• Home Page III
• Vietnam "Nam Tien" or the Southern Imperial March of Vietnam against Champa and Cambodia.
• By mid-19th century, Champa had totally disappeared from the map of the world. The majority of the remnant of its population is now residents in Cambodia.
• The Southern part of Cambodia known as "Kampuchea Krom" came under Vietnam's total control by the mid-19th century.
• Now Cambodia itself is under Vietnamese virulent attack through the invisible but deadly continuous stream of illegal immigrants with the full support of the Hun Sen puppet regime that is totally subservient to Vietnam .

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The Imperial March of Vietnam or Nam Tien

(From the "Horse's Mouth"

as Perceived and Explained by a Vietnamese Scholar)

The expansion has taken this determined direction, because in the North and in the west there are insurmountable natural and political obstacles, whereas the south provided plentiful of sparely populated and welcoming low land available to the rice farmers. The conditions were ripe for the penetration for the Vietnamese monarchy to abandon its policy of "Confucian persuasion" based only on the prestige of the "royal virtue" and to replace it by an act purely imperialistic, by imposing its administrative and cultural framework to the regions newly acquired, in order to better integrate them in the Vietnamese space." (Please, also see map of "Nam Tien", just below this excerpt)

Source: Nguyen The Anh; Le Nam tien dans les textes Vietnamiens; in P.B. Lafont; Les frontieres du Vietnam; Edition l’Harmattan, Paris 1989

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Will Cambodia suffer the same fate as Champa did in the hands of the Vietnamese genocidal imperialism?

(See Vietnamization Process of Champa posted below)

• It is up to all freedom-loving Cambodians to organize themselves to fight for their survival as a free and independent society and culture.

A History of Champa:

The kingdom of Champa (or Lin-yi in Chinese records) controlled what is now south and central Vietnam from approximately 192 through 1697. The empire began to decline in the late 15th century, became a Vietnamese vassal state in 1697, and was finally dissolved in 1832.

Writing Champa's history was dominated, until the end of the Twentieth Century, by the Chinese and Vietname annals. This imposed a unitary view on Cham history which is not supported by epigraphical, geographical, or archaeological records. Recently, a revised Champa historiography has emerged. The newer histories describe a string of Cham territories with central authority moving between different regions and at times not existing at all. You may click on any heading of the "contents" to learn more about the history of Champa.

The Vietnamization Process of Champa

In 1694, Nguyen Phuc Chu made Po Saktiraydaputih the native king (phien vuong) of Thuan Thanh Tran, and the latter was obliged to pay tribute to the Nguyen. Thus the tributary relationship was resumed. Nguyen Phuc Chu also returned the royal seal of Champa together with captured weapons, horses, and population. Thirty Vietnamese soldiers or Kinh Binh (soldiers of the Imperial City) were sent to protect the new Cham ruler.[11] At this point the kingdom of Champa no longer existed as an independent entity, but had been integrated into the Nguyen domains. The Cham people continued to live in small pockets from the region of Quang Nam down to the Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri region, where the seat of the Cham court under Po Saktiraydaputih was situated. The ruler’s palace was situated at Bal Chanar, not far from Phan Ri.[12]

Even though the Chams continued to refer to their kingdom in the Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri region as Panduranga, it was actually occupied territory. Vietnamese-Cham relations after 1697 under Nguyen Phuc Chu were based on central-regional relations; the role of the Cham ruler was more of a cultural and economic leader than a political one. But it was probably due to such a relationship that the Cham people were able to co-exist with the Vietnamese during the southward expansion of the Nguyen up to the early nineteenth century.

The Nguyen-Champa tributary relationship provides an insight into the attitude of the Nguyen with regard to its new status as a suzerain. On the one hand, the tribute had great economic and practical value to the Nguyen. More significantly, this self-created tributary relationship was a manifestation of the Nguyen’s achievement of an independent state ruling over its newly acquired tributary state, Champa. The Nguyen court was now the center of a system of tributary states made up of weaker states and uplanders.

