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I. List Of Affirmative Errors of Popular Historians and Writers
Item: In a review in the Washington Post of May 3, 2009, by Ernest B. Ferguson of the book Vicksburg
1863, by Winston Groom, the reviewer refers to General Grant as possessing qualities that enabled him to command
all Union armies and "win the war in the East". The clearly intended implication here is that the entire Civil
War was won by Grant, and that it was done in the Eastern theatre. Neither of those statements is true. The
fact is, as demonstrated, that the Civil War was won certainly politically not in the East but in the West with
the capture of Atlanta, which led directly to Lincoln's ensuing reelection. Arguably the War was won
militarily in the West as well, primarily with the Union's Atlanta campaign victories. (Nods
should of course be given toward the later Nashville and earlier Vicksburg Union victories in the West, along with
the Gettysburg victory in the East, as important contributions to the North's winning, as well.) The salient fact is
that, as we have seen, among these major determinants of the War, Grant was responsible for Vicksburg
only, in the West, which makes the reviewer's intended statement as noted above wholly untrue, no matter how one interprets
it. Since the book under review involved Vicksburg only, the reviewer can be forgiven perhaps for not mentioning General
Thomas, but by gratuitously and unecessarily perpetuating the myth of Grant as Union War hero, he unwittingly and unjustly
does Thomas great harm.
Item: Michael Korda, in his biography of Grant published as part of an "Eminent Lives" series, titled Ulysses
S. Grant, The Unlikely Hero, describes Grant’s entire role in the Chattanooga/Missionary Ridge campaign in one paragraph.
He there states that
- Grant personally broke the siege of the Union’s then beleaguered and outnumbered Army of the Cumberland
by opening up a new supply line (In fact the proposed supply line and plan to open it was created by General Baldy
Smith under Thomas before Grant’s arrival). See Backup Source page, Compendium, Index, Missionary Ridge.
- Grant, "* * * waiting only for Sherman to join him, *** moved to attack Bragg’s supposedly impregnable
positions on Missionary Ridge , and in a brutal uphill frontal attack * * * drove Bragg back and took six thousand Confederate
prisoners. Korda thus credits Grant with what he then describes as a stunning victory. Page 90. (In fact, Grant did
not wait for Sherman, but ordered the attack two weeks before his arrival; Thomas saved Grant from a huge and costly blunder
by maneuvering Grant to withdraw that order. And, as we have seen, the credit for the stunning victory at Missionary Ridge
belongs solely to Thomas, who in fact in the process saved Grant from from his own failed plan and from further serious blunders)
See Backup Source page, Compendium, Index, Missionary Ridge.
Item: In the same book, Korda, at page 157, says of Grant’s Memoirs that they "are factual, precise,
and about as objective as it is possible to be." Page 157. Compare: Source page, Compendium, Index, under Grant (or
Sherman) memoirs, and Castel, referencing Albert Castel’s views thereon at page 23 of the Compendium. As to why
Grant (and Sherman) would write memoirs which are so blatantly wrong and do Thomas such a grave injustice, see, in addition
to the information referenced in the Index to the Compendium regarding the Grant/Sherman-Thomas relationships, the findings
of Alan Nevins and Korda recorded in Source 6 on the Backup Source page (regarding Grant’s vengeful nature due to his
insecurity when confronted with men such as Thomas). Korda’s swallowing of the myth of Grant’s greatness by claiming
superior objectivity in Grant’s Memoirs is unforgivable historical writing in view of clear conflicting facts of record
cited with favor in his own book, as noted above.
Item: William Kristol, in an article in the Washington Post's Outlook Section for July 15, 2007, entitled "Why
Bush Will Be A Winner", says that one reason is that Bush has finally found his General Grant. If that is the case,
we are done in for sure, as Grant's record includes more mistakes and ourright blunders than accomplishments, and it would
have been disastrous if George Thomas was not there to bail him personally, and his favorite, Sherman, out, time after time. See
the Compendium on the source page. Kristol swallows the myths hook, line and sinker.
Item: The History Channel on April 21, 2007, aired a piece entitled Sherman's March. Nothing new in
what was included. What would have been fresh and interesting, indeed, entertaining, however, are the following facts,
which were omitted. 1. The evidence shows that the idea of the March originated with General Thomas, not
Sherman. 2. Sherman commandeered for his March Thomas's elite 14th Army Corps and key military
specialists from Thomas's Army, such as his pontoon engineers. 3. Sherman left Thomas with the responsibility
of defending the Union's entire underbelly (the Ohio Valley) against Hood's still viable Western Confederate Army with
the remnants, a circumstance that placed Lincoln and especially Grant in supreme agony during the March. 4. When,
as reported, Sherman presented Lincoln with Savannah as a Christmas present, Lincoln's response praised not only
Sherman and his March, but equally, in the same sentence of the same telegram, Thomas's achievement of destroying Hood's
Western army at the battle of Nashville, an achievement all the more remarkable because it was done with an Army rebuilt
from remnants. So the real story, the one that should have been told, was that Sherman's March was achieved only through
the unique efforts and abilities of Thomas, which not only made the March possible, but averted the disaster
in 1864 for the Union in the West that the March seemed likely to engender.
