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r. Capture of Hawsawi and Laptop With Anthrax Spray Drying Docs Capture of Hawsawi and Laptop With Anthrax Spray Drying Docs On March 23, 2003, the Washington Post reported on documents allegedly discovered at the Abdul Qadoos Khan residence -- on a seized laptop -- relating to biochemical weapons. The documents indicated that Al Qaeda leaders may already have manufactured some of them. The documents at the Qadoos home reveal that Al Qaeda had a feasible production plan for anthrax. Confronted with scanned handwritten notes on the computer, Mohammed reportedly began to talk about Al Qaeda's anthrax production program. KSM, however, denies that it was his computer. He says it was the computer of Mustafa Hawsawi, who was captured at the home the same day. In 2001, before departing for the UAE, Al-Hawsawi had worked in the Al Qaeda media center Al Sahab (Clouds) in Kandahar. The letter containing the first anthrax went to the American Media in Florida had blue and pink clouds on it.
Hawsawi worked under KSM who in turn worked for Zawahiri. Al-Hawsawi was a facilitator for the 9/11 attacks and its paymaster, working from the United Arab Emirates. He sent thousands to Bin Al-Shibh in the summer of 2001. After 9/11, he returned to Afghanistan where he met separately with Bin Laden, Zawahiri and spokesman Abu Ghaith. KSM worked closely with al-Hawsawi. It would make perfect sense that the computer is actually al-Hawsawi's. The fact that the anthrax spray drying documents were on that computer, however, and that Al-Hawsawi had worked for Al Sahab in Kandahar in 2000, serves to suggest that the undated documents predated 9/11, particularly given that extremely virulent anthrax was later found in Kandahar. At the same time, it suggests that Al-Hawsawi has personal knowledge relevant to anthrax. Al-Hawawi in turn worked with Aafia Siddiqui's husband-to-be, KSM's nephew Al-Baluchi, in the UAE in the summer of 2001. The two provided logistical support for the hijackers. Hawsawi worked as a financial manager for Bin Laden when he was in Sudan. He was associated with Egyptian Islamic Jihad shura leader Mahjoub, who was Bin Laden's farm manager in Sudan. Mahjoub was the subject of the anthrax threat in January 2001 in Canada, upon announcement of his bail hearing. The day after Mahjoub's bail was denied on October 5, 2001, the potent stuff was sent to US Senators Daschle and Leahy. The FBI needed to prioritize any lead involving individuals who knew Mahjoub; but in accusing Ivins, it appears that they failed to do so. The Washington Post explained that "What the documents and debriefings show, the first official said, is that "KSM was involved in anthrax production, and [knew] quite a bit about it." Barton Gellman in the Post explained that Al Qaeda had recruited competent scientists, including a Pakistani microbiologist who the officials declined to name. "The documents describe specific timelines for producing biochemical weapons and include a bar graph depicting the parallel processes that must take place between Days 1 and 31 of manufacture. Included are inventories of equipment and indications of readiness to grow seed stocks of pathogen in nutrient baths and then dry the resulting liquid slurry into a form suitable for aerosol dispersal." The Washington Post story notes that U.S. officials said the evidence does not indicate whether al Qaeda completed manufacture. The documents are undated and unsigned and cryptic about essential details. In addition to establishing him as paymaster for the hijackers, Al-Hawsawi's computer disks reportedly also included lists of contributors worldwide, to include bank account numbers and names of organizations that have helped finance terror attacks. In press accounts, one unnamed government official confirmed that the information has yielded the identities of about a dozen suspected terrorists in the US. In his substituted testimony in the Moussaoui case, Al-Hawsawi says he became part of Al Qaeda's media committee in Afghanistan in about July 2000. Hawsawi lived at the media office. For about 4-5 months in 2000, Hawsawi worked as a secretary on al Qaeda's media committee. Hawsawi's role "was to copy compact discs and reprint articles for the brothers at the guesthouse in Qandahar. After 2000, Hawsawi worked at the direction of Sheikh Mohammed, transferring funds, and procuring goods." KSM joined the committee in February 2001. The first time that Hawsawi was asked to be come involved in operational activities was about March 2001, when he took his second trip to the UAE. Although Sheikh Mohammed did not use the word "operation," Sheikh Mohammed told Hawsawi that he would be purchasing items, receiving and possibly sending money, and possibly meeting individuals whom Hawsawi would contact or who would contact him. Sheikh Mohammed also told Hawsawi that his stay would be lengthy, so he should rent an apartment. Sheikh Mohammed said Hawsawi did not need cover because he was carrying a Saudi passport, and it was a common practice for a Saudi to rent an apartment in the UAE. In approximately August 2001, Hawsawi, with Sheikh Mohammed's blessing, decided to take an English course. Sheik Mohammed told Hawsawi that he would be in contact with individuals called 'Abd Al-Rahman (Muhammad Atta) and the "Doctor" (Nawaf al-Hazmi). Atta called Hawsawi four times while in the US. Hawsawi says he was never in contact with Hani or Nawaf while in the US. On September 9, Ramzi bin Shibh told him the date of the planned operation and urged that he return to Pakistan. He flew out on 9/11 and after a night in Karachi, flew on to Quetta. Hawsawi stated repeatedly that he never conducted any activity of any type with or on behalf of Moussaoui and had no knowledge of who made Moussaoui's travel arrangements. Documents, however, reportedly show that al-Hawsawi worked with the Dublin cell to finance Moussaoui’s international travel. Hamid Aich was an EIJ operative there who once had lived with Ressam, the so-called millennium bomber, in Canada. The indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui named al-Hawsawi as an unindicted co-conspirator. Moussaoui unsuccessfully tried to call KSM and Hawsawi as witnessses. Hawsawi has said that it was Qahtani who was to have been "the 20th hijacker" rather than Moussaoui. Qahtani, Hawsawi said, had trained extensively to be one of the "muscle hijackers." Atta went to pick Qahtani up at the Orlando airport but immigration officials turned Qahtani away. Al-Hawsawi said he had seen Moussaoui at an al-Qaeda guesthouse in Kandahar, Afghanistan, sometime in the first half of 2001, but was not introduced to him and had not conducted any operations with him. At Moussaoui's trial, the government pointed to FAA intelligence reports from the late 1990s and 2000 that noted that a hijacked airliner could be flown into a building or national landmark in the U.S., Such an attack was viewed "as an option of last resort" given the motive of the attack was to free blind sheik Abdel Rahman. Flying a plane into a building would afford little time to negotiate. Zacarias Moussaou reportedly was in Karachi with anthrax lab tech Yazid Sufaat on February 3, 2001 when they bought air tickets through a local travel agency for Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. They reportedly left on a flight for KL on February 8, 2001. Moussaoui began at the Norman, Oklahoma flight school on February 26, 2001. KSM says that Moussaoui's inquiries about cropdusters may have related to Hambali and Sufaat's work with anthrax. Another reason not to underestimate Hawsawi's role in an anthrax operation is his contact with al-Marri. Al-Marri, who entered the country on September 10, 2001, was researching chemicals in connection with a "second wave." Al-Marri was also drafting emails to KSM. Although al-Marri denies being in contact with Hawsawi, phone records show otherwise. Email evidence also confirms messages drafted by al-Marri to KSM. An article by Susan Schmidt in the Washington Post on al-Marri notes that al-Marri picked up $13,000 in cash from al-Hawsawi. Al-Marri made the mistake of opening the briefcase containing the money in bundles and peeling off a few hundred dollars to pay his bail after being stopped on a traffic charge a couple days after 9/11. References to al-Hawsawi turned up in the Dublin, Ireland, office of a Saudi-backed charity suspected of having links to bin Laden upon a raid after 9/11 by Irish authorities. even though his English was fine. In applying, he would not provide a home address or sign the application. “He was a very pugnacious individual,” the administrator told the Post. He was calling students. A number of people reported him as acting suspicious in the heightened sensibilities after 9/11. One student from whom he sought help was the local mosque imam, graduate student Jaloud. Jaloud curiously reports that he did not remember him as the fellow he had taken to the airport 90 minutes away in the summer of 2000, or the fellow he had argued about shipping the computer, or the fellow who had then put him to the expense of shipping the computer to Washington. (Jaloud reports when questioned in 2005, he told the Saudis that he did not remember the address in Washington where he sent the computer.) t. 2003 Capture Of Hambali And Sufaat's Assistants And The Seizure Of "Extremely Virulent" (But Unweaponized) Anthrax Muklis Yunos was arrested on May 25, 2003. Agents reportedly became suspicious when an ambulance pulled over and delivered Yunos, who was wearing a plaster cast on a leg as part of a disguise. According to other reports, he was also wearing facial bandages. An Egyptian missionary accompanying him, Al Gabre Mahmud, was apparently on an international terrorist watchlist. Authorities became suspicious when the two went to the wrong gate (and did not go to the one typically used for medical transport). The pair then objected when officials wanted to remove some of the mummy-like bandages. AP reported that a police intelligence dossier describes him as "a fanatic of the extreme fundamentalist movement" who received training in an Al Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, including lessons on the use of anthrax as a biological weapon. He is described as about five foot three and with the features of a Japanese-Korean. The MILF leadership has strongly but unconvincingly denied that Yunos was affiliated with their organization. According to one report, Yunos initially was cooperating with authorities over a bucket of spicy Kentucky Fried Chicken, complaining about the arrogance and unhelpfulness of MILF leadership. Hambali was arrested in mid-August 2003 in Thailand. Hambali had fled Malaysia with his wife, Lee, not long after 9/11. His wife and her sister had studied at the school of Bashir, JI's religious leader. He told his mother they were moving to Thailand. Hambali worked and his wife studied Arabic. Over the next two years, he also spent time in Cambodia and Myanmar. Soft-spoken and polite, the neighbors said he kept to himself in the apartment building. He reportedly underwent plastic surgery to alter his appearance, but perhaps he just shaved his beard. His wife, an ethnic Chinese Malaysian who converted to Islam, was also detained. After being shipped to Jordan, where he was harshly