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Imagine that you are a traditional, pious Roman Catholic woman,
and that you are pregnant at a time in your life when you don't want to be.
To whom do you go, and to what resources do you turn for advice? A traditional,
pious Roman Catholic would naturally want to know what the highest official
in her religion would say, and so she would seek out the pronouncements of the
pope. Similarly, she might want the advice of her bishop, her priest, or the
nuns she knows. It would be important to her what her god had revealed on the
subject, and in this case that god would be Yahweh; and some of that revelation
might be found in her religion's holy book, the Bible. She might also be concerned
to know the views of her religion's savior, Jesus. Armed with such information,
she would then make her decision as to what to do or not to do. That is what
we would expect her to do, for that is how "morality" works,
and most of us here would defend to the death her right to freely choose
her own course of action precisely as her conscience dictated.
Now, imagine yourself to be a Protestant woman with an unwanted pregnancy.
What resources would you seek out? Your god would still be Yahweh. The Bible
would still be your holy book, and your religion's savior would still be Jesus.
But, you would not really care what any pope or bishop or priest or nun might
have to say. You would be more interested, perhaps, in what Billy Graham and
your own local minister would advise. Thus prepared, you would make your decision;
and most of us here would support you, even though the criteria you used
were different from those used by the Roman Catholic woman!
Finally, imagine yourself as two other women with unwanted pregnancies:
first, as a traditional, pious Buddhist, Hindu, Zoroastrian or member of
any other religion; and second, as a secular, humanistic agnostic or
atheist. What resources would you seek out? Well, religious women would
seek out the will of their gods-maybe Vishnu or Ahura Mazda; and instead of
Jesus they would turn to their own savior figures, such as the Buddha or Confucius.
Their holy books might be the Bhagavad-Gita or the Upanishads. Their human advisers
might range from an imam (such as the Ayatollah Khomeini) to some minister (such
as Louis Farrakhan). As for agnostic or atheistic women, "none of the above"
would matter to them: no gods, no saviors, no clergy. In all likelihood they
would turn to secular advisers such as philosophers, ethicists, psychiatrists,
or to agencies such as Planned Parenthood. Thus prepared, these last two groups
of women would make their decisions; and we would support their individual rights
to do so even though some or none of the criteria they used would be criteria
that Christians might use. That is how "morality" works: by
the free and informed choice of an individual who, after careful deliberation,
obeys his or her own conscience and acts responsibly.
Now, imagine something very different. Imagine any of the women I have just
described. But this time, instead of them having to decide personally and
privately about their own unwanted pregnancies, imagine that they have now
become the president of the United States or a justice on the Supreme Court
or a Congressperson or a senator or a state governor or a judge...and so on,
such that these women must now decide public social policy for everyone
who lives in America.
Suddenly what were perfectly appropriate criteria for making private, personal
decisions about "morality" seem clearly inappropriate for determining
public, social, "ethical" policy! Remember the fears prior to
John F. Kennedy's election as president? No Protestant wants legislation determined
on the basis of what a pope believes; and no Catholic wants Billy Graham dictating
public policy. You can be sure that none of the Muslims in America want social
policy to be based upon a Jewish interpretation of things, and vice versa! By
now, I'm sure you get the point: "Morality" is one thing.
"Ethics" is something entirely different. "Morality"
has to do with making personal and private decisions about the behavior of single
individuals. "Ethics" has to do with making public and social decisions
about the behavior of all of the members of a society. The criteria
which are appropriate for making moral judgments are not the same criteria
which must be used for making ethical judgments.
This morning, I want to speak to you-not from a "moral," "religious,"
or "legal" perspective, but from an "ethical"
point of view. I want to address, as an "ethical" question, whether
or not abortion should be understood as "murder."
Philosophers rightly insist that the very first thing people ought to do
when discussing any controversial issue is to define the terms being
used, so that they may begin by speaking in neutral language which
does not contain any assumptions or hidden agendas. In order to
avoid the fallacy of "circular reasoning," conclusions
must never be used as the starting points for discussions.
If it is defined neutrally, in medical terms, an "abortion"
must be described as "the intentional termination of a pregnancy."
Nothing more, nothing less. Anything beyond that definition is an assumption
or a conclusion which must be argued for, and which should not
be used as a premise!
Most people are not philosophers or ethicists; and so they do not begin with
definitions. The result, unfortunately, is that their discussion deteriorates
into shouting matches, logic becomes overwhelmed by rhetoric, tempers flare,
and nothing constructive gets accomplished.
In our society, "murder" is something no one condones, everyone
condemns, and all of us want to prevent. Labeling any action "murder"
cannot start a discussion; it can only end debate. If abortion
turns out to be "murder," the debate is over, the case is closed,
and Roe vs. Wade is not only irrelevant, but unacceptable.
