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Letter to Lou Sessinger
October 12, 2006
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Dear Mr.
Sessinger,
I just
read your column in today’s Intelligencer titled “Voting Remains Easy.” I appreciate that you appeared to present both sides of the issue, by including
talking points by county officials and the Coalition for Voting Integrity. Unfortunately,
several points and opinions you stated only served to perpetuate some misinformation and reduce some complexities to simplistic
erroneous assumptions. Because you reach thousands of citizens with your column,
I am hoping you will use your forum responsibly to correct factually inaccurate or misleading statements made about the electronic
voting machines, to clarify why there are serious concerns about the integrity of our votes and a huge dissatisfaction with
the Bucks County commissioners’ choice.
My name
is Janis Hobbs-Pellechio, and I am a member of the Coalition for Voting Integrity. As
extremely concerned persons alarmed at what is happening with our election system, we have spent the last year and a half
trying to inform county officials and citizens about this very issue. We know many think this is either too complicated, or
it is really so simple, the answer is obvious (i.e., new technology is always the best and easiest way to go, for example).
Armed with extensive research from computer science and election experts, government and non-partisan committees, and real-world
performance reports on how these systems work (or don’t) to actually record our votes accurately and securely, it’s
been our mission to dispel myths, alert and educate citizens about this issue. Some
statements from your column:
“There
has been a lot of controversy about Bucks County’s new electronic voting machines, but one thing’s certain: They’re
easy to use.”
This seems
to be the most important selling point for this new voting system, which you perpetuated with your article. However, our priorities (and allegedly the commissioners') in order of importance are security/accuracy,
ease-of-use, and cost. You will notice very little about the first priority in
the county literature (aside from asking citizens to trust the machines, and other points addressed in this letter), and an
almost obsession with how easy this Danaher machine is to use. A recent report
released by the Brennan Center
for Justice, however, concluded the following about full-face touchscreen voting machines, such as the Danaher, which is mentioned
indirectly in the Philadelphia reference. Among the report’s key findings (boldface is added):
- Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) and scrolling Direct Recording
Electronic (DRE) voting systems are more accurate at recording voter intention than older voting systems. In 2004, residual
vote rates were less than 1% for both technologies.
- Full-face DRE systems
continue to be plagued with an unacceptably high residual vote rate. In 2000, 2002 and 2004, it exceeded that of either PCOS
or scrolling DRE systems.
- Residual
vote rates among voters earning less then $25,000 are higher on full-face DREs (2.8%), than on either PCOS (1.4%) or scrolling
DREs (1.3%).
“The good news is that
most states are selecting machines and designing ballots that will record more voters’ choices accurately. The bad news is that major jurisdictions like Philadelphia, and perhaps New York City, plan to use voting technology
that is known to have high error rates,” said Lawrence Norden, Associate Counsel at the Brennan Center and lead author of the report.
It seems that the full-face machines are more confusing
to many people, and lead to under-votes and inaccurate casting. So much for the
ease-of-use, as well as accuracy, priorities. Since you did not touch on the
cost issue in your article, I won’t elaborate much here, but there are reams of data to prove that the optical scan
systems are far less expensive to acquire, maintain, and use.
[Concerning voting on new touchscreen Danaher machines]
“When everything’s the way you want it, you press a large, green VOTE button, and your choices are recorded to
eight, internal memory cartridges.”
“Each machine can print out the data in its memory.”
“I’ve heard there are scanner-type voting machines on the market that give voters a printout, but the old,
mechanical machines never printed me a copy of how I voted, so what’s the difference?”
These sentences reveal that
you, like many people, don’t understand how the different systems work, the shortcomings inherent in some, and why we
are so concerned. While a fuller explanation can be found on our website, www.CoalitionforVotingIntegrity.org, in the “Facts & FAQs” section, the nutshell version
is this:
1.
Direct Record Electronic (DRE) voting systems, such as the Danaher, record all
information via software inside the machine. There is no voter-verification
of what is actually being recorded, counted, or tallied. There is no way to determine
that the result that comes out at the end of the day is actually what the voter intended.
According to computer experts and non-partisan research of actual election incidents, whether by malicious or unintentional
computer or human error, it is very possible for a DRE to show one thing on the screen, and to record, cast and/or tally something
completely different. It therefore makes no difference how many times the software-generated ballot information is allegedly
being stored inside the machine. Because there is no physical, independent
check against the software-generated vote tally, there is absolutely no way to claim or guarantee that the election results
are valid.
2.
Optical scanner voting systems are inherently voter-verified. Voters indicate their choices on actual paper ballots, filling in ovals with pencil, as with lottery tickets
or standardized tests. This physical ballot is read by a scanner, and retained
in a locked box. It is not an ATM-type receipt or printout generated by computer
for the voter to look at. The actual ballot filled out by the voter—a
hard copy of the voter’s intent independent of the computer— is available for recounts and audits as a check against
the final electronic tally.
3.
It is true that lever voting machines do not issue paper receipts for the voter
to verify, and that any system, including the lever one, is not error-free. However,
because the levers are mechanical, their vote results are much harder to tamper with or have large error results. Each individual machine would have to be manipulated, and the results would be limited to that machine.
With software and computers, however, the
damage by errors or malicious intent can be far more extensive. Entire elections
can be affected by a single programming flaw or virus. The potential for disaster
is so much greater with computers that to use the lack of paper backup for levers as an argument for DREs is a huge red herring,
and a disservice to citizens everywhere.
