Theory of Knowledge," 170.
[37] Ernest Sosa, "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence Versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," in Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, ed. Ernest Sosa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 165–91.
[38]It is worth noting that some PCEs who entertain matters epistemological seem more comfortable with a coherentist approach to knowledge.
[39] MacDonald, "Theory of Knowledge," 170.
[40] MacDonald, "Theory of Knowledge," 170.
[41] As far as I can tell, Thomas would not have countenanced a view of the SD that we have set forth. That remained for Calvin to do. There is no question, however, that Thomas was thinking of theology (as well as natural science) as paradigmatic illustrations of the structure of knowledge he advocates. See MacDonald, "Theory of Knowledge," 174.
[42] Some, like Aquinas, would hold that truth accrues only to propositions, and the statements that represent them. If the knowledge of God given in the SD is not propositional, then, under this construal, it cannot be true. This does not, however, seem to be the way Paul understands the truth that we have by way of God`s revelation in creation. Taking Paul`s context, we might simply want to say that truth obtains whenever our cognitive content, propositional or not, corresponds to the way things really are.
[43]It is not necessary at this point (perhaps at any point) to commit to the kind of knowledge that Paul describes; he seems himself to be little interested in such things. But, if "knowledge by acquaintance" does not suffice there are other candidates. For example, William Alston notes, " But if the belief is to the effect that a perceived object is as it perceptually appears to be, why shouldn`t it be justified by the fact that it arises, in the normal way, from that object`s perceptually appearing to be that way? To be sure, the relationship is not "logical". But that will seem to rule out a justificatory relationship only if we are fixated on the model of logical relations between propositions as the only model of epistemic justification. As Wittgenstein said, too restricted a diet of examples can be fatal," William P. Alston, "Sellers and the Myth of the Given" (1998), v, Http://www.ditext.com/alston/alston2.html.
[44]One will readily note the covenantal implications that are central to this kind of knowledge.
[45]This point is all-important and should be emphasized. The knowledge of God implanted, by way of nature, is only acknowledged if one comes to Christ. Without that, the knowledge is suppressed, held down and otherwise subverted and perverted. Thus, true knowledge, if by "true" we mean knowledge that affirms all facts as God`s created facts, cannot be had apart from regeneration. While the basis for our general epistemic condition, therefore, is the sensus divinitatis, given by revelation, the basis for all `true` knowledge, is God`s revelation in his Word applied to our hearts, by the Spirit. See Luke 10:21-22 (parallel with Matt. 11:25-27).