But is abortion "murder"? That is a question! The answer
must be argued for, and not merely assumed. Because this is a
public, social policy issue, the criteria for analyzing it cannot be the same
as those used in personal, private morality or in religion or in law. Remember:
the United States is a pluralistic, secular democracy whose citizens practice
many different religions, and observe vastly different personal moralities.
Granted, we are a people of laws; but we also know that, sometimes-as in the
case of slavery-laws are not always ethical.
So, before we assume that abortion is "murder," let us determine
just what criteria any action must meet before it qualifies as "murder,"
and then, let us ask if abortion meets those criteria.
It is my contention that for something to be labeled as "murder"
it must meet at least all of six criteria:
Number one: to be "murder" an
action must involve "killing." Something that was alive
before the act must be dead as a result of the act. Meeting this criterion
alone is insufficient reason to label something a "murder," however,
because we often kill things in situations where no one would ever think of
uttering the term "murder." We kill germs with disinfectants, and
weeds with defoliants. We kill insects and rodents and cows and pigs and never
get charged with murder. We even kill each other in accidents, in war,
in self-defense and no one screams out the dreaded "m"-word.
"Killing" is not the problem: we do it all the time.
Number two: to be "murder" an
action must involve the killing of "life." I mention this
obvious fact in order to get the word "life" into the discussion.
Notice, I did not say, "a life." I did not because the term
"a life" has been misused by many people who have turned it into a
stealth term: a euphemism they have secretly substituted for a
different, much more important term, a term which represents the last, the most
difficult to meet, and yet, the most crucial of all these six criteria.
Number three: to be "murder" an
action must involve the killing of "human" life. When you
kill bacteria by gargling Listerine, you have not committed murder. When butchers
slaughter pigs for hot dogs and cows for steaks, they have not committed murder.
If the life you kill is porcine, bovine, feline, canine, or anything other than
"human," then your action cannot ethically be described as "murder."
Number four: to be "murder" an
action must involve the "intentional" killing of human life.
Imagine two scenarios. In each one you hurriedly back your car out of your driveway.
In one scenario, you fail to notice that your elderly neighbor has just walked
behind your car. In the second scenario you notice that someone you despise
has just walked behind your car. In both scenarios you back your car over the
victim and kill him. In the first case you did so by accident, and in
the second case you did so intentionally. No one would doubt that the
second killing was a "murder"; but, whatever else they might call
it-an accident, a tragedy, a misfortune-no one would label the first scenario
a "murder" precisely because it was not done intentionally.
Number five: to be "murder" an
action must involve the intentional killing of "innocent" human life.
As history shows, intentionally killing human life is not an ethical
problem. We do it all the time, and usually congratulate ourselves on a deed
well done. We do it in wartime. We do it in capital punishment,
and we do it in self-defense. English versions of the Old Testament may
say, "Thou shalt not 'kill,'" but the meaning really is:
thou shalt not "murder," because killings-in war, in capital
punishment, and in self-defense-were long ago recognized as ethically justifiable
forms of killing. The term "murder" was used to refer to
forms of killing which were considered ethically unjustifiable. What
is it about war, capital punishment, and self-defense which justifies killing?
It is the fact that none of the deceased individuals was "innocent":
all had become a "clear and present danger" to the lives and
welfare of others, and as such, each had relinquished whatever "right to
life" he or she had previously possessed.
Number
six: to be "murder" an action must involve the intentional killing
of innocent human life which is a "person."
This is the sine qua non, the absolute key, essential element
of the whole definition. If the innocent human life which is intentionally killed
does not constitute a person, than no "murder" has been committed.
But what is "personhood"? Some ethicists list more than a dozen
criteria for defining "personhood." But I believe there are just three
which are absolutely necessary: they are "consciousness,"
"self-awareness," and "memory."
In order for me to be a person, to be "Robert," it is essential that
I possess the ability to experience "consciousness"-by which I mean
an awareness of my environment. I must also have the ability to recognize the
difference between my environment and myself, which is what I mean by "self-awareness."
Despite temporary lapses into unconsciousness and loss of self-awareness due
to sleep, sedation, and so on, I remain the "person" I am only so
long as I am able to return to consciousness and self-awareness with the memory
of my own past intact.
What is it that gives someone consciousness, self-awareness, and memory? It
is only one thing: a brain. With a mature, fully functioning human
brain, there can be consciousness, self-awareness, memory, and "personhood."
Without a brain, personhood is absent.