However, the relationship between Po Saktiraydaputih and Nguyen Phuc Chu did not prevent friction from taking place in day-to-day affairs between the Cham people and Vietnamese settlers. Chams were also dissatisfied with the Vietnamese administration of the newly created Binh Khanh prefecture, whose jurisdiction covered the Cham territories in the Pho Hai-Phan Rang-Phan Ri (Panduranga) region. Such friction involved the jurisdiction of law enforcement, trade, trade taxes, slaves and labor contracts, and administrative boundaries.[13] The Chams were at a disadvantage when dealing with the Vietnamese in these matters.

An agreement made in 1712 between Nguyen Phuc Chu and Po Saktiraydaputih included five provisions to regulate or govern Vietnamese-Cham relations in Binh Khang. Nguyen records mentioned that the agreement was made at the request of Po Saktiraydaputih and that Nguyen Phuc Chu “granted” a list of rules (not an agreement).[14] It is difficult to ascertain if Po Saktiraydaputih really requested such an agreement, but clearly it was important in safeguarding the interests of the Chams, even though some of the articles were biased against them:

1. Anyone who petitioned at the Royal palace (of Po Saktiraydaputih) has to pay 20 string of cash (quan) to each of the Left-Right Tra (court official), and 10 string of cash to each of the Left-Right Phan Dung; Whereas those who petitioned at Dinh Binh Khanh have to pay 10 string of cash to the Left-Right Tra, and 2 string of cash to each of the Left-Right Phan Dung.

2. All disputes among Han people (Vietnamese) or between Vietnamese and a resident of Thuan Thanh shall be judged by the Phien Vuong (Cham King) together with a Cai ba (treasurer) and a Ky Luc (judicial official) (both Vietnamese officials); Disputes among the people of Thuan Thanh shall be judged by the Cham King.

3. The two stations of Kien-kien and O-cam shall be defended more carefully against spies. The authorities shall have no power to arrest residents of the two stations.

4. All traders who wish to enter the land of the registered barbarians (Man de) must obtain a pass from the various relevant stations.

5. All Chams from Thuan Thanh who drifted to Phien Tran (borders with Cambodia) must be well treated.

From the agreement it is apparent that the Cham territories were well penetrated by Vietnamese settlers and that there was no distinctive demarcation between a Cham and a Vietnamese area in the Binh Khang Garrison (Thuan Thanh area). The terms of the agreement also suggest that the Nguyen had conceded a great deal of administrative authority to their sponsored Cham king. However, the great influx of foreign culture and people inevitably forced the Chams to accept the presence of the Viet people and adopt some of their ways, including wearing Vietnamese costumes and using the Vietnamese language.

Source: Wikipedia

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A Memorandum on a Meeting with Kem Sokha in Olney (MD), on his recent choice of Pen Sovann as a senior member of his HRP party and its implications for the future of Cambodia. 

August 22, 2007

To: Friends 

From: Naranhkiri Tith

Subject: Meeting with Kem Sokha and Keo Remi, on 08/21/07

Last night, a meeting was held at Schanley Kuch’s home, in Olney, Maryland, to host Kem Sokha and to discuss the recent events in Cambodia, especially Kem Sokha inclusion of Pen Sovann in his HRP party. Other people were present in the meeting namely; Mr. Keo Remi, an associate of Kem Sokha, Mr. and Mrs. Kim Tuy, Mr. and Kem Vanthan, Kem Sokha’s daughter, another gentleman from the region, and Mr. Schanley Kuch and his spouse, the very hospitable hosts of that reception. The meeting was kept small purposefully by the Schanley, so that we could have more time to exchange ideas. And it was a good decision from Schanley.

Those in the meeting were unanimous in the opinion that the choice of Pen Sovann could have negative on the future of Cambodia. Pen Sovann is not anybody. He was hand-picked by the Vietnamese to be their first puppet in Cambodia after their invasion. More importantly, Pen Sovann continues to claim that Vietnam did not invade Cambodia. This claim would vindicate Vietnam’s claim that they did not invade Cambodia but liberated it.

Kme Sokha, by accepting Pen Sovann to be one of the most senior members in his party, has indirectly endorsed this theme advanced by Vietnam and its supporters that they liberated Cambodia. But, more deadly for Cambodia is the fact that Kem Sokha’s acceptance of Pen Sovann in his party has another deadly consequence. And that consequence is the fact that by accepting Pen Sovann Kem Sokha has endorsed that Vietnam fabricated and distorted assumption that Cambodia represents a permanent threat to Vietnam. Therefore Vietnam has the right to keep Cambodia under its control, and if need be, it has the right to intervene including invading Cambodia, when it deems unilaterally the latter country presents a threat (imaginary and non verifiable) to Vietnam’s security.