interrogated, Hambali eventually began providing information about Al Qaeda's anthrax production program. He told interrogators that the terror network had what author Ron Suskind describes as an "extremely virulent" strain of anthrax before the September 11 attacks. In the autumn of 2003, Suskind reports, U.S. forces in Afghanistan found a sample of the virulent anthrax at a house in Kandahar. Pulitzer Prize winning author Ron Suskind writes: "One disclosure was particularly alarming: al Qaeda had, in fact produced high-grade anthrax. Hambali, during interrogation, revealed its whereabouts in Afghanistan. The CIA soon descended on a house in Kandahar and discovered a small, extremely potent sample of the biological agent." He continued: "The anthrax found in Kandahar was extremely virulent. What's more, it was produced, according to the intelligence, in the months before 9/11. And it could be easily reproduced to create a quantity that could be readily weaponized." Suskind writes: "Ever since the tense anthrax meeting with Cheney and Rice in December 2001, CIA and FBI had been focused on determining whether al Qaeda was involved in the anthrax letter attacks in 2001 and whether they could produce a lethal version that could be weaponized. The answer to the first was no; to the second, 'probably not.' Though the CIA had found remnants of a biological weapons facility -- and blueprints for attempted production of anthrax -- isolating a strain of virulent anthrax and reproducing it was viewed as beyond al Qaeda's capabilities. Suskind continued: "No more. The anthrax found in Kandahar was extremely virulent. What's more, it was produced, according to the intelligence, in the months before 9/11. And it could be easily reproduced to create a quantity that could be readily weaponized." "Alarm bells rang in Washington. Al Qaeda, indeed, had the capabilities to produce a weapon of massive destructiveness, a weapon that would create widespread fear. The next puzzle piece was tucked, inconspicuously, inside a computer. The computer was picked up in late August in Pakistan in a sweep by ISI of apartments that were once safe houses for al Qaeda operatives. On the hard drive were pictures of a very precise, very professional casing effort in New York City. Grand Central Terminal, and its cavernous vaults, from many angles. Banks. Hotel lobbies. The headquarters of famous Manhattan-based companies, with pictures that included everything from heating, ventilation, and air-condition systems to locks on security doors. Many of the sites photographed represented closed spaces, each ideal, in different ways, for mubtakkar attacks or, now, an anthrax attack." This apparently was the report from the trip to New York City by Dhiren Bhart and Al-Marri. Based on the additional information being provided in 2003, authorities also captured two mid to low level technicians -- an Egyptian and a Sudanese. President Bush has explained that these mid-to low level technicians were part of a Southeastern Asian based cell that was developing an anthrax attack on the United States. In Fall of 2006, President Bush explained: "KSM also provided vital information on al Qaeda's efforts to obtain biological weapons. During questioning, KSM admitted that he had met three individuals involved in al Qaeda's efforts to produce anthrax, a deadly biological agent -- and he identified one of the individuals as Yazid. KSM apparently believed we already had this information, because Yazid had been captured and taken into foreign custody before KSM's arrest. In fact we did not know about Yazid's role in al Qaeda's anthrax program. Information from Yazid then helped lead to the capture of his two principal assistants in the anthrax program. Without the information provided by KSM and Yazid, we might not have uncovered this al Qaeda biological weapons program, or stopped this al Qaeda cell from developing anthrax for attacks against the United States." Sufaat wrapped things up in the Summer of 2001, according to Tenet, and briefed Hambali and Zawahiri over the course of a week. University of Maryland researcher Milton Leitenberg views Al Qaeda's efforts in Afghanistan as incompetent. He asserts: "The 2005 Silberman-Robb Commission report claims that Al Qaeda in Afghanistan did obtain ‘‘Agent X,’’ which is understood to have meant a B. anthracis pathogenic strain, and not a vaccine strain. The claim appears to be incorrect." He argues Al Qaeda's "effort failed, as the organization was unable to obtain a pathogenic strain of B. anthracis. Al Qaeda’s work was incompetent in the extreme and had barely advanced beyond early speculation by the time a joint allied military team raided and occupied its facilities in December 2001. Mr. Leitenberg concludes: "In terms of bioterrorism perpetrated by a terrorist organization, the Amerithrax events are an outlier, as they almost certainly were carried out by a U.S. scientist, fully trained, with access to pathogenic strains and optimum working conditions. " An exclusive September 2007 Associated Press, article quoted one hearing before the Combat Status Review Tribunal. It quoted an allegation against Rahmatullah Sangaryar, who stood accused of "planning biological and poison attacks on United States and coalition forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan" and of possessing anthrax powder and a liquid poison." The article reports that "the Afghan detainee said he was captured only with muddy clothes, possessed no anthrax and never planned such an attack." "Do you know of anyone who would accuse you of such an act? This is so serious," the hearing officer said. "I am trying to understand why it is here in front of me, this allegation against you." iopelled grenades, the AK-47 and the Sakil machine gun.
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in the late 1970s. His group was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. He received about half of all CIA funding despite his virulent anti-western views. Hekmatyar has long-established ties with both Osama Bin Ladin and blind sheik Abdel-Rahman. Prosecutors in the prosecution of US-based charities took a dim view of any defendant's connection to Hekmatyar. f Taliban Spokesman With Anthrax Packets Intended For Mailing To Government Officials Amerithrax Agents checked the Kabul area in May 2004 but came up empty, sources told the Washington Post. In November of that year, on additional information, agents spent weeks searching an area in the Kandahar mountains, several hundred miles outside of Kabul. Again they found nothing. In January 2007, a Taliban spokesman was captured. An Afghanistan governor says his residence contained anthrax powder packets. According to a report by the Afghan Islamic Press Agency, as monitored by the BBC, the powdered anthrax was intended for mailing to government officials. The former Taliban spokesman quietly told a camera that he was "on a mission" when he was arrested. The fellow who reportedly had "anthrax powder packets" had been living in Peshawar. Muhammad Hanif's real name is Abdulhaq Haji Gulroz. Is this young guy mentioned above Qari Mullah Din Muhammad Hanif, the former madrassa-trained Minister of Education who wouldn't let the medical school use cadavers? (That was a good thing given that the school didn't have electricity.) Is he a "Dr." If so, what kind? The former education minister had not received a secular education and oversaw the medical school. A veterinary student in September 2001 said they had nothing in the way of facilities or equipment. It was the Agriculture Minister who had taken a keen interest in supervising the Red Cross/FAO-funded anthrax vaccine laboratory. Yazid Sufaat did his anthrax work, he says, as part of a "Taliban medical brigade." A building associated with the charity WAFA housed a lab, and WAFA was a militant supporter of the Taliban. So while we still lack lab tests and further clarification or confirmation, this sketchy report about anthrax powder packets is intriguing. No failure on the part of the ISI to cooperate with the FBI or CIA on the subject of an attack using aerosolized anthrax should be countenanced. Dr. Claire Fraser-Liggett told the panel assembled by the National Academies of Sciences in July 2009 that she began her work to find a match began in late 2001 -- a successful method was not completed until 2007, when agents report that they began to seriously investigate Ivins. "I was hopeful that perhaps genomics would provide sufficient amount of information to be able to track the material to its source, but I then, and have always, asserted that in no way did I ever believe that this kind of genomics-based investigation was ever going to lead to the perpetrator," Fraser-Liggett said. "That was going to require much more traditional police investigation." The US Department of Justice responded in April 2009 in response to a September 2008 question by the House Judiciary Committee responded with gobblydygook:
Remember when senior FBI officials spoke plain English? In February 2002, onen senior FBI agent told the Wall Street Journal that access to anthrax was “absolutely so lax,” that even if the lab is identified, it may not be possible to discover where the terror strain was sent or who had access to it. The WSJ article noted: "At Dugway Proving Ground, a large military facility in Utah currently under investigation, a former scientist said security was slipshod. 'Somebody could have walked out of a hot area with a couple of spores in a briefcase or lunch pail,' he said." Paul Keim told the journal Science: "My body went cold because I realized we only had a few hours to prepare for it. It was sundown when I drove to the commercial airport at Flagstaff. The airport officials let me drive out on the tarmac. I watched the jet land; an attractive blonde woman got off with a box containing the culture. It was a surreal experience. I felt like Humphrey Bogart in a scene from Casablanca. I put the box in my car and drove right back to the lab. The next morning, we called Atlanta to say that we'd determined the sample to be the Ames strain." The Affidavit submitted in support of the search regarding Ft. Detrick research Bruce Ivins, who committed suicide in mid-Summer 2008, states:
As one news account noted: "Ask Keim [the FBI's key scientist on the issue] if he thinks Ivins was the anthrax letters terrorist and he says he just doesn’t know. 'It remains to be seen.' " Claire Fraser-Liggett, professor at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and director of the University of Maryland Institute for Genome Sciences and an adviser to the FBI on Amerithrax, asked, “What would have happened in this investigation had Dr. Hatfill not been so forceful in his response to being named a person of interest. What if he, instead of fighting back, had committed suicide because of the pressure? Would that have been the end of the investigation?” It was Fraser-Liggett’s genetic analysis of the anthrax spores in the letters led to Ivins' flask, and the other 7 isolates with the same genetic profile. “The part that seems still hotly debated is whether there was sufficient evidence to name Dr. Ivins as the perpetrator,” Fraser-Liggett says. “I have complete confidence in the accuracy of our data,” Fraser-Liggett says, but she says it does not indicate Ivins is guilty.