Let me offer two examples:
First: imagine that a bank robber intentionally
shoots at the hand of a cashier who is reaching for an alarm button,
and the bullet completely destroys the woman's thumb. Here we have the
intentional killing of innocent human life: he shot at her hand, not at her
head or heart; and it was, after all, not a horse's hoof nor a dog's paw, but
a human hand!
Notice: I once again did not use the term "a life."
Why? Because, while no one can deny that this thumb was innocent human life
which was intentionally killed, the term "a life" is misused
by some in the abortion debate to refer to more than merely living human tissue:
it is, instead, a euphemism for "personhood."
Second: imagine that someone has been mugged,
is brain-dead, but still exists only because of life-support equipment. Then,
at the request of his family, physicians unplug the patient from those machines,
and he dies. The physicians are not arrested. Nor are they charged with murder.
Instead, the state's attorney upgrades the original charge against the man's
attacker from assault to murder. Why? The beating obviously did not kill the
victim's body which was alive until the machines were stopped. What did
the beating kill? It killed the victim's brain-which itself was innocent
human life. Had it been his thumb, his kidney, or his lung that was killed,
no charge of murder would have been contemplated. But the brain is special:
it is the organ of personhood. When someone intentionally kills an innocent
living, mature and fully functioning human brain, he has also killed a person;
and that destruction is what constitutes "murder."
To repeat, here are my six criteria: to be
"murder" an action must involve the intentional killing of
an innocent human life which is a person.
For abortion to be defined as "murder," it must meet all six
of these criteria. Does it?
As for criteria #1 and #2: does abortion involve the killing of life?
The answer is, yes, in 99% of all abortions, the living content of the womb
is killed. However, in some extremely rare, late-term abortions, a viable fetus
emerges; and in all such cases, by law, it is not killed nor allowed to die,
but emergency measures are taken to preserve its life.
As for criterion #3: is the life killed by abortions "human"
life? Again, the answer is, yes, because it is genetically human and
belongs to no other species. However: this is not the same as saying
that "a human life" has been killed, for the term "a life"
refers to "personhood," which is a different matter.
As for criterion #4: is the killing of human life in an abortion done
"intentionally"? Abortion is done intentionally to terminate
a pregnancy. That poses no ethical problems unless criterion #6 is met,
and the fetus turns out to be a "person."
A further implication is raised by abortion opponents. They claim that
the intention to terminate a pregnancy also involves a determined effort to
kill a person. If that were true, that would deserve our ethical condemnation.
Granted that no one can ever really know the intentions which motivate other
individuals' actions, I would nevertheless argue that the burden of proving
such a dastardly charge falls on those who would so impugn the medical profession,
especially in light of the cases in which physicians and nurses have fought
hard to preserve the lives of viable post-abortion fetuses.
As for criterion #5: is the human life killed in abortions "innocent"?
In most cases, the answer is, yes. However, when a pregnancy endangers the life
or emotional welfare of the woman, the fetus can no longer be considered "innocent."
It is irrelevant whether the fetus has "intentionally" endangered
the woman. Viruses, bacteria, rabid dogs, drunk drivers, sportsmen out hunting-none
of these really "intends" to harm or kill anyone, and yet all of us
have the right to try and protect ourselves from them. Even if the fetus
turns out to be a person, the pregnant woman is a person, too, and as
such she retains the inherent right of self-defense against whatever
or whoever attacks her. (Remember: there is no ethical problem with killing
in self-defense.)
Finally, as for criterion #6: is the human life killed in an abortion
a "person"? This is the "ontological question."
It asks: "What kind of being is a fetus?" The answer given
will determine the ethical status of a fetus, and that will determine how it
ought to be treated.
Because "personhood" is an epiphenomenon of the human brain,
it is clear that if there is no fully functional brain, then there is no
personhood.
In the case of a fetus, there simply is no brain present during the first
few weeks of pregnancy, and consequently no personhood. It takes many
weeks for individual cells to become transformed into neurons,
for these neurons to grow and reach out to connect with other neurons, for synapses
to form, and for the central nervous system to develop.
There is a great deal of theoretical debate about when during a pregnancy-if
at all-a fetus achieves personhood. Some child psychologists argue that
personhood does not really develop until months or years after birth,
while some neuropsychologists argue that the most rudimentary elements of "sentience"
and psychological activity may begin sometime around the 26th week-which is
the beginning of the third trimester.
In any case, the prevailing medical opinion is that, at least as far as the
first trimester goes, there simply is not yet sufficient maturation of the developing
brain and nervous system to give the fetus any real ability to achieve consciousness
or self-awareness. The ethical conclusion that follows from this is inescapable:
at least during the first trimester and possibly into the third, a fetus
is simply not a "person;" and therefore an early term
abortion does not constitute "murder."
Now, let's see what's on your minds.
[A dialogue
between the Minister and the Congregation followed.]