Kem Sokha’s response to our argument that he was wrong to allow Pen Sovann to be included in his party as a senior member, was t say the least not very genuine or even very immoral. He said that his party needs as many supporters as possible, therefore he does not see why he should not include Pen Sovann. He added that if Pen Sovann did not behave properly, he just let him go.

Kem Sokha by saying what he said had revealed a lot about himself. First and foremost, his argument that he will let Pen Sovann go should this fellow does not behave according to the party’s wish is totally unacceptable and also shows that Kem Sokha is not a very good thinker and is very expedient. We agreed that not all CPP members or Khmer rouge members are bad. They were caught in the situation not to their doing. But, we told Kem Sokha that Pen Sovann is not a comment person of the CPP, he was had-picked by the Vietnamese to be their surrogate in Phnom Penh. Only when Pen Sovann became more ambitious for personal reason and not for national benefit, asked for more power did the Vietnamese remove him prom power. But, until now Pen Sovann still claims that Vietnam did liberate Cambodia. We asked Kem Sokha whether he had confronted pen Sovann on this important stand of Pen Sovann which disastrous consequences on Cambodian’s destiny. His answer was NO.

From this meeting, I came home with such disappointment and hopelessness about the future of Cambodia. Cambodia cannot produce decent leaders at its present political and social environment, which is based on what Theary Seng had described as the mentality of the ‘Lesser Evil,’ that is Cambodians seem to be able to choose their leaders, not among the best, but among the worst. By choosing Pen Sovann, Kem Sokha had provided a perfect example of this kind of deadly mentality adopted by Cambodian leaders, in past and present day Cambodia.

I hope I am all wrong in assessment of this behavior of Kem Sokha. If I am right then Cambodia’s future is very bleak indeed. I hope that I am totally wrong in my analysis of Kem Sokha’s behavior and its potential disaster for the Cambodian people. Last but not least, I did not say that Kem Sokha is a bad person. All I am saying is that he lacks firm moral grounding, analytical ability, and good judgment. And, that is not what we all should expect from those who proclaim to be leaders of our country of birth. Cambodia.  

Naranhkiri Tith, Ph.D.

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Did Vietnam Liberate or invade Cambodia?

Two important testimonies from a book by a staff member of the Library of the Congress, and Bui tin, a former colonel of the Vietnamese army

(Comments: Here are some documents on the reasons behind Vietnam invasion of Cambodia. These information and testimonies from the 'horse's mouth' on Pen Sovann, and the true motivations why Vietnam invaded Cambodia will allow you to see the true nature of Vietnam intentions in Cambodia which are not liberating but invading Cambodia, contrary to what Pen Sovann had strongly maintained until today.

Please, distribute this email to as many Cambodians as possible so that they can see why it is bad for Kem Sokha to have chosen a person like Pen Sovann to be a senior member of HRP. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington DC. August 21, 2007)

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Motives Behind the Vietnamese Occupation

Cambodia: A Nation in Turmoil; by Marc Leepson,

(Editorial Research Reports: Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C. April 5, 1985)

Western analysts disagree about the exact reasons behind Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia and its goals in that country. But there is near unanimous agreement in the West that the reasons put forward by Vietnam are, in the words of former U.S. Representative to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "a transparent deception." 3 Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in an interview published last year in Newsweek magazine, said his government "could not stand by in good conscience and watch the Pol Pot clique butcher millions of innocent Kampucheans in cold blood."4 The evidence shows, however, that Vietnam knew of the Khmer Rouge terror for years prior to the invasion. "Hanoi showed not the slightest concern for the fate of the Cambodian people while most of the killing was actually going on," Morris said. "On the contrary, Vietnamese Communist Party and government statements were lush in their praise of Pol Pot and his regime." 5  

Some believe that Vietnam invaded Cambodia because it felt threatened by an aggressive and unfriendly Khmer Rouge government, which launched raids into Vietnam late in 1978. "The first thing that drives the Vietnamese is their own security concerns," said Linda Hiebert, co-director of the Center for International Policy's Indochina Project.6 "They would like to see a very close relationship between the three countries of Indochina [Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam! because that will maintain security on many levels - military, economic, et cetera." Arnold Isaacs, author of Without Honor: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (1983), agreed. "What is uppermost m the Vietnamese minds is their own security," said Isaacs, who was a war correspondent for the Baltimore Sun in Indochina in 1972-75 "They feel they should be the dominant power in the region and ... the governments of Laos and Cambodia should be friendly and not a threat...."  

There may be another factor behind the invasion: Vietnam's desire to rid Cambodia of a government that was closely aligned with Vietnam's longtime enemy, China. "The major national security concerns of Vietnam's present leadership are to successfully weather Chinese pressures and to consolidate all the nations of Indochina into an alliance structure, said Southeast Asia expert Carlyle A. Thayer.7 Stanley Karnow, a journal 1st and former Vietnam war correspondent, agreed with that assessment. The "real reason" behind the invasion, Karnow wrote in Vietnam: A History, was Vietnam's "concern that Pol Pot's forces, underwritten by China, intended to embark on a campaign to annex the Mekong Delta and other parts of Vietnam that had formally belonged to the Cambodian empire; 'When we look at Cambodia,' a Vietnamese official in Hanoi told me, 'we see China, China, China.'"8

Some analysts dismiss this argument. Despite centuries of antagonism between the two countries, they note, China was a strong supporter of Vietnam in its wars against France, the United States and South Vietnam. "Without the Chinese the Vietnamese probably couldn't have 'won' the war against the United States," one expert who asked not to be identified told Editorial Research Reports. "That nullifies allegations that the Chinese represent a threat to the Vietnamese." China stopped sending military aid to the Vietnamese communists when they defeated South Vietnam in 1975, but continued to support Vietnam economically until June 1978 when Vietnam joined COMECON, the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual economic Assistance. 

Colonization Debate; Question of Thailand 

There is some evidence that Vietnam's long-range goal is to colonize Cambodia ‹ to subjugate the Khmer people. Journalist Jack Wheeler, who visited Thailand and Cambodian in July 1964, said that some 700,000 Vietnamese farmers, fishermen, merchants, technicians, mechanics and others have been brought into Cambodia as settlers since the 1978 invasion. The settlers, Wheeler said, have "appropriated much of the best land" and gained control over commercial fishing operations in the Tonle Sap (the Great Lake), a large and bountiful fishing ground in the center of the country.¹¹ A significant number of jobs in urban areas have been taken by Vietnamese settlers, many of whom do not speak the Khmer language. "At least half the people in Phnom Penh who do mechanical work and the trades ... are Vietnamese," a Cambodian analyst told Editorial Research Reports. "The Vietnamese have taught Cambodians the Vietnamese language. So colonization is real, no question about that...."

Vietnam claims that the settlers are former Vietnamese residents of Cambodia who fled that nation during the period of anti-Vietnamese sentiment in the 1960s and 1970s. But that appears to tell only part of the story. The settlers include "what they call 'Old Vietnamese' ‹ people who lived there before the Pol Pot era ...," said Linda Hiebert. But there also are "New Vietnamese," who have not previously lived in Cambodia. "These people are young ‹ often draft resistors from Ho Chi Minh City [formerly Saigon] ‹ or people who simply find it much easier to make a living being small entrepreneurs inside Cambodia," Hiebert said. "There are apparently more restrictions on that kind of activity in Vietnam than in Cambodia." Hiebert, who visited Vietnam and Cambodia in 1984, does not believe that Vietnam is out to colonize Cambodia.

Vietnam's long-term goals also might involve Thailand, a staunch U.S. ally that basically has escaped the last four decades of war and turmoil in neighboring Indochina. Some believe that if conditions were ripe ‹ if Thailand were politically and socially unstable, for example, or if Thai communist rebels gained popular support ‹ then Vietnam might move against Thailand. "I don't think [Vietnam] has an imminent intention of invading Thailand," said Rep. Stephen J. Solarz, D-N.Y., chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. "But I would not preclude the possibility that if [the Vietnamese] could consolidate their position in Cambodia, they would then attempt to support communist revolutionary forces in Thailand, particularly in the provinces adjacent to Laos that might, with assistance, have a better prospect of succeeding."

Morris believes that Vietnamese nationalism is traditionally expansionist and that "communist revolutionary values" shape Vietnam's foreign policy. Still, he said, it is unlikely the Vietnamese would try to take Thai territory because "the Vietnamese army, occupying Laos as well as Cambodia, and pinned down by China to the north, cannot escalate much further."¹² Then, too, Thailand has a security treaty with the United States. Any large-scale Vietnamese movement into Thailand risks war with this country, as well as with China, which has said it would fight to stop Vietnamese expansion outside Indochina.

Finally, there are historic factors that buttress the argument that Vietnam has no interest in expanding its influence beyond Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam's domination of Cambodia and Laos, Allan Goodman said, "is much more consistent historically with what the Vietnamese have seen as their patrimony and their sphere of influence, and is not an 'opening wedge' in an effort to export their revolution throughout Southeast Asia. They own Indochina and they want to make sure they do."

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3 Statement before the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 30, 1984. Kirkpatrick resigned her post effective March 31.                                         

4 Quoted in Newsweek, May 14, 1984, p. 40.

5 Morris, op. cit., p. 76.

6 The Washington-based Center for International Policy is a non-profit education and research organization concerned with US policy in the Third World

7 Carlyle A. Thayer, ³Vietnamese Perspective in International Security² (1984) p.72

8 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (1983), p. 45.

9 Morris, op. cit., p. 77.

10 China which supplied the Khmer Rouge rebels with much of their military needs, has warned that the latest Vietnamese offensive in Cambodia could bring about a second  ³Chinese lesson," but many Western analysts are skeptical that this will take place

11  Jack Wheeler, "The Khmer in Cambodia," Reason, February 1985, p. 28.

12  Morris, op.cit., p. 82

Source: Cambodia: A Nation in Turmoil; by Marc Leepson, (Editorial Research Reports: Congressional Quarterly Inc., Washington, D.C. April 5, 1985)

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Following Ho Chi Minh: Memoirs of a Vietnamese Colonel; by Bui Tin

(Comments; Bui Tin, whom I met several times here in Washington DC, was a colonel in the North Vietnamese army. He came in with the invading Vietnamese forces in December 25, 1978 and stayed in Cambodia for three years. Then in the early 1990, he defected to the West and now resides in Paris. He was the Deputy Editor for the Vietnamese Communist party newspaper "Nan Dhan.' Interestingly enough, he said that one of the reason for his defection was his opposition to Vietnam occupation of Cambodia. He said that had Vietnam turned Cambodia to the United Nations after the invasion, then it would have been politiand correct for Vietnam to have invaded Cambodia.

Here is what Bui Tin had to say about Pen Sovann and other Khmer Viet Minh who were under Vietnamese control. Naranhkiri Tith Ph.D. Washington  DC. August 21, 2007) 

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'After the liberation of Cambodia, the isease of subjective arrogance took over again. Within the Party, it was explained that we were carrying out our international proletarian duty in strengthening the Revolution and expanding it to other countries. But, among the people it was regarded as the equivalent of inviting oneself into a house belonging to somebody else.

The person primarily responsible for our policy towards Cambodia was Le Duc Tho. He had been assigned  by the Politburo to oversee in liberation and the construction of its new Party and state apparatus.  Even before our forces reached Phnom Penh, he presided over a meeting held near Snuol in what is known as the Fish Hook area of the border to set up a Cambodian government to replace that by Pol Pot. Among those he chose was Pen Sovan who became Minister of Defence and was later emerged as General Secretary of the Cambodian Communist Party. His appointment came a little surprise to many Cambodians because for several decades he had been a broadcaster with the Voice of Vietnam as head of the Khmer language service. Then there was Chan Si who was also a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Le Duc Tho usually lived in a villa behind Chamcar Mon, the royal place on the bank of the Mekong in Phnom Penh, and often convened meetings of key cadres including the Cambodian Party General Secretary, the Prime Minister and his cabinet. I once saw him talk to a group of Cambodian leaders at the palace during 1981 and again in Thau Duc at the beginning of 1982. Had I not been personally present, I would never have believed such scenes were possible. They all quivered with fear when Le Duc Tho scolded them very outspokenly as if they were naughty children. I just sat and listened to the speech, hoping that the interpreter was mistranslating and softening its meaning, otherwise it would have been appalling for the audience.

The removal of Pen Sovan from his position as Party General Secretary and Minister of Defence in 1981, was also the work of Le Duc Tho. Tho acting together with general Le Duc Anh. On their recommendation, the Politburo in Hanoi accepted an 'appeal' from several members of the Cambodian Communist Party. The Cambodian People had nothing to do with the rise and fall of Pen Sovan.'

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INDIGENOUS ISSUES

Written statement* submitted by the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA), a non-governmental organization in special consultative status The Secretary-General has received the following written statement which is circulated in accordance with Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31. [10 February 2005]

* This written statement is issued, unedited, in the language(s) received from the submitting non-governmental organization(s).

SITUATION OF KHMER KROM PEOPLES IN VIETNAM

1. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUMASIA), a non-governmental organisation in special consultative status, in cooperation with the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) and the Khmers Kampuchea-Krom Federation, wish to draw the attention of the 61st Commission on Human Rights on the situation of Khmer Krom Peoples in Vietnam.

2. While the human rights situation in Viet Nam has been raised at the UN Commission on Human Rights, very little is known about the oppression of the indigenous Khmer Krom people in this country who lived in the former Cochin China, now in the southern part of present-day Viet Nam.

3. The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) while considering Viet Nam’s second Periodic Report, requested the country "to provide information on minorities in Viet Nam, including the Khmer Krom community."

4. The assurances provided, in Viet Nam’s response to the HRC dated 23 April, 2002, contrast sharply with the actual reality of Khmer Krom situation.

Having endured immense human rights violations, subjected to ethnic, religious, and cultural discrimination and grievous oppression, they remain too terrorized to speak out about their sufferings to the world. Efforts to use domestic remedies have resulted in increased repression and retaliation, as indicated in the report, Vietnam: The Silencing of Dissent, by Human Rights Watch of 1 May 2000.

5. Gross and systematic human rights violations have been inflicted upon the Khmer Krom people by Vietnamese authorities. This has been the strategy of Viet Nam after it occupied Khmer Krom homeland. In this strategy countless Khmer Krom leaders have faced summary executions. Others faced involuntary disappearance or remain incarcerated for life. In terms of prison atrocities, unknown substances to impair a Khmer Krom individual’s brain functions were applied with detainees then being released mentally immobilised.

6. The Khmer Krom people are farmers and as such securing their land rights becomes a crucial issue. Unfortunately, their lands have been confiscated by the Vietnamese authorities to build roads and irrigation systems or handed over to Vietnamese farmers. No compensation has been provided to the Khmer Krom people. On the contrary, if they wish to use the water from the irrigation facilities, they must pay for it.

7. Around 95 percent of the Khmers-Krom people practice Hinayanna Buddhism, whereas most Vietnamese practice Mahayanna. On this issue, Viet Nam continues to violate the rights of Hinayana Buddhists. The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief, in his report to the fifty-fifth session of the UNCHR said: "The Special Rapporteur went to the place where a private meeting was to take place with representatives of the Khmers Krom, but the people he interviewed were unable to communicate any information whatsoever. After the visit, non-governmental sources indicated that the Khmers Krom representatives' failure to make statements had apparently been due to pressure from the security services."

8. Similarly, HRC Concluding Observations of 26 July 2002 noted that Viet Nam had provided insufficient information for the Committee "to have a clear view of the situation in Viet Nam with regard to religious freedom. In the light of information available to the Committee that certain religious practices are repressed or strongly discouraged in Viet Nam, the Committee is seriously concerned that the State party's practice in this respect does not meet the requirements of Article 18 of the Covenant. The Committee is deeply concerned by allegations of harassment and detention of religious leaders and regrets that the delegation failed to provide information relating to such allegations. In this context, the Committee is concerned at the restrictions placed on outside observers who wished to investigate the allegations."

9. The Viet Nam’’s Ordinance of the Standing Committee of the National Assembly regarding religious belief and religious organizations of 18 June, 2004 assures a degree of religious freedom. However, in practice temples have been used as prisons. Authorities dictate how Buddhism should be practiced with police stationed at Buddhist to enforce the government’s policies. Land owned by Buddhist temples has been seized to provide housing for Vietnamese settlers. The imposition of restrictions on the importation of Pitakas (Buddhist religious texts) from Cambodia for use by the Khmer Krom people remains a serious concern. Similarly forcing Khmer Krom monks to join the Vietnamese army is creating a vacuum in the Khmer Krom’s Buddhist clergy strength to serve the religious needs of the Khmer Krom people.

