“ An Unexpected Enemy ”
At a time when the colonies were engaged in a struggle to win their independence from Great Britain, another battle was being fought against a much more formidable adversary. It was an adversary that struck fear throughout the fledgling Continental Army and government, and one that possessed an even greater potential to deny the colonists their goal of freedom. To John Adams, it was “An unexpected Enemy,” which was “ more terrible than British Troops, Indians, or even Tories.” 1 It was a spy that stealthfully infiltrated the Continental Army, revealing itself at the worst possible moments – on the eve of battle, on the cusp of victory and during the march in retreat. It showed no mercy, gave no quarter, took no prisoners. That enemy was smallpox.
To the civilian population, smallpox proved an equally devastating menace, flaring up with little or no warning, causing panic and disrupting the rhythm of everyday life. After the death of their daughter to smallpox, Ester Reed, wife of Joseph Reed, secretary to George Washington, wrote in her diary:
I cannot help reflecting on my neglect of my dear lost child. For, thoughtful and attentive to my own situation, I did not take the necessary precaution to prevent that fatal disorder when it was in my power. Surely I ought to blame myself.2
However, smallpox, “that fatal disorder” that took her daughter and left Reed guilt ridden for years, was a double-headed hydra. Along with the danger the disease posed to civilian and solider alike, came an equal danger from the only known means at the time for preventing theinfection: inoculation.
Much like smallpox, inoculation posed a threat to the Patriot cause, but in a less obvious way. While everyone shared the possibility of contracting smallpox, not everyone shared the possibility of being inoculated. Herein was the inherent danger of the procedure. To incur the expense and endure the pains of inoculation was to cheat the virus of a victim. Many gladly did so, but others only hoped for that opportunity. When the wealthy of Boston traveled to Philadelphia to be inoculated and when the common soldier disobeyed orders and inoculated himself, equality among colonist was strained, the cohesiveness of the army challenged and fissures in the Patriot cause exposed. But were these fissures strong enough to be a threat to the Revolution? To what extent did innoculation contribute to the fragility of an already fragile cause? By examining the experiences that common soldiers, generals, poor and elite had with inoculation, we are able to gain insight into their attitudes and loyalties toward the Patriot cause and determine whether or not inoculation posed a real threat to the success of Revolution.
Innoculation, the Process
From its initial use in the colonies in 1721 until the introduction of vaccination in 1796, inoculation sparked some degree of fear and controversy almost every where it was used. Unlike vaccination for smallpox, which introduces the harmless cowpox virus into an individual’s blood stream in order to initiate an immune response, inoculation introduced residue of the actual smallpox virus into an uninfected individual. Smallpox was highly contagious, usually communicated from person to person through a cough, sneeze, or from dried bodily secretions, such as smallpox scabs that became airborne and inhaled.
John Adams
But by taking puss or scab residue from an infected person and placing this material into an incision made in the arm, hand or leg of a uninfected person, a milder, less lethal case of smallpox resulted. The procedure was less risky to the subject being inoculated than contracting the disease in the “natural way” through the respiratory tract. To people around the subject, and to the community at large, however, inoculation posed considerable risk. Herein lies much of the controversy surrounding the procedure. Usually around the twelfth day after inoculation, the subject became contagious and was able to convey the virus to others in its most virulent form. This period of contagion lasted until the final pustule had fallen off, usually a month into the infection. When used cautiously, and under strict quarantine precautions, inoculation could be beneficial, but if abused or used indiscriminately, the procedure caused more harm than good; something not always appreciated or understood at the time.3
1John Adams to Samuel Cooper, June 9, 1776, in Papers of John Adams, ed. Robert Taylor, vol. 4 (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1979), 243.
2J. Thomas and Thompson Westcott Scharf, quoted in History of Philadelphia: 1609-1884 (Philadelphia, PA: L.H. Everts and Co., 1884), 1689-90.
3Elizabeth A. Fenn, “ Biological Warfare in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffery Amherst,” The Journal of American History 86, no. 4 (March 2000):1553,1580.