“Members of the Coalition for Voting Integrity
don’t like the machine Bucks is using. It’s made by the Danaher company,
and its machines are used around the country.
"Problems with the machines have occurred, though. For example, in Knox County, in 2001, election officials were unable
to retrieve data from one machine or have the machine print out the results.
"But that was five years ago. Technology is always improving....
“Bucks officials are confident the machines
will live up to their expectations and that they have a good track record in nearby counties.”
These statements made in your column display a large
unfamiliarity with the real history of the Danaher machines and their actual track records in other municipalities, and perhaps
are based on vendor or commissioner-supplied information. One can check websites
that keep track of election problems for the true story (again, can be accessed via our website, among others).
In the 2004 election, Philadelphia (which uses the Danahers exclusively)
reported nearly 400 machine failures. That doesn’t even include the human error problems
with these machines, which could reflect on machine design flaws. After the grave
problems with under votes on Danahers and other electronic machine mishaps in New Mexico, the governor threw out all the DREs and replaced
them statewide with optical scan machines.
By implying that the Danaher system had one problem
worth mentioning five years ago, and that everyone else using this system has been problem-free, you are perpetuating a huge
myth, one that the commissioners seem intent on pushing to validate their decision.
The majority opinion among computer experts is that
computer technology, as embodied in non-voter-verifiable, paperless voting systems, is not appropriate to conduct entire elections
on. While technology can speed up some election steps, they state it is not reliable
enough at this time (and possibly never will be) to conduct our elections on exclusively. We are making a process that should
be simple (counting our votes reliably) needlessly complex with unnecessary technology. For us to rely on computer results
that cannot be backed up independently is foolish, which should be apparent to anyone with a passing familiarity with computers
crashing or viruses changing results.
So “technology is always improving”
is not a valid argument right now. And to apply it to the Danahers is even more
problematic, since the models we have now are essentially unchanged since their initial design years ago. Also, after contracting
to get all new machines, the commissioners are now purchasing “refurbished” ones!
Looking ahead to the inevitable day that voter-verifiable
paper records are required in Pennsylvania (37 states already have legislation for this), the “solution” to make the Danaher system
compliant will be very expensive and very problematic. To date, Danaher has no
operating attachable printer that has been used in a real election. The alleged
cost for this future printer, according to the commissioners, will be around $2400 each (now multiply by
over 700 machines!). Printers attached to DREs are notoriously prone to extra problems, like jamming. So all this “technology” we are getting with our new voting system to help us looks instead
like a needlessly complex problem that could be averted using a much simpler system that inherently produces voter-verifiable
paper records easily and with no extra cost.
“I suppose accuracy is a matter of trusting
the technology you’re using. Errors have occurred with mechanical machines,
and errors have occurred with hand-counted paper ballots.
"Probably nothing is completely error-free, but it’s
the responsibility of the election board and the judges of elections to provide the oversight necessary to detect such errors.”
These sentences are perhaps
the most chilling. Accuracy is NOT a matter of trust, in any way,
shape or form. Accuracy can only be reasonably assured by having a physical crosscheck
of any result, especially important when dealing with the non-transparent process of software tabulations inside a computer!
This is the heart of our
arguments, and the basis of our passionate pleas for a voting system that we can verify to count our votes correctly. We resent and deplore the fact that the commissioners have essentially taken away
our rights and confidence that our votes will actually count. If they and you
and anyone else want to be foolish enough to trust your vote, your voice in our democracy, in something that every computer
scientist and elementary school kid know is basically untrustworthy, then you all have that right, I suppose. But it is NOT their right to demand that WE trust any computer.
You seem to think that it
will be up to the election boards and judges to guarantee that everything will go smoothly and error-free on Election Day. Here is the hard truth: Our elections
are not transparent anymore. The casting, tabulations and vote-counting are
happening inside the computers, where no one can see what is happening. It is
impossible, even for computer experts, to watch or catch many errors that occur. Computer software errors, viruses that can
change results without leaving any trace of their activity, human errors in using voting machines, memory chips that can be
lost or switched or misprogrammed---any or all of these things are outside the view and expertise of the poll workers and
officials, and to rely on them to safeguard your vote is the height of folly.
I am very perplexed by the
commissioners’ decision and insistence on going ahead with a voting system that is so obviously inferior and does not
serve the needs of the citizens of Bucks County. They defy all logic, try to defend
their choice with lame arguments that are easily refuted with facts, and seem to have thrown all common sense out the window. It has turned into a very sad and frightening situation, in which the decision of
a very few can affect so many so negatively, especially when their decision has no basis in reality.
I am positive we will hear
of “glitches” occurring on November 7. Officials will use that word,
as well as “human-error,” to cover all manner of election mishaps, ranging from small errors to huge problems,
in an effort to downplay any concerns about whatever transpires. I am truly hoping
that nothing goes wrong, as I cherish the idea that all our votes will count, and we will elect whomever the majority chooses.
My real fear is not that there will be obvious problems. My fear is that any real election-changing problem may go completely unnoticed
or undetectable, a situation that could have been avoidable with a different voting system.
If you have any questions
at all, or don’t understand something, or want clarification of any of my points, please don’t hesitate to contact
me, Mr. Sessinger. I am sure we all want the same thing, in the end; to know
that the foundation of our democracy is never eroded because its cornerstone—the integrity of each citizen’s vote—is
solid. Thanks so much.
Sincerely,
Janis
Hobbs-Pellechio
Doylestown, PA
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