10. In terms of economic, social and cultural rights, there are no health care facilities, no doctors or health workers, no prenatal care for expectant mothers, no vaccinations for children. As a result infant mortality rate is high. One of the major health crisis, faced by thousands of Khmer Krom people is blindness of undetermined origin in one or both eyes, for which no treatment is available.

11. Clinics and hospitals in the urban areas generally refuse to treat Khmer Krom people because they cannot pay medical bills. Since 2003, the epidemic of blindness has spread throughout Kleang Provinces. Viet Nam, however, has failed to address the problem by making no serious effort to find the causes and remedies.

12. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in its Summary Record of the 848th Meeting of 22 January 2003, acknowledged that children in remote areas of Viet Nam had less access to social services than children in urban settings. This applies generally to Khmer Krom children. Deficiencies in education for the Khmers Krom children relate closely to religious-cultural discrimination and socio-economic marginalisation. Instead of promoting the tradition and culture of Khmer Krom people as an integral part of educating Khmer Krom children; Viet Nam has looked upon the Khmer Krom language, culture, and tradition with consistent disdain. As such, there is no center for Khmer Krom studies or library in the Khmer language anywhere in Viet Nam. Teaching of the Khmer language in public school is inadequate. The Khmer Krom Buddhist clergy are forced to study new books and materials that are devoid of their cultural values.

13. The Vietnamese population generally enjoy far better educational opportunities and programs than the Khmer Krom people. In a Khmer Krom population estimated by some international sources as 8 million (1.3 million, according to the Government of Viet Nam), no one holds a Ph. D. and only 6 individuals hold Masters Degrees. Many Khmer Krom who hold undergraduate degrees remain unemployed.

14. Khmers Krom people are forced to adopt Vietnamese culture, forced to use only the Vietnamese language in official business, forced to subordinate their traditions to the economic interests of the State (as in conducting the traditionally-annual boat-racing festivals more than once a year, so as to provide more tourist-generated income for the government). Social and cultural activities of the Khmer Krom people are controlled and managed by Vietnamese authorities. The Khmer Krom people are denied the right to wear traditional clothing and the right to build cultural museums.

15. Another serious problem faced by the Khmer Krom people is the State-supported settlement of Vietnamese in the Khmer Krom homeland. This brought about grave consequences upon our culture. The Concluding observations Viet Nam of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD),, of 15 August, 2001, included the following expression of concern: "The Committee is further concerned about the alleged population transfer to territories inhabited by indigenous groups, disadvantaging them in the exercise of their social, economic and cultural rights."

16. In conclusion, our organisations calls upon the Government of Viet Nam i. To invite the World Health Organization (WHO) and relevant thematic mandates of the UN Commission on Human Rights, in particular the SpecialRapporteur on the Right to Health and the Special Rapporteur on human rights of indigenous peoples, on official missions, including to the homeland of the Khmer Krom people.

ii. To take effective measures in implementing the recommendations of the following treaties bodies

a. Concluding observations of the Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Vietnam 15/08/2001 especially

i. Paragraph 424: "The Committee recommends that State party strengthen the education of the society in a spirit of respect for human rights and in particular the rights of members of ethnic minorities."

b. Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Vietnam 26/07/2002 especially

i. Paragraph 19 "The State party should take immediate measures to ensure the rights of members of indigenous people communities are respected. Non-governmental organizations and other human rights monitors should be granted access…"

c. Concluding observation of the Committee on Rights of the Child: Vietnam

18/03/2003 especially

i. Paragraph 14 "The Committee recommends that the State party pay particular attention to the full implementation of article 4 of the Convention by prioritizing budgetary allocations to ensure implementation of the economic, social and cultural rights of children, in particular those belonging to economically disadvantaged groups and living in rural or mountainous areas,…"

18. We call on the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples of the Sub-Commission to take into consideration the plight of Khmer Krom people in their continuous study on lands rights and Indigenous peoples.

19. We call on the Permanent Forum of the Indigenous Peoples to pay attention in their discourse to this highly marginalized Khmer Krom peoples in Vietnam.

SOURCE: WIKIPEDIA