Item: Doris Kearns Goodwin, in Team of Rivals, says Grant's abilities to "plan, execute and win" battles
was "unmatched". Page 529. And later, refers to Grant as the hero of Chattanooga. Page 614. No mention
of Thomas.
Item: George Will, in a column entitled "Interstate Ribbons of Progress" states that the Civil War was won
by General U.S. Grant. Washington Post, July 9, 2006, p. B7.
Item: Ken Burns, in his PBS series, says that Grant arrived on the scene at Missionary Ridge and achieved
the victory. He then quotes Sherman's statement that Missionary Ridge was a great victory--the neatest and cleanest
battle he was ever in, and that Grant deserves the credit of it all. Compendium listed on the Backup Source Page
as Source # 1 p. 21 (hereinafter cited simply as "Compendium"). The facts: Missionary Ridge was among the
greatest military victories ever achieved by American military forces, and arguably the greatest. And the person
who achieved it, who deserved all of the credit, was George Thomas, not Grant, who in fact mismanaged it. Compendium
pp. 5-9.
Item. Ken Burns, in his PBS series, says that Sherman defeated Hood on July 22 in the so-called Battle
of Atlanta. The fact: The actual, real battle of Atlanta occurred two days earlier, at Peachtree Creek, and
it was won solely by Thomas, not Sherman, who was not even aware the battle had been fought. Compendium pp.
11, 21-22. The fall of Atlanta enabled Lincoln to be reelected, which in turn most likely preserved the Union as we
know it. And all thanks go to Thomas, not Sherman.
Item: Bruce Catton, in Grant Takes Command, notes Sherman's remark about Missionary Ridge that "Grant
deserves the credit of it all" and concludes that it is largely justified, while giving no credit to Thomas. Compendium pp.
32-33 The facts: His attempt at justification is a feeble and result reaching affair, at best. Compare
Catton's remarks about Thomas elsewhere where he recongnizes Thomas' abilities and unique contributions and states that perhaps
this is one case where the general verdict of history needs to be upgraded. American Heritage Magazine, The Rock
of Chickamauga, February, 1962. If so, then Catton, in his book, as referenced above, should not have credited Grant
with Thomas' brilliant work at Missionary Ridge, as he did. It seems the popular historians simply can't resist fawning
over Grant and Sherman.
Item: Stephan Oats, in a widely used college textbook, refers to Grant as the one who won the battles around Chattanooga. Compendium
p. 33.
Item: James McPherson in his Pulitzer Prize winning book Battle Cry Of Freedom lists the socalled greatest
generals of the Civil War, with Grant listed as the Union's best. Thomas is not even mentioned. Compendium
pp. 33-34.
Item: Peter Andrews, writing in American Heritage Magazine, said of Grant and the battles of Chattanooga/Missionary
Ridge, that
Grant was hailed as the hero of the West, and properly so. His battle had not gone according to plan. Battles rarely
do. But he had kept his head and altered his tactics to suit changing conditions. When something didn’t work, he tried
something that did. Rock of Chickamauga, March, 1990.
This is puzzling since Andrews in his article generally lauds Thomas for his unique professionalism
and recongnizes that he has been seriously underrated, but his work is typical in the sense that even
in the face of facts to the contrary (he says explicitly that Grant's plan went off the rails almost at once), he fails to
summon the courage in the end to transfer credit from the icons Grant and Sherman to Thomas.
Item: Carl Sandburg tells of Sherman, on leaving Atlanta for the sea, being happily surrounded by "his" elite 14th
Army Corps. Those "cheery and swinging" men, however, comprised the heart of Thomas Army of The Cumberland, and were
taken from Thomas by Sherman for his March, leaving Thomas with bits and pieces to oppose Hood. Compendium
p. 25, n. 10.
II. What the popular historians have
failed to tell
the American public.
Item: They have failed to report that Thomas's Army of the Cumberland is considered by experts to
have been, and was by all accounts, the most modern, professional, best trained, and most effective army among all the
armies of the Civil War, on both sides. Compendium pp. 13-17.
Item: They have failed to report that the Battle of Peachtree Creek on July 20, 1864, won solely by Thomas, without
knowledge or control by Sherman, was the decisive battle for Atlanta, and not the one two days later. Compendium pp.
11, 21-22.
Item: They have failed to tell of Sherman's trememdous blunder on the way to Atlanta in refusing to follow
Thomas plan at Snake Creek Gap, whereas, if Thomas' plan had been adopted, Atlanta would have been captured more than two
months earlier, and the Confederate western army would most likely have been destroyed, which would no doubt have shortened
the War by years, with consequent saving of hundreds of thousands of lives and countless resources. Compendium
p. 10.