Given that the documentary evidence establishes UNM received virulent Ames from flask 1029 in March 2001, why is UNM not on the list of places that received Ames from 1029? (as distinguished from 1028 and 1030). Why isn’t University of Michigan? Michael Hayes, a lab tech there, reported on killing virulent Ames supplied by Dr. Ivins in a petri dish. In October 2001, LSU and University of Michigan were subpoenaed. A DARPA Program Manager at the time privately told a friend of mine that they knew where the attack Ames came from and even the machine used to make it. LSU and University of Michigan were subpoenaed out of the gate. According to Richard Hidalgo, assistant to the dean of the school of veterinary medicine at LSU, the DOJ asked the school to provide by Oct. 23 a log of all visitors and employees at the Hugh-Jones Special Pathogens Lab since Jan. 1, 2000, including their Social Security numbers and dates of birth. The subpoena also asked for information on shipments of pathogens to and from the lab. "Besides Dr. Hugh-Jones and his lab director, only three others have been in the lab" during the time in question, Hidalgo said. "I've never been there myself." Why did the FBI limit the October 2001 subpoena of LSU Special Pathogens Lab to visitors after January 1, 2000. Wasn't the DARPA research involving virulent Ames supplied by Bruce Ivins occurred prior to that? Newsday reported:
Alibek says Russia had Ames. Porton Down reportedly provided it to four unnamed researchers. (That, for example, is where Martin Hugh-Jones at LSU got it in the late 1990s). American Type Culture Collection ("ATCC") has written me to say that as a matter of policy, they will not address whether their patent repository (as distinguished from their online catalog) had virulent Ames prior to 9/11. Although ATCC did not take the opportunity to deny it, one can infer from the FBI's affidavit in connection the search of Ivins' residence that no lab in Virginia is known by the FBI to have had virulent Ames. Thus, FBI, in its "Ivins Theory," was working on the understanding that ATCC did not have Ames in its patent repository. Ari Fleischer explained: "What you have to keep in mind is the difference between knowledge about what type of information you have to have to produce it, and who could have sent it. They are totally separate topics that could involve totally separate people. It could be the same person or people. It could be totally different people. The information does not apply to who sent it." Ken Alibek, the former head of the Soviet bio-weapons program suggests that 'If I were a terrorist, I would certainly not use a strain known to be from my country.'" To the same effect, Bruce Ivins would not have used the strain -- a special mixture of the US Army strain -- for which he was the "go-to" person. The Washington Post explained in a late October 2008 article: "While some FBI scientists were analyzing genetic mutations, others were scouring the planet for repositories of Ames-strain bacteria. To their surprise, Ames turned out to be quite rare, with only 15 U.S. institutions and three foreign ones possessing live, virulent Ames. Samples of Ames were collected and added to a repository the FBI had established at Fort Detrick. In a process that ended only in late 2006, bureau scientists picked up 1,072 samples of anthrax bacteria and tested each for mutations identical to the ones in the bioterrorist's letters." "Back at the bureau's Washington field office, agents were reconstructing the history of RMR-1029. A giant flow chart, covering most of a wall, recorded each discovery about the origins of the spores and what Ivins did with them. But the agents wondered: Could others, besides Ivins, have gotten access to the flask of spores?" The Post article continues: "The question drives much of the skepticism about the FBI's case. At a news conference in August, bureau officials estimated that as many as 100 people potentially had access to the biocontainment lab where Ivins kept his collections. Investigators have maintained that other possible suspects were ruled out, but they have never explained how. It is one of the gaps that independent experts and lawmakers have raised since Ivins's death." Journalist Joby Warrick writes: "In interviews, FBI officials said the list of 100 names included USAMRIID scientists as well as anyone with even a tenuous connection to Ivins's lab, such as visitors or janitors. Each person was investigated, though most could not have gotten to the spores under any reasonable scenario the investigators could construct." "Still, dozens of people were cleared at various times to enter USAMRIID's Building 1425, where Ivins worked and kept his spore collection. Each had to be investigated, even those who lacked the basic knowledge to handle highly lethal bacteria." Joby Warrick of the Washington Post reports that "In late October 2001, lab technician Terry Abshire placed a tray of anthrax cells under a microscope and spotted something so peculiar she had to look twice." "Abshire focused her lens on a moldlike clump. Anthrax bacteria were growing here, but some of the cells were odd: strange shapes, strange textures, strange colors. These were mutants, or 'morphs,' genetic deviants scattered among the ordinary anthrax cells like chocolate chips in a cookie batter." Although it would take years to develop the science, this discovery led to proving that the origin of the anthrax was originally Ivins reference flask. There was no requirement to document transfers prior to 1997. One former USAMRIID-sponsored vaccine researcher at UMass, Dr. Curtis Thorne reports that samples used to be sent by ordinary mail. In 2001, his research on virulence of genetically altered anthrax strains was being built upon at the University of Texas (Houston) by Theresa Koehler under a grant from the CIA, the National Institutes of Health and others. The Ames strain, along with other strains, would be distributed not for nefarious purposes, but for veterinary and other research, to include use in challenging vaccines in development. "We just don't know how many hands it went through before it got to the ultimate user," explained Michael Osterholm, director of the Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy at the University of Minnesota and once a consultant to the government's investigation. One expert, Dr. C.J. Peters, summarizes: "Knowing that this strain was originally isolated in the U.S. has absolutely nothing to do with where the weapon may have been prepared because, as I tried to make the point, these strains move around. A post doc in somebody's laboratory could have taken this strain to another lab and it could have been taken overseas and it could have ended up absolutely anywhere. Tiny quantities of anthrax that you couldn't see, that you couldn't detect in an inventory can be used to propagate as much as you want. So that's just not, in fact, very helpful." The FBI estimates that, at a minimum, 100 had access to the flask in Bruce Ivins' lab. Ft. Detrick scientists point out that it used to be stored in a different lab in 1997, bringing the number to 200-300 people. The New York Post reports that "multiple facilities outside of Fort Detrick were sent RMR-1029 for their own research, including government laboratories, the Battelle lab and academic institutions like the University of New Mexico." The Post explains: "In April 2007, the FBI sent Ivins a letter saying he was "not a target of the investigation" and said it was investigating 42 people who had access to RMR-1029 at the Battelle labs in Ohio, [Ivins attorney] Kemp said." Dean Boyd, a Justice Department spokesman, commented in February 2009: "The recent inventory issues at USAMRIID highlight the difficulties confronted by the FBI in their efforts to trace the evidentiary material back to its source at USAMRIID, and reinforce our conclusion that samples of anthrax could easily have been removed from the facility undetected." “Another lab might take a couple of milliliters of that spore preparation and create a daughter preparation,” Gerry Andrews, Ivins former boss and now a Professor at the University of Wyoming, says. “How many [samples] Ivins gave out I have no idea, but he did it through official channels, and there is a chain of custody records that indicates which labs got RMR-1029 and how much of the material they got.” The exact match to what was known to be in Ivins flask was at "one other institution" with the word "institution" being parsed to be different from the word laboratory.
The FBI WMD head implied that the other institution might be deemed "quasi-governmental" rather than what we call government.
Dr. Majidi took his guidance at the conference from Battelle employee James Buran, who had been head of the Navy biological defense program. In a March 6, 2009 Press Release, the FBI explained:
The strain referenced in documents on Khalid Mohammed's computer seized in March 2003 was not Ames and perhaps not even virulent. It is reasonable to assume that the anthrax purchased from the North Korea supplier was not Ames (if that report of an early acquisition is credited). Thus, the question relevant to an Al Qaeda theory is what access to the US Army strain might have been accomplished by someone with 1) an organization supported by funds diverted from charities backing his play, and 2) a lot of educated and technically-trained Salafists who believe in his Islamist cause. A former KGB spy master says that the Russians had a spy at Ft. Detrick who provided samples of all specimens by diplomatic pouch. But it seems more likely that Al Qaeda got it directly from a western laboratory. For example, Ayman had a trusted scientist attending conferences sponsored by Porton Down scheduling 10-day lab visit as early as 1999. In the US, he had the support of other scientists (such as GMU's Al-Timimi) who did advanced research alongside researchers working with the Ames strain under a contract with USAMRIID for DARPA. NBC once reported that the 16 labs known to have Ames had been winnowed to 4 that were a match. On NPR, Attorney Paul Kemp, attorney for the family of the late Bruce Ivins, said that Ames from Ivins' flask was known to have gone to Battelle and University of New Mexico. Warrick explains: "Ivins, the FBI discovered, had spent more than a year perfecting what agents called his 'ultimate creation' -- his signature blend of highly lethal anthrax spores -- and guarded it so carefully that his lab assistants did not know where he kept it." "Ivins's talents also helped give him away, investigators told the Washington Post said. Exceptionally pure concentrations of anthrax spores were Ivins's trademark and placed him in an exclusive class. In the end, the FBI concluded, he was the only one with access to the deadly spores who also possessed the skills and equipment needed to create the extraordinarily powerful bioweapon that was mailed to U.S. Senate offices and news organizations in the fall of 2001." The Washington Post's Warrick writes: "It was intended for garden-variety animal experiments, but the collection of anthrax spores known as RMR-1029 was anything but ordinary. Ivins, its creator, had devoted a year to perfecting it, mixing 34 different batches of bacteria-laden broth and distilling them into a single liter of pure lethality. The finished product, a muddy, off-white liquid in a glass flask the size of a small coffee pot, was the greatest single concentration of deadly anthrax bacteria in the country, FBI investigators said." Ivins began work on it in 1996 with the goal of creating a large repository of highly virulent Bacillus anthracis spores that could be used by his fellow scientists at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases, or USAMRIID, for years to come. To measure the effectiveness of new anthrax vaccines, the drugs have to be tested against a potent form of bacteria that remained the same from one experiment to the next." "It was his ultimate creation," Jason D. Bannan said of the flask, an FBI microbiologist assigned to the Amerithrax case told the Washington Post. "This was the culmination of a lot of hard work." Warrick writes: "He wasn't an expert. He was the expert," said a senior FBI investigator, who answered questions about the still-open case on the condition of anonymity." "Bruce Ivins was a victim of a vicious plot," said Ayaad Assaad, a toxicologist who once worked with Ivins at Fort Detrick, in Maryland. In a number of patents by University of Michigan researchers in Ann Arbor, Tarek Hamouda and James R. Baker, Jr., including some filed before 9/11, the inventors thank Bruce Ivins of Ft. Detrick for supplying them with Ames. The University of Michigan patents stated: "B. anthracis spores, Ames and Vollum 1 B strains, were kindly supplied by Dr. Bruce Ivins (USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Md.), and prepared as previously described (Ivins et al., 1995). Dr. Hamouda served as group leader on the DARPA Anti-infective project. A patent application filed April 2000 by the University of Michigan inventors explained:
In late August 2001, NanoBio relocated from a small office with 12 year-old furniture to an expanded office on Green Road located at Plymouth Park. After the mailings, DARPA reportedly asked for some of their product them to decontaminate some of the Senate offices. The company pitched hand cream to postal workers. The inventors company, NanoBio, is funded by DARPA. NanoBio received a $3,150,000 defense contract in 2003. Dr. Hamouda graduated Cairo Medical in December 1982. He married in 1986. His wife was on the Cairo University dental faculty for 10 years. Upon coming to the United States in 1994 after finishing his microbiology PhD at Cairo Medical, Dr. Hamouda was a post-doctoral fellow at the Wayne State University School of Medicine in downtown Detroit. His immunology department biography at Wayne indicates that he then came to the University of Michigan and began work on the DARPA-funded work with anthrax bio-defense applications with James R. Baker at their company NanoBio. The University of Michigan researchers presented in part at various listed meetings and conferences in 1998 and 1999. The December 1999 article titled "A Novel Surfactant Nanoemulsion with Broad-Spectrum Sporicidal Activity of against Bacillus Species" in the Journal for Infectious Diseases states: "B. anthracis spores, Ames and Vollum 1B strains, were supplied by Bruce Ivins (US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases [USAMRIID], Fort Detrick, Frederick, MD) and were prepared as described elsewhere. Four other strains of B. anthracis were provided by Martin Hugh-Jones (Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge." Dr. Baker reports the work NanoBio's research with virulent Ames was "done at USAMRIID by a microbiologist under Dr. Ivins' direct supervision and at LSU under the direction of Dr. Hugh Jones. "
In the acknowledgements section, the University of Michigan authors thank:
In 1999, [Dr.Kimothy Smith] moved to the Arizona lab, bringing with him the lab's first samples of anthrax".
The patent explained that "The nanoemulsions can be rapidly produced in large quantities and are stable for many months *** Undiluted, they have the texture of a semisolid cream and can be applied topically by hand or mixed with water. Diluted, they have a consistency and appearance similar to skim milk and can be sprayed to decontaminate surfaces or potentially interact with aerosolized spores before inhalation." A March 18, 1998 press release had provided some background to the novel DARPA-funded work. It was titled "Novavax Microbicides Undergoing Testing at University of Michigan Against Biological Warfare Agents; Novavax Technology Being Supplied to U.S. Military Program At University of Michigan as Possible Defense Against Germ Warfare." The release stated that "The Novavax Biologics Division has designed several potent microbicides and is supplying these materials to the University of Michigan for testing under a subcontract. Various formulations are being tested as topical creams or sprays for nasal and environmental usage. The biocidal agent's detergent degrades and then explodes the interior of the spore. Funding, the press release explains, was provided by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense. In a presentation at the Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy (ICAAC) on September 26, 1998, Michael Hayes, a research associate in the U-Michigan Medical School, presented experimental evidence of BCTP's ability to destroy anthrax spores both in a culture dish and in mice exposed to anthrax through a skin incision. "In his conference presentation, Hayes described how even low concentrations of BCTP killed more than 90 percent of virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis spores in a culture dish." Its website explains that the Interscience Conference on Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy is the "[p]remier meeting on infectious diseases and antimicrobial agents, organized by the American Society for Microbiology."
An University of Michigan Medical school, Medicine at Michigan, (Vol. 1, No. 1, Spring 1999) explained:
Dr. Baker, by email, advises me that Ivins did the studies involving Ames for them at USAMRIID. He reports: "We never had Ames and could not have it at our UM facilities." Before September 2001, it's office was described as in the basement of a downtown bank which seems to describe 912 N. Main St., Ann Arbor, just west of University of Michigan campus.
According to an email he wrote on March 29, 2000, he had been on crutches through March: "I'm just coming off a ruptured gastrocnemius in my right calf - very painful. I've been on crutches for 6 weeks, and this is my last week. (I hurt it while walking down the hall at work!)" An article in the Summer of 2000 in Medicine at Michigan explains:
An EPA report explains: "In December 1999, the U.S. Army tested a broad spectrum nanoemulsion and nine other biodecontamination technologies in Dugway, Utah, against an anthrax surrogate, Bacillus globigii. Nanoemulsion was one of four technologies that proved effective and was the only nontoxic formulation available. Other tests against the vaccine strain of B. anthracis (Sterne strain) were conducted by the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and by the U.S. Army Institute of Surgical Research." As Fortune magazine explained in November 2001 about NanoBio: "Then bioterror struck.... It moved to a bland corporate park where its office has no name on the door. It yanked its street address off its Website, whose hit rate jumped from 350 a month to 1,000 a day." NanoBio was part of the solution: "in the back of NanoBio's office sit two dozen empty white 55-gallon barrels. A few days before, DARPA had asked Annis and Baker if they could make enough decontaminant to clean several anthrax-tainted offices in the Senate. NanoBio's small lab mixers will have to run day and night to fill the barrels. 'This is not the way we want to do this,' sighs [its key investor], shaking his head. 'This is all a duct-tape solution.' " James Baker, founder of Ann Arbor's NanoBio's likes to quote a Chinese proverb: "When there are no lions and tigers in the jungle, the monkeys rule." It's naive to think that Al Qaeda could not have obtained Ames just because it tended to be in labs associated with or funded by the US military. US Army Al Qaeda operative Sgt. Ali Mohammed accompanied Zawahiri in his travels in the US. (Ali Mohamed had been a major in the same unit of the Egyptian Army that produced Sadat’s assassin, Khaled Islambouli). Ali Al-Timimi was working in the building housing the Center for Biodefense funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency ("DARPA") and had access to the facilities at both the Center for Biodefense and the adjacent American Type Culture Collection. Michael Ray Stubbs was an HVAC system technician at Lawrence Livermore Lab with a high-level security clearance permitting access. That was where the effort to combat the perceived Bin Laden anthrax threat was launched in 1998. Aafia Siddiqui, who attended classes at a building with the virulent Vollum strain. She later married a 9/11 plotter al-Balucchi, who was in UAE with al-Hawsawi, whose laptop, when seized at the home of a bacteriologist, had anthrax spraydrying documents on it. The reality is that a lab technician, researcher, or other person similarly situated might simply have walked out of some lab that had it. What was NanoBio's old street address? Why is Aafia Siddiqui associated with an address at 1915 Woodbury Drive in Ann Arbor? An Assistant United States Attorney has claimed in open court (in the opening argument in United States v. Paracha) that Aafia was willing to participate in an anthrax attack if asked. Among the documents found in Afghanistan in 2001 were letters and notes written in English to Ayman Zawahiri by a scientist about his attempts to obtain an anthrax sample. One handwritten letter was on the letterhead of the Society for Applied Microbiology, the UK's oldest microbiological society. The Society for Applied Microbiology of Bedford, UK, recognizes that "the development and exploitation of Applied Microbiology requires the maintenance and improvement of the microbiological resources in the UK, such as culture collections and other specialized facilities." Thus, Zawahiri's access to the Ames strain is still yet to be proved or disclosed, but there was no shortage of possibilities or recruitment attempts by Ayman. One colleague of his estimates that he made 15 recruitment attempts over a many year period. Dr. Keim observes: “Whoever perpetrated the first crime must realize that we have the capability to identify material and to track the material back to its source. Whoever did this is presumably aware of what’s going on, and if the person is a scientist, they can read the study. Hopefully, the person is out there thinking: When am I going to get caught?” After the February 2009 presentation, the New Scientist summarized: "Eight samples had all four. One came from a flask labelled RMR-1029 that Ivins was responsible for at USAMRIID. The other seven came from cultures taken from that flask, only one of which was not located at USAMRIID. So while these findings show the attack spores came from one of these cultures, the FBI has gone further in concluding the attack came directly from the RMR-1029 flask." The FBI has not yet identified the location of the 8 isolates downstram from Ivins' flask known to be an identical match -- or the 100+people it says had access. For the US Attorney Jeff Taylor to make it seem, however, that only Ivins had control over anthrax that was genetically identical was specious. The more commonsensical point would be that Ivins would have no reason to use anthrax so directly traceable to him by reason of being a distinctive mix of Ames strains. In an April 2001 report describing testing of decontamination agents at Dugway, the best performing decontamination nanoemulsions were University of Michigan, Sandia National Laboratories and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. In June 2001, in addition to the conference at Annapolis organized by Bruce Ivins, a conference was held at Aberdeen Proving Ground (Edgewood) for small businesses that might contribute to the biodefense effort. It it showcased APG’s world class facillities that had the full range of relevant equipment, as well as the range of activities and research featured by presenters at such conferences. It was called “Team APG Showcase 2001.″ Edgewood maintains a database of simulant properties. The info and equipment, including spraydrying equipment, is available to participants in the SBIR -- promoting small business innovation. So might the anthrax attack have required the learning of a state? Well, to get that, all you needed to do was go to the program that shares such research for the purpose of innovation in the area of biodefense. APG built a Biolevel-3 facility and, according to a Baltimore Sun report, by October 2002 had 19 virulent strains of anthrax, including Ames. Here is a 1996 report on a study done at Edgewood involving irradiated virulent Ames provided by John Ezzell that was used in a soil suspension. Another article discusses Delta Ames supplied to Edgewood by the Battelle-managed Dugway, subtilis, and use of sheep blood agar. Did Battelle have virulent Ames across I-95? Edgewood tested nanoemulsion biocidal agents during this time period, according to a national nanobiotechnology initiative report issued June 2002. The DARPA-funded work involving use of the lyophilizer by Dr. Ivins apparently involved the DARPA-funded work done by Ann Arbor researchers. In thanking Dr. Ivins who in numerous patents for supplying the Ames, the researchers referenced his 1995 Vaccines article describing preparation of the spores (and the method included use of a lyophilizer).. Salon.com blogger Glen Greenwald explains:
Throughout the period 2000-2008, the Ann Arbor researchers would explain: "B. anthracis spores, Ames and Vollum 1 B strains, were kindly supplied by Dr. Bruce Ivins (USAMRIID, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Md.), and prepared as previously described (Ivins et al., Vaccine 13:1779 [1995])."
Dr. Gerard P. Andrews told the Baltimore Examiner “The only lyophylizer available was a speed vac,” he says. “That’s a low-volume instrument that you can’t even fit under a hood” used to contain pathogens. “The only opinions that I would place any confidence in would have to come from individuals who have made the stuff, in the same quantity of the letters,” said infectious disease specialist W. Russell Byrne. “And then I would ask them to go into B3 in building 1425, work there for a couple of weeks and reproduce what they say Bruce did. That’s the only way I could, in good conscience and in the spirit of objective scientific inquiry, believe them.” Dr. John Ezzell, the scientist referenced in Dr. Ivins' email to Pat Fellows, tells me the aerosolized Ames he made for DARPA in 1996 had been irradiated (and testing confirmed that the irradiation had rendered the anthrax inactive). He worked for the FBI's Hazardous Materials Resource Unit in 1996. The first order of business, then, is for the FBI to allow its scientist leading the first investigation into the attack anthrax made the dry powdered anthrax in 1996 and to see if the equipment and time he used was available to Dr. Ivins. The lead investigator Montooth, told the Washington Post: "When you go to the true experts and ask them how many people can develop [anthrax spores] into something with this purity and this concentration, they shake their heads." "Some will say there are perhaps six. Others will say maybe a dozen." The Washington Post reports: "But drying the spores turned out to be no obstacle at all, FBI scientists said. It required only one more step, using a common laboratory machine known as a lyophilizer. Ivins had one in his lab." In contrast, the head of the Air Force lab, expert at making anthrax simulants, advises me by email: "The Amerithrax spores were neither freeze dried nor milled. I have seen both and the Amerithrax had characteristics of neither." Dr. Alibek, who once thought a spraydryer likely was used, told me that he later came to think a fluidized bed dryer was used. In September 2008, Dr. Serge Popov of the GMU Center for Biodefense has explained a far simpler method based on his experience involving a tin container. In an October 16, 2008 letter to the academy, Rep. Rush D. Holt (D-N.J.), a member of the House intelligence committee, asked the National Academies of Science to investigate whether the bureau's scientific discoveries were "inconsistent with the FBI's conclusions." Jennifer Smith is a retired FBI agent and biochemist who also worked for the CIA and now leads BioForensic Consulting. Smith was involved in the agency’s DNA unit when the investigation began. She told the NAS panel in July 2009: “I want to say that I hope this committee is able to see information that was shared … even if that information might currently be housed within the classified files,” she said. Alice Gast, the committee chairwoman and president of Lehigh University, said the academy has the ability to pursue classified materials. The study will deepen as the group learns more and asks additional questions, she said. “Really it remains to be defined — the scope of all materials we’ll receive,” Gast reported. Before the anthrax mailings, in an interview in September 2000, Dr. Ken Alibek addressed whether Bin Laden could make a "Alibek-caliber" powdered anthrax. Dr. Alibek was a colleague of microbiologist Ali Al-Timimi. Al-Timimi was taught by Bin Laden's Sheik al-Hawali and actively communicating with him.
Scientists have determined that anthrax spores mailed to Capitol Hill were made less than two years ago before being mailed. Moreover, contrary to what has often been implied or assumed, the technique to weaponize the anthrax used in the Fall 2001 was not the one used by the US Army in weaponizing anthrax in the 1950s. William Patrick's process for weaponizing anthrax involved freeze drying and chemical processing whereas it was the process contemplated by Al Qaeda that involved spraydrying. "We made little freeze-dried pellets of anthrax," Donald Schattenberg explained, "then we ground them down with a high-speed colloid mill." The finding cast doubt on the hypothesis that the spores could have been stolen from a lab a long time ago. Commenting on the fine powder sent Senator Daschle and Leahy, "Only nations, probably, have figured out how to do this," Professor Matthew Meselson at Harvard said at the time. But, he adds, this means "how to do it is in the minds of people," including former employees of weapons programs in the Soviet Union and the US. Dr. Spertzel, the U.N. Special Commission chief biological inspector from 1994 to 1998 told the Washington Post: “In my opinion, there are maybe four or five people in the whole country who might be able to make this stuff, and I’m one of them. And even with a good lab and staff to help run it, it might take me a year to come up with a product as good.” At a break from a briefing before a Congressional subcommittee in December 2001, Dr. Richard Spertzel and Dr. Ken Alibek discussed access to the Ames strain and the method of weaponization. They might just as well have been demonstrating how to palm a basketball -- with Dr. Alibek agreeing with Dr. Spertzel on the likely general method but saying it is easier than Dr. Spertzel may think. According to an article in the New England Journal of Medicine, "Scanning electron microscopy of the spores used in the Senate office attack showed that they range from individual particles to aggregates of 100 [microns] or more. Spores were uniform in size and appearance and the aggregates had a propensity to pulverize (i.e., disperse into smaller particles when disturbed)." The Homeland Security Subcommittee on Prevention of Nuclear and Biological Attack held a hearing in July 2005 on "Engineering Bio-Terror Agents: Lessons from the Offensive U.S. and Russian Biological Weapons Programs." The hearing evaluated Al Qaeda's ability to develop and use catastrophic biological weapons -- such as weaponized anthrax. The hearing examined the known biological warfare capabilities developed by the U.S. and Russian offensive programs, and the potential of those capabilities being utilized in future terrorist attacks. One of the witnesses at the hearing ironically was the former colleague of Al-Timimi, Dr. Kenneth Alibek, Executive Director, Center for Biodefense, George Mason University Another witness, Dr. Michael V. Callahan, Director, Biodefense & Mass Casualty Care, CIMIT/Massachusetts General Hospital, explained:
Links to the power point presentations on microbial forensics at the National Academies Randall Murch (Virginia Tech), Stephen Morse (Columbia), Bruce Budowle (FBI) can be reached here. Dr. John Ezzell, the scientist referenced in an email from Dr. Ivins to Pat Fellows reported by FoxNews, tells me the aerosolized Ames he made for DARPA in 1996 had been irradiated (and testing confirmed that the irradiation had rendered the anthrax inactive). Since 1996, he had been the anthrax specialist for the FBI's Hazardous Materials Resonse Unit.
Dr. Meryl Nass, a long-time critic of the health consequences of anthrax vaccine, moderated and led a robust defense by interested scientists and others -- asking that the FBI come forward with any evidence to support its accusation. Prominent defenders of Dr. Ivins pointing to the lack of evidence included former heads of the Bacteriology Division. Like experienced prosecutors Senators Leahy and Specter, they were stunned at the US Attorney Jeff Taylor's conclusions. The Baltimore Examiner quotes Gerald P. Andrews, director of the bacteriology division and Ivins’ supervisor from 2000 to 2003: “Knowing the layout of the BSL-3 suite, the implication that Bruce could have whipped out [anthrax mixture] in a couple of weeks without detection is ridiculous.” Andrews explains: “You can’t just throw a flask up in the air and have dry weaponized spores come down. One preparation may take between three and five days — Day 1 to prepare the materials and start seed cultures, Day 2 to inoculate the spores, Day 3 to harvest, centrifuge and purify the spores. And those are the wet spores,” he says, which then need to be dried into a powder. And that would take at least another day. “So for 10 envelopes, 100 preparations would be required to make all the mailed material at three to five days for each preparation,” he says. “Months of continuous spore preparation without doing any other work and avoiding detection? It’s ridiculous.”One USAMRID researcher, speaking anonymously, told The Baltimore Examiner: “It would have been impossible for Ivins to have grown, purified and loaded the amount of material in the letters in just six days. It simply could not be done.” George Mason University professor and former Soviet bioweapons researcher Sergei Popov told the Baltimore Examiner that he agrees: “This number of plates is impossible to handle inconspicuously,” says. “It would be impossible to cover up these activities.” W. Russell Byrne, who preceded Andrews as the division’s director, said he “never believed Ivins’ could have produced the preparations used in the anthrax letters working in the bacteriology division area of Building 1425.” Nearly 1 gram per contaminated letter would have required months of intensive labor and hundreds of agar “plates,” on which the spores are grown, Dr. Byrne says. Spores from two of those show a distinct chemical signature that includes silicon, oxygen, iron, and tin; the third letter had silicon, oxygen, iron and possibly also tin, says Michael. The coat of the bacteria from Ivins' RMR-1029 flask did not contain any of those four elements.
Dr. Paul Keim first learned Dr. Ivins was a focus of their investigation in May 2008:
In a March 31, 2003 public exchange sponsored by the Washington Post, in response to my written question submitted in advance, Ali Al-Timimi's George Mason University colleague, Kenneth Alibek, said: "This anthrax wasn't sophisticated, didn't have coatings, had electric charge and many other things." In other responses, he further explained: "There was no special need to add silica to this anthrax. Presence or absence of silica says nothing about whether it was state sponsored." US bioweaponeer William Patrick took time out from advising GMU grad students and gave it a 7 out of 10 --- calling it professionally done but not weapons grade. Perhaps that would be a B+ or even an A-. In an interview with CBS, William Patrick explained that he had been given a polygraph in June 2002 about the anthrax letters. He reports that "The FBI that they wanted me to become a part of their inner circle of--of experts, and that in order to become a part of that inner circle of technical experts, that I'd have to pass a polygraph test." On April 11, 2003, Scott Shane reported that reverse engineering "carried out at the Army's biodefense center at Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, raises the disquieting possibility that al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups could create lethal bioweapons without scientific or financial help from a state." Quoting one outside bioterrorism expert. "It shows you can have a fairly sophisticated product with fairly rudimentary methods." At last report, the reverse engineering reportedly was not able to recreate the identical product. Lisa Bronson, deputy undersecretary of defense for technology security policy and proliferation, has said that commercially available equipment used to make powdered milk could be used to make powderized anthrax. A spray dryer is used in chemical and food processing to manufacture dried egg, powdered milk, animal feed, cake mixes, citrus juices, coffee, corn syrup, cream, creamers, dried eggs, potatoes, shortening, starch derivatives, tea, tomatoes, yeast, and -- last but not least -- yogurt. Washington State University also has an informative discussion on the web. Making dried milk is not rocket science and doesn't require a PhD. But, if experience is any guide, Al Qaeda has PhDs and even rocket scientists who are sympathetic to its cause (indeed, even the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb). Here is a Q&A from a March 31, 2003 exchange with Kenneth Alibek, in response to a question I posed to him. (The month before 100 agents had come to Syracuse the same minute Ali Al-Timimi's residence was searched, and so I was curious what the fuss was all about.)
Dr. Ivins worked with Ames in a BL-3 lab on the dates preceding the mailings -- and so why did the FBI rely on his recollections years later of how he spent his time rather than a contemporaneous transcript from 2001detailing how he spent his time? (Surely he was asked as part of his polygraph). The standing instructions were all logical follow-on investigation be "aggressively and immediately conducted and reported. Experienced, aggressive, creative Agents should be assigned this investigation in order to insure all logical investigation is conducted, and not just that requested as defined in a lead."
Also, why did the investigators want the human DNA? This should be disclosed. We know it was not a match with the DNA of the hair in the mailbox. In support of a search in support of its theory that Ivins was the culprit, the FBI stated:
There has not been any report that fiber matched what was collected at Ivins residence or vehicles. THE REWRITING OF HISTORY: WHITING OUT INCONVENIENT FACTS I asked for a copy of the record relating to flask 1029. That is initially the only document I requested. The US Army FOI people, after it was vetted by the US Department of Justice, gave me a xerox showing that flask 1029 was kept in Bldg 1425. An earlier version of this document, however, showed 1412. The "1412" had been very neatly whited out and replaced by 1425. Who did that? I have asked John Peterson and James Ferrari of USAMEDCOM, responsible for the FOI production, to promptly give me both documents, as well as the remaining requested long-delayed documents. Dr. John Ezzell, the only fellow known to have made dry powdered Ames anthrax at Ft. Detrick (for a DARPA project done at a University) addresses this issue of altered records in a chapter in the FBI-sponsored treatise MICROBIAL FORENSICS. He writes (at p. 222)
MIXED GENOTYPE AND THE FOUR MORPHS
Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, who runs the Federation of American Scientists’ chemical and biological arms control program, announced in December 2001. “I’m certain it’s someone connected with a government program, or who works in a laboratory connected with a government program,” she said. “The grapevine has it that the results of an experiment on genetic variation at certain locations suggest that this material was made in a very small batch, and that suggests that the material was not made in some old weapons program on a large scale,” she said, citing sources inside and outside the government. “All the available information is consistent with a U.S. government lab as the source, either of the anthrax itself or of the recipe for the U.S. weaponization process.” Dr. Read, a scientist helping with the Amerithrax investigation in the DNA sequencing, long ago published the news that the anthrax was a 50/50% mixture of genotype 62 (Ames) and genotype 62 with an inversion on the plasmid. This would mean two distinct nucleic acids were detected in the sample. This means that some of the Ames had a segment of DNA that is inverted, or flipped, relative to the remainder of the plasmid. Years ago one expert advised me that no properly trained microbiologist would propagate or archive a mixture. Standard microbiological procedure calls for isolation of single colonies - i.e., single, unmixed cells and their clonal, unmixed progeny -- at each step. Inversions are not an uncommon class of mutational events, however. It would only be especially probative if it were a rare inversion and if samples were to be present among samples collected from laboratory archives. It was always possible that the anthrax used was highly distinctive (pinpointing a single lab) and the authorities just didn't have that sample collected. But given that since 2002 they have known it was a mix of Ames strains, it is surprising that they did not zero in on Ivins flask a half decade ago given that any description of how it was created would have revealed it to be a mix of two sources. The FBI in August 2008 announced that 8 samples were an exact match. The FBI reports that 100+ individuals had access. Unnamed Ft. Detrick sources report that 200-300 individuals had access. The source of the stream of genetically identical isolates downstream was the original flask. At the August 2008 Science Briefing,
While I think there is no solid evidence indicating Dr. Ivins' guilt, I am not disputing the validity of the FBI's genetic investigation revealed to date. Even genetics consultants Fraser-Liggett and Keim do not claim it establishes that Dr. Ivins is guilty. Claire Fraser-Liggett, professor at the University of Maryland School of Medicine and director of the University of Maryland Institute for Genome Sciences, asked in one news report, “What would have happened in this investigation had Dr. Hatfill not been so forceful in his response to being named a person of interest. What if he, instead of fighting back, had committed suicide because of the pressure? Would that have been the end of the investigation?” “I have complete confidence in the accuracy of our data,” Fraser-Liggett says, but she concedes it fails to prove Ivins is guilty.It is only the common sense of the investigators that the analysis falls short, not the work of its scientists. Thus, a review by the National Academy of Sciences, while desirable, misses the point of critics. It is critical that the issues are framed in a way that leads to meaningful answers. After the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology detected silica, [USAMRIID Major General John] Parker reported that the anthrax in question contained silica, a common substance found in sand and quartz. At the August 18, 2008 Science Briefing On The Anthrax Investigation, in his opening statement Dr. Vahid Majidi explained "First of all, let me dispel some frequently repeated erroneous information. For example: There were no intentional additives combined with the bacillus anthracis spores to make them any more dispersible." He noted that the Silicon Signature may have been due to a silica-based substance in the culture medium used to grow the anthrax. Another department colleague of Bin Laden's sheik's protege -- Dr. Alibek's co-director of the Center for Biodefense at GMU --told a reporter that the presence of silica is significant, but he declined to say why, citing national security concerns. "I don't think I want to give people -- terrorists -- any information to help them, said Dr. Charles Bailey, a scientist at Advanced Biosystems Inc. at George Mason University and former commander of the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)." The problem was that a microbiologist trained in computer science and actively communicating with Bin Laden's sheik and the 911 imam was working just feet away from both famed Russian anthrax bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and Dr. Bailey. Bin Laden's supporters already had access to the information. Bailey and Alibek in mid-March 2001 filed a confidential patent application relating to the concentration of anthrax using silicon dioxide. Ari Fleischer discusses the silica in the anthrax in his book Taking Heat. He reports that he had argued at length with ABC News over its story that the additive was bentonite (which arguably was characteristic of the Iraq program). He explained that from the start he had told ABC that it was silica, not bentonite, that had been detected. The suggestion that AFIP experts did not know the difference between silica and silicon is not very well founded, and the now-deceased scientist who performed the EDX specifically told the journalist that oxygen was also detected in ratios consistent with silicon dioxide. One of the two applicants for the international patent was a leading aerosol scientist and innovator in dry powder inhalations used in the pharmaceutical industry and the founder of Aerosol Techniques in 1955. A PhD student supervised by Matthias Frank, a big star at Livermore in developing the biosensor, addressed these issues in 2004. Lawrence Livermore lab was tasked with combating the Bin Laden anthrax threat in 1998 and is steeped in biodetection, the subject of the PhD thesis. LLNL researchers have developed advanced technologies to rapidly detect the airborne release of biological threat agents. The student cites Gary Matsumoto's Science article and says: "In the case of anthrax, it is known that Van der Waals forces cause unprocessed spores to clump together. Large particles are not deposited efficiently in human lungs and also settle rapidly from the air. Both are undesirable properties if maximal lethality is desired. Silica powders and nanoparticles have long been used to prevent agent particles from coming close enough together for Van der Waals forces to become significant." *** Military scientists have stated that the 'weaponized' anthrax letters sent to Senator Daschle's office contained silica. In the Senate anthrax letter, there is also evidence that the bond between the silica nanoparticles and spores was further enhanced by the use of sol-gel or polymerized glass. " Former Russian bioweaponeer Ken Alibek and Harvard biologist Matthew Meselson, however, have opined that there was no special silica coating observable in the Scanning Electron Microscope ("SEM") images they saw. The FBI's scientist at Sandia confirms that no silica was observed on the exosporium and that instead it was below the exosporium, absorbed in the coats. The presence of any silica, Drs. Meselson and Alibek say, may have come from the environment because of the special tendency of anthrax spore coats to attract silicon. (The lead FBI scientist Dwight Adams relied on the study provided the FBI by Meselson in briefing the Congress in November 2002.) Indeed, the silica may have been in the culture medium and then removed as described by a mid-March 2001 and related patent filed by researchers at Dr. Alibek's Center for Biodefense at GMU. Sergeui Popov “The silicon is probably the most important scientific evidence that would lead anybody to question whether Bruce was capable of making these spores,” says Gerald P. Andrews, Bruce Ivins’ former boss. Andrews and George Mason University professor and former Soviet bioweapons researcher Sergei Popov believe the silicon was purposely added, due to unnaturally high levels of the mineral in the spores. Sandia made a video on YouTube explaining its research on behalf of the FBI. A scientist from the FBI Laboratory, Dr. Doug Beecher, in a July 2006 issue of "Applied and Environmental Microbiology" provided me a copy of his article that reports that:
Harvard University Matthew Meselson reviewed the language in the FBI scientist's article before publication. "The statement should have had a reference," editor-in-chief of the microbiology journal told a trade periodical. "An unsupported sentence being cited as fact is uncomfortable to me. Any statement in a scientific article should be supported by a reference or by documentation." The two passages, footnoted or not, essentially said what Dr. Alibek had been saying: "'[J]ust because you have a sophisticated product doesn't mean the technique has to be sophisticated.' " Silica in the culture medium would not be a sophisticated "additive" that aided dispersability but would permit the agent to be concentrated. In a Letter to the Editor in Applied and Environmental Microbiology, Aug. 2007, p. 5074, titled “Unsupported Conclusions on the Bacillus anthracis Spores,” Kay A. Mereish, at the United Nations, reports:
Dr. Mereish tells me that her letter to the editor was not intended to agree or disagree with the FBI scientist. She merely notes that his two sentences that related to this issue of additive were not supported by the scientific experiment and data that he published. She relies on Dr. Small who made her statement based on her scientific research finding in connection with her work on the anthrax samples. Dr. Mereish's letter, however, is another example where the use of "electrical charges" scientists as Dr. Patrick and Dr. Alibek are failing to distinguish between electrostatic charges and Van der Waals forces, thus resulting in some of the confusion in the press reports. Kathryn Crockett, Ken Alibek’s assistant -- just a couple doors down from Ali Al-Timimi -- addressed these issues in her 2006 thesis, "A historical analysis of Bacillus anthracis as a biological weapon and its application to the development of nonproliferation and defense strategies." She expressed her special thanks to Dr. Ken Alibek and Dr. Bill Patrick. Dr. Patrick consulted with the FBI and so the FBI credits his expertise. "I don't want to appear arrogant. I don't think anyone knows more about anthrax powder in this country," William Patrick told an interviewer. Dr. Alibek’s access to know-how, regarding anthrax weaponization, similarly, seems beyond reasonable dispute. Dr. Crockett successfully defended the thesis before a panel that included USAMRIID head and Ames strain researcher Charles Bailey, Ali Al-Timimi's other Department colleague. She says that scientists who analyzed the powder through viewing micrographs or actual contact are divided over the quality of the powder. She cites Gary Matsumoto’s “Science” article in summarizing the debate. She says the FBI has vacillated on silica. “Regarding the specific issue of weaponization," Dr. Alibek's assistant concluded in her PhD thesis, "according to several scientists at USAMRIID who examined the material, the powder created a significant cloud when agitated meaning that the adhesion of the particles had been reduced. Reducing the adhesion of the particles meant that the powder would fly better.” She explains that “The most common way to reduce electrostatic charge is to add a substance to the mixture, usually a silica based substance.” On the issue of encapsulation, she reports that “many experts who examined the powder stated the spores were encapsulated. Encapsulation involves coating bacteria with a polymer which is usually done to protect fragile bacteria from harsh conditions such as extreme heat and pressure that occurs at the time of detonation (if in a bomb), as well as from moisture and ultraviolet light. The process was not originally developed for biological weapons purposes but rather to improve the delivery of various drugs to target organs or systems before they were destroyed by enzymes in the circulatory system" (citing Alibek and Crockett, 2005). "The US and Soviet Union, however, " she explains, "used this technique in their biological weapons programs for pathogens that were not stable in aerosol form... Since spores have hardy shells that provide the same protection as encapsulation would, there is no need to cover them with a polymer.“ She explains that one “possible explanation is that the spore was in fact encapsulated but not for protective purpose. Encapsulation also reduces the need for milling when producing a dry formulation." She wrote: "If the perpetrator was knowledgeable of the use of encapsulation for this purpose, then he or she may have employed it because sophisticated equipment was not at his disposal." One military scientist who has made anthrax simulants described the GMU patents as relating to an encapsulation technique which serves to increase the viability of a wide range of pathogens. More broadly, a DIA analyst once commented to me that the internal debate seemed relatively inconsequential given the circumstantial evidence -- overlooked by so many people -- that US-based supporters of Al Qaeda are responsible for the mailings. Most of Dr. Ivins' colleagues have thought Al Qaeda was responsible. Clarifying the matter -- or not -- Michael told FOX News, "I don’t think this exonerates (Ivins) at all.” He added, "I don’t think it's not enough to say that he did it, as well." Jacobsen reasons:
Posts following Sandia's YouTube video illustrate the ongoing debate: Mouse2Ben (1 week ago)
Dr. Michael reportedly is suggesting Leighton–Doi broth leads to the silicon signature observed. Leighton Doi medium broth was used to grow the virulent Ames supplied the Ann Arbor researchers. (It was used in growing the virulent Ames in the 1995 Vaccine article which involved an aerosol spore challenge. The scientists cite the 1995 article in describing how the virulent Ames was prepared. The FBI apparently suspects that heat shock was used and had the effect of increasing the permeability of the outer membrane with considerable individual spore variability. Ivins and co-authors also used Leighton-Doi in connection with an article submitted June 2001 and revised October 2001. The FBI questioned Mrs. Ivins about co-authors Mara Linscott and Patricia Fellows. Ivins' attorney told Bruce to stop emailing Mara and Pat. Mrs. Ivins in her note to him the day he died asked why he was paying his attorney so much if he was not going to take his advice. Bruce was leaving Mara anonymous gifts. Other culture mediums, however, also result in a spike for silica. An authoritative source on the chemical composition of spores appears to be the 1969 The Bacterial Spore, with chapter 7 by a Dr. Murrell. The attack anthrax was contaminated with a distinctive B. subtilus strain. No matching subtilis was found in swabbing of the USAMRIID labs were Dr. Ivins worked. The affidavit in support of a search warrant explained:
“Why wasn’t this unique B. subtilis strain looked for in Bruce’s lab — or any other lab in the BSL-3 suite?” Ivins' former boss Andrews. “It may, in fact, serve as a marker for where those preparations were really made.” At the ASM Biodefense presentation in February 2009, the FBI scientists explained that no subtilis found in any of Dr. Ivins samples was the genetically distinct subtilis. “We don’t know the process used,” Bannan says. “We never found the equivalent B. subtilis at USAMRIID in any of the evidence that we had.”
Ivins flask did not contain tin. There was no iron or oxygen or silicon or tin detected in the spore coat of those spores.Dr. Michael speculated it might have been in the water. But Ft. Detrick water did not have high levels of tin.. Former Russian bioweapons expert Sergeui Popov comments:
Dr. Popov reports: "I don’t remember the exact levels from the presentation, but it spikes out like hell."
Dr. Popov walks me through the scenario:
Even those "tin cans" nowadays made of aluminum or steel are commonly plated with a thin layer of tin. For example, some Heinz products in 2001 involved contamination of a spaghetti product in tomato sauce with high levels of tin. Sergei first described use of such a tin container in September 2008 in discussing the possible drying method used and Professor Rosenberg's opinion addressing the drying method.
In questioning at the ASM Biodefense presentation, Dr. Bannan explained that the isotope analysis of the water did not support Dr. Ivins guilt given the wide range of isotopes and given that the isotopes are affected by culture medium used. He explained that the New York Times report that there was a unique chemical signature of the water was mistaken. A New York Times "Postscript" dated February 28, 2009 states:
But before the issue that had been used in the court of public opinion to convict Dr. Ivins is passed by, let's review the science that had been done on the subject. The FBI scientists have been able to distinguish between water isotopes ratios in the anthrax. Brian Williams reports that investigators have told NBC that the water used to make the spores came from the Northeastern United States. Researchers have been able to establish that anthrax grown in water in the Northeastern United States is distinguishable from anthrax grown in water from the Southeast and Pacific Northwest. In one published anthrax study, researchers grew Bacillus subtilis, a harmless bacteria that resembles Bacillus anthracis, using local water from five different U.S. cities. The scientists were able to distinguish those grown in various cities. The method can be used to narrow the number of possible origins of the water based on the number of oxygen and hydrogen isotopes. Ft. Detrick made its own de-ionized water (as do all military labs apparently). The FBI's expert James Ehleringer advises me that "there are regional stable isotope ratios for drinking water, including many locally-bottled waters. If de-ionization is completed by a reverse-osmosis process, then the isotope ratios of the de-ionized and pre-de-ionized waters should be the same." Dr. Ehrlinger explained the research in an NPR interview in 2004. Interviewer Kestenbaum said: "Ehleringer is now creating a map showing how the isotope ratios of water vary anthrax was grown, it may rule some places out." As defined by the Census Bureau, the Northeast region of the United States covers nine states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Perhaps, however, the phrase is intended more broadly. In January 2009, the New York Times claimed without naming or describing a source that of 60 waters tested only one had the unique chemical signature of the mailed anthrax -- that of Frederick, Maryland. But Dr. Bannan at the ASM Biodefense Conference confirms that dramatic report was false. The authors of one of the key articles specifically noted that they couldn't distinguish between North Carolina and Ohio -- the dark green. Similarly, they can't distinguish between Central New Jersey and North Carolina (again, the dark green). The key studies in the peer reviewed literature indicate that they were funded by the Central Intelligence Agency. Someone needs to pay the bills. Ehleringer and his colleagues published a March 2007 article titled "Stable isotope ratios of tap water in the contiguous United States" in "Water Resources Research." The study was funded by the "federal government." The raw data survey results have been embargoed by the federal government." (The agency would usually be identified). In other water isotope ratio studies the funding agency was identified as the CIA or whatever agency it was -- it varied. Perhaps this March 2007 study was funded by the Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation and was done specifically for the purpose of laying the scientific groundwork of a prosecution in Amerithrax. Separately, a press release announced in September 2003 that University of Maryland researchers have developed a technique to help the FBI track the origins of deadly anthrax spores by identifying the medium used to grow it. The FBI asked Maryland professor Catherine Fenselau to turn her mass spectrometry lab to the forensic task of sleuthing how bacillus spores, such as anthrax, are prepared. While the Utah scientist in this study was looking at the tap water, Helen W. Kreuzer-Martin, the Maryland scientist in a study published in April 2007 titled "Stable Isotope Ratios and the Forensic Analysis of Microorganisms," was looking at the nutrients in the culture. The DOJ/FBI likely hoped to put all the data together with the more familiar reasons to suspect someone (means, motive, modus operandi and opportunity), and put on a case that to a moral certainty proves it was committed by the perp(s). By looking at the oxygen, hydrogen and deuterium geospatial distribution, authorities can more precisely identify where the water came from. For example, the deuterium map might be relied upon to narrow an ambiguity left by the range indicated by the oxygen and hydrogen maps. The FBI scientist Dr. Bannan at the ASM Biodefense, however, made clear that the isotope analysis in this case was not able to lead to a smoking petri dish. Why hasn't the Task Force released the isotope ratio analysis? Why hasn't it lifted the embargo on on the raw data from the survey results? This should be part of any review by the National Academy of Sciences even if it did not support its "Ivins Theory." On the list that was the subject of a 12/03/2001 memo from the WFO, was Dr. Ivins a "High Priority", "Priority" or "Low Priority" - Does his name appear? If so, where? If FBI's Hazardous Materials Resource Unit's anthrax expert Dr. Ezzell now tells us now that he had made dry powdered anthrax at Ft. Detrick, was his name on the list? If so, where? Or did he tell the FBI the same thing that they told General Parker -- that they did not make dry powdered anthrax at Ft. Detrick.
Some objected to adding names to the "POI" list. To find the missing spraydryer, perhaps the FBI merely needs to find and trace the steps of Al Qaeda's expert yogurt or dried milk or animal feedstuffs or rice hull processor. A couple years later, Dr. Alibek told me that he had come to think that it was made using a fluidized bed dryer rather than a spraydryer. Another former Russian bioweaponeer tells me that even a tin can might suffice. One early potential lead that was reported in the press concerned a $100,000 piece of equipment bought by someone from Pakistan paying cash who had it delivered to 215 Main St. in Ft. Lee, NJ, one mile from where pilot Nawaf al-Hazmi lived. Nawaf attended a critical meeting with Yazid Sufaat, the biochemist working on anthrax, in January 2000. The United States alleged in its indictment of Zacarias Moussaoui that on or about April 1, 2001, Nawaf al-Hazmi was in Oklahoma (at the same time Zacarias Moussaoui was in Norman, Oklahoma). Nawaf then lived in Falls Church, VA and attended mosque and met with the imam that spoke alongside fellow Falls Church imam Ali Al-Timimi at a conference with other Salafists in Toronto and London in July and August 2001. The individual from Karachi who had ordered the processor pled guilty to a check kiting scheme that raised the funds used to purchase the processor. The purchaser, Syed Athar Abbas from California and then New Jersey, used the name Arthur Abbas in making the purchase. The front company was Computers Dot Com, a computer peripherals wholesaling firm, owned by Abbas. A Syed Athar Abbas (with records showing a different age and a different social security number) had a computer peripherals wholesaling firm named Mixun Solutions, also based in Karachi. Mixun Solutions went defunct after the New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was arrested. According to the database PACER, he had initially been denied bail because he turned in two expired passports but failed to turn in the third. The New Jersey Syed Athar Abbas was given back his passport after serving a 15 month sentence. Karachi was where KSM and As Sahab was located. KSM settled his family in Karachi in 1998. In April 2001, al Hawsawi, whose laptop contained the anthrax spraydrying documents, traveled to Dubai from Karachi at the direct of Qaeda's Media Committee. Between September 11 and September 21, 2001, KSM and others at the guesthouse in Karachi, Pakistan recorded many news stories of the 9//11 attacks for future use in As Sahab films. In “connecting the dots” one also would want to consider whether any supporter of the militants had access to the know-how of this encapsulation technique or the drying technique proposed by Dr. Popov. I’ve posed the question whether Ali Al-Timimi had access to such know-how. A supporter of the Taliban who was working with Bin Laden’s spiritual mentor, Al-Timimi was a Salafist imam sentenced to life plus 70 years for sedition and exhorting some young men to go abroad and defend their faith. We might also consider, however, whether any supporter of the militants has expertise in such polymerization or encapsulation relating to drug delivery, such as biochemist Magdy al-Nashar. He studied in North Carolina in 2000. His webpage at Leeds explained he was expert in functional polymers used in the delivery of drugs. He was represented by an attorney in Cairo who has been alleged as Ayman Zawahiri's conduit to jihadists in Egypt and Iraq and elsewhere. Al-Nashar had the keys to the apartment used to make the London subway bombs and to store materials shipped to al-Zawahiri's chief aide al-Hadi. Ali Al-Timimi was a graduate computational biology student at George Mason University, where famed Russian bioweaponeer and former USAMRIID Deputy Commander and Charles Bailey on March 14, 2001 filed a patent involving the use of hydrophobic silica in permitting greater concentration of biological agents. There is a related, more sophisticated, patent based on Dr. Alibek's know-how published later (after the mailings). The First Floor intermingled the Center for Biodefense/Hadron and the GMU/ATCC computational sciences people. Here, the government even allowed the method to be commercialized and be published in the public domain for use in a broad range of possible commercial applications. Perhaps the United States biodefense establishment should not let officials commercialize and disclose such dual use technology, whether the patent is assigned to a DARPA-funded program or not -- and whether deemed "biofriendly" or not. (The patent, which is not classified, has been assigned to George Mason University). FBI Director Mueller this Fall cautioned universities to guard against access to pre-patent, pre-classification biochemistry information. GMU microbiology grad Al-Timimi, who was working with and had been taught by Bin Laden's sheik, did mathematical support work for the Navy that required a high security clearance while working for a Beltway contractor SRA. What did his work for the Navy involve? Dr. Bailey, the former deputy USAMRIID Commander who served as co-Director of the GMU Center for Biodefense, was also at SRA in 1999. He and Dr. Alibek served as consultants to Battelle in 1999. Al-Timimi had a high security clearance for some of his work for the government. Why? When? The lead Amerithrax scientist, a Battelle employee James Buran, had been head of the Navy's biological defense effort. Has the FBI's December 30, 2001 assessment of what "a person capable of producing the anthrax found in the letters mailed would require" stood the test of time and later forensic investigation? When pressed by the interviewer, "Does it nag at you in the back of your mind that possibly you do know [the anthrax processor]?" Dr. Bill Patrick said: "Possibly, possibly, I could have talked to these people. But it would have been within the context of their having a need to know." He explained: " Most of my discussions about the biological problem has been in secure conferences and meetings, and involve people with need to know, with security clearance and what have you. I don't talk about 'how to', I don't get into 'how to' with many people, no people other than the fact that those who really have a need to know."As so well explained by Rutgers professor Richard Ebright, proliferation of know-how serves to proliferate opportunities for access to that know-how. In August 2007, scientists working on the FBI Amerithrax investigation published "Role of Law Enforcement Response and Microbial Forensics in Investigation of Bioterrorism" in the Croat Medical Journal. The choice of the Croat Medical Journal is an interesting coincidence given that a doctor who had worked for Benevolence International Foundation in Zagreb, Croatia at a time BIF was actively seeking WMD, worked at Lenox Hill Hospital in Manhattan where the first inhalational victim, Kathy Nguyen, died. Ms. Nguyen had worked in a stockroom at a related nearby hospital that was a subsidary of Lenox Hill. The doctor was a listed author in Journal of American Medical Association article describing the epidemiological investigation of her case. Two days later after the massive FBI operation (part of OPERATION IMMINENT HORIZON), Lenox Hill Hospital issued a stern warning to the former employee of the Al Qaeda charity front. It is a coincidence such as the FBI's choice of February 26, the date of the WTC 1993, for the search of Ali Al-Timimi's townhouse and search of a couple drying experts related to Al-Timimi's charity and the arrest of one of them as a material witness. In February 2007, under a Consent Order, the former Falls Church, VA resident lost his Virginia medical license for failing to disclose the February 28, 2003 warning. His lawyer also represents IANA, for example, in the lawsuit brought by the estate of former FBI Al Qaeda expert John P. O'Neill. A government investigator explains: "Approximately 45 million Federal eagle 6 3/4" envelopes were manufactured by Wastvaco Corporation (now known as Mead WestVaco Corporation) of Williamsburg, Pennsylvania, between December 6, 2000 and March 2002. These Federal eagle 6 3/4" envelopes were manufactured exclusively for and sold solely by the U.S. Postal Service between January 8, 2001 and June 2002." "[E]nvelopes with printing defects identical to printing defects identified on the envelopes utilized in the anthrax attacks during the fall of 2001 were collected from the Fairfax Main post office in Fairfax, Virginia and the Cumberland and Elkton post offices in Maryland. The Fairfax Main, Cumberland, Maryland, and Elkton, Maryland post offices are supplied by the Dulles Stamp Distribution Office (SDO), located in Dulles, Virginia. The Dulles SDO distributed "federal eagle" envelopes to post offices throughout Maryland and Virginia. Given that the printing defects identified on the envelopes were used in the attacks are transient, thereby being present on only a small population of the federal eagle envelopes produced, and that envelopes with identical printing defects to those identified on the envelopes used in the attacks were recovered from post offices serviced by the Dulles SDA, it is reasonable to conclude that the federal eage envelopes utilized in the attacks were purchased from a post office in Maryland or Virginia." The affidavit in support of the search relating to Dr. Ivins claims that the only lab among the 16 labs in Maryland or Virginia known to have virulent Ames was USAMRIID at Ft. Detrick.
Dr. Philip S. Barie wrote a spirited editorial in the journal Surgical Infections in August 2008 titled "Forensic Microbiology, and the Reinterpretation of History,"
The FBI wined and dined up to 40 scientists from mid-June to mid-July at a beachfront retreat in Naples, Florida. The scientists were paid well and worked 8 hours a day. It is not yet known whether any of those same scientists have had a role in formulating the task and charge of the National Academy of Sciences which was asked by the FBI to provide an independent check on its work. Senator Grassley does not like conflict of interest among scientists supposedly rendering an independent expert opinion. Neither does the media or public. Paul Keim tells the journal Science: "Scientists are committed to publishing all of the research. The goal is to package all of the papers into one journal so that the community can evaluate the quality of the science all in one place."
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Meryl Nass, MD