Item: They have failed to report Grant's blunder on the way to Atlanta which occurred two weeks before the
battle of Missionary Ridge in ordering a premature attack on the Ridge, an attack that would have been disastrous had
not Thomas got the order rescinded. Compendium pp. 4-5.
Item: They have failed to report Grant's blunder at Missionary Ridge in devising a battle plan which
placed Sherman in charge of the critical assault, and which resulted in failure, until Thomas came to the rescue. Compendium
pp. 5-7
Item: They have failed to report Grant's blunder at Missionary Ridge in ordering Thomas to advance to and
take the rifle pits at the base of the Ridge and hold at that position. Grant's order, if carried out as Grant
intended, held the potential for a military disaster. Compendium pp. 7-8. Instead, Thomas delayed until the
time was ripe and provided the opportunity for his field commanders to go beyond Grant's order, seize the initiative
and achieve a remarkable military victory.
Item: They have failed to report Grant's blunder at Missionary Ridge in directing his main attack against
the Confederate right, instead of the left, as recommended by Thomas. Hooker's advance on the left combined with Thomas'
intentionally delayed advance to the rifle pits followed by his army's timely attack up Missionary Ridge, contrary to
Grant's wishes and intentions, saved the day for Grant. Compendium p. 6-7
Item: They have failed to report that Thomas' quick and decisive actions at Chickamauga after he chose
to fight on alone resulted, when the day was done, in more Confederate casualties then those suffered by the Union forces.
Item: They have failed to report that Thomas' heroic actlons at Chickamauga made up for Rosecrans' failure
to consolidate and gather further intelligence following his capture of Chattanooga. The Union Army came within
a whisker of suffering utter destruction in McLemore's Cove at Chickamauga because of Rosecrans' blunder. The Union
would have avoided running that risk if Thomas' advice to consolidate and gather fresh intelligence had been followed. Compendium
p. 12.
Item: They have failed to report the botched fiasco at the Crater in Petersburg as a failure of Grant's leadership. They
have never held him accountable.
Item: They have failed to report Gant's many blunders prior to the Battle of Nashville when, in a panic, he
issued peremptory but premature orders to Thomas to attack, including his order to attack during an ice storm, and orders
at various times relieving Thomas of command, the latter of which orders were fortuitously circumvented by wiser heads. Compendium
pp.17-21, 29.
Item: They have failed to report Grant's blunder in dismembering Thomas' army after the battle
of Nashville, which, if not done, would have enabled Thomas to send decisive forces East to Virginia for an
attack on Lee's rear, which would have ended the War at an earlier time and in an easier manner. Compendium
p. 30.
Item: They have failed to report that it was Thomas' idea to march an army to the sea after the
fall of Atlanta, not Sherman's. Compendium pp. 28-29.
Item: They have failed to report Sherman's serious error of judgment when he proposed taking his
entire forces to the sea, leaving no one behind to deal with Hood's still intact and dangerous Confederate western army. Compendium
p. 29.
Item: They have failed to refute the slander in both Grant's and Sherman's memoirs and papers that accused
Thomas of being "slow", Compendium pp. 31-32, when they were often recklessly fast, or slow, themselves, in many of which
cases George Thomas was there to save them from disaster.
Item: They have failed to report both Grant's and Sherman's tendencies to make costly, unsound military decisions
for unwworthy personal or political reasons, e.g.,
when at Missionary Ridge Grant stubbornly issued militarily unsound orders for the sole purpose of attempting to salvage
his battle plan and Sherman's part in it, when it was obvious a change of plan was necessary, Compendium pp. 5-6, 21.
when at City Point during the Petersburg campaign Grant told Lincoln that he would not order Sherman up to assist because
to do so would tend to validate his critics point that he and his men were not up to the task themselves, based on past performance, Compendium
p 30, and
when Grant after the battle of Nashville decided to disband and dusburse Thomas' Army of the Cumberland, Compendium
p. 30, for no apparent rational reason than,just to get it out of the picture; and
when at the so-called battle of Atlanta on July 22 Sherman refused to send assistance to his old command,
the Army of the Tennessee when they needed it, for reasons of personal pride and because he and the survivors would feel
better if left to their own devices, Compendium p. 22, and
when Sherman throughout the Atlanta campaign chose his former command for the critical glory roles, rather than
his best Army, the Army of the Cumberland, and its Comander, George Thomas, Compendium pp. 11-12, and
when Grant on leaving to assume overall command in the East, chose his friend Sherman, brother of the influential
Senator from Ohio, to replace him as Departmental Commander in the West, instead of Thomas, the only logical and by far
the better choice. Compendium pp 24-25. .
Item: They have failed to correct or even question the myriad false statements in Grant's and Sherman's
memoirs that, among other things, claimed credit for Thomas's accomplishments, and failed to mention the times Thomas
averted disasters for them which were about to be served up as a result of Grant's and Sheraman's own mistakes. Compendium,
genearally, pp. 23-